Globalization, Islam, and the West: Between Homogenization and Hegemonization

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Let us begin with the challenge of a definition. What is *globalization*? It consists of processes that lead toward global interdependence and the increasing rapidity of exchange across vast distances. The word *globalization* is itself quite new, but the actual processes toward global interdependence and exchange started centuries ago.

Four forces have been major engines of globalization across time: religion, technology, economy, and empire. These have not necessarily acted separately, but often have reinforced each other. For example, the globalization of Christianity started with the conversion of Emperor Constantine I of Rome in 313. The religious conversion of an emperor started the process under which Christianity became the dominant religion not only of Europe but also of many other societies thousands of miles distant from where the religion started. The globalization of Islam began not with converting a ready-made empire, but with building an empire almost from scratch. The Umayyads and Abbasids put together bits of other people's empires (e.g., former Byzantine Egypt and former Zoroastrian Persia) and created a whole new civilization.

Voyages of exploration were another major stage in the process of globalization. Vasco da Gama and Christopher Columbus opened up a

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whole new chapter in the history of globalization. Economy and empire were the major motives. There followed the migration of people symbolized by the Mayflower. The migration of the Pilgrim Fathers was in part a response to religious and economic imperatives. Demographic globalization reached its height in the Americas with the influx of millions of people from other hemispheres. In time, the population of the United States became a microcosm of the population of the world, for it contained immigrants from almost every society on earth.

The Industrial Revolution in Europe represents another major chapter in the history of globalization. This marriage between technology and economics resulted in previously unknown levels of productivity. Europe's prosperity whetted its appetite for new worlds to conquer. The Atlantic slave trade was accelerated, moving millions of Africans from one part of the world to another. Europe's appetite also went imperial on a global scale, and one European people, the British, built the largest and most far-flung empire in human experience, most of which lasted until the end of World War II.

The two world wars were themselves manifestations of globalization. The twentieth century is the only one to witness globalized warfare: during 1914-18 and again during 1939-45. The Cold War (1948-89) was yet another manifestation of globalization, for it was a global power rivalry between two alliances: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. While the two world wars were militarily the most destructive, empirically the Cold War was potentially the most dangerous, for it carried the seeds of planetary annihilation via nuclear warfare.

The final historical stage of globalization came when the Industrial Revolution was joined with the new Information Revolution. Interdependence and exchange became dramatically dependent upon the computer. The most powerful country by this time was the United States. *Pax Americana* mobilized three of globalization's four engines: technology, economy, and empire. Although in the second half of the twentieth century this *Pax Americana* apparently did not seek to promote a particular religion, it did help to promote secularism and the ideology of the separation of church and state. On balance, the impact of Americanization probably has been harmful to religious values worldwide, whether intended or not. Americanized Hindu youth, Americanized Buddhist teenagers, or Americanized Muslim youngsters are far less likely to be devout adherents of their faiths than their non-Americanized counterparts.

Between Homogenization and Hegemonization

This brings us to the twin concepts of homogenization and hegemonization. One of the consequences of globalization is that we are begin-

ning to resemble each other to a much greater degree than we ever did in the past, regardless of physical distance. Homogenization is increasing similarity. The second accompanying characteristic of globalization is hegemonization, by which I mean the paradoxical concentration of power in a particular country or civilization. While homogenization is the process of expanding homogeneity, hegemonization is the emergence and consolidation of a hegemonic center. With globalization, there has arisen an increasing similarity between and among different societies. However, this trend has been accompanied by a disproportionate share of global power among a few countries.

As the twentieth century comes to a close, people dress more alike all over the world than they did at the end of the nineteenth century (homogenization). But the dress code being globalized is overwhelmingly that of the West (hegemonization). Indeed, the man's suit (Western) has become almost universalized throughout the world, and the jeans revolution has captured the dress culture of half of the world's young people.

At the end of the twentieth century, humanity is closer to having world languages than it was in the nineteenth century, if by world language we mean a language spoken by at least 300 million people, enjoying the status of a national language in at least ten countries, functioning as a major language on at least two continents, and being widely used in four continents for special purposes (homogenization). However, when we examine such globalized languages, they are disproportionately European, namely, English and French, and, to lesser extent, Spanish (hegemonization). Arabic is asserting a strong claim as a world language, but this is based partly on the globalization of Islam and the role of Arabic as Islam's religious and ritual language.

At the end of the twentieth century, we are closer to a world economy than ever before. A sneeze in Hong Kong, and certainly a cough in Tokyo, can send shock waves around the globe (homogenization). And yet the powers who control this world economy are disproportionately Western: the United States, Japan, Germany, Britain, France, Canada, and Italy, in that order of economic muscle (hegemonization).

At the end of the twentieth century, the Internet has given us instant access to information and mutual communication across vast distances (homogenization). However, its nerve center remains located in the United States and has residual links to the American government (hegemonization).

The educational systems at the end of the twentieth century are becoming more and more similar across the world: comparable term units and semesters, increasing professorial similarities, and similar course content (homogenization). But the role models behind this dramatic aca-

demic convergence have been the educational institutions of Europe and the United States, which have attracted both emulators and imitators (hegemonization).

The major ideological systems at the end of the twentieth century also are converging as market economies appear triumphant. Liberalization in being embraced widely, either spontaneously or under duress. Anwar Sadat in Egypt opened his nation's gates via his policy of *infitāḥ*, and even China has adopted a kind of market Marxism. India is in danger of traversing the distance from Mahatma Gandhi to Mahatma Keynes (homogenization). However, the people who are orchestrating and sometimes enforcing marketization, liberalization, and privatization are Western economic gurus reinforced by the power of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States, and the European Union (EU). Indeed, Europe is the mother of all modern ideologies, whether good or evil: liberalism, capitalism, socialism, Marxism, fascism, Nazism, and others. At the end of the present century, the most triumphant ideology is Euro-liberal capitalism (hegemonization).

Egypt in the Annals of Globalization

Where does Egypt fit into this saga of globalization, homogenization, and hegemonization? We mentioned earlier that the four engines of globalization in history are religion, technology, economy, and empire. Let us first take the engine of religion. Pharaoh Akhenaton is widely regarded as the father of monotheism, and it was monotheism that later became the most globalizing of all religious principles. Was Pharaoh Akhenaton a *rasūl* (apostle) or a *nabī* (prophet) or *neither*? The Qur'an tells us that God sends a *rasūl* to each nation (Qur'an 10:47, 16:36). Was Akhenaton the *rasūl* to ancient Egypt? In addition, Moses was born in Egypt. So in that sense, Egypt is the cradle of Judaism, even if one does not accept the thesis that Moses himself was Egyptian (a thesis made famous in the twentieth century by Sigmund Freud's theories about Jewish identity). Judaism became another monotheistic tradition born in Egypt.

If Egypt was the country from which Moses later fled, it subsequently became the country in which the infant Jesus found asylum from the deadly machinations of King Herod.

> ... the angel of the Lord appeared to Joseph [Mary's husband] and said, "Rise, take the child and his mother to Egypt, and stay there until I tell you. Herod is going to search for the child to destroy him." (Matthew, 2:13-23.)

The underlying logic of the story is that without asylum in Egypt, there would have been no Christianity, for the infant Jesus would have been "crucified" in the cradle. Is Egypt therefore the savior of Christianity? If Egypt is the birthplace of historical monotheism and of Moses, and if Egypt also is the place of asylum for the infant Jesus, what is Egypt's historic destiny for Islam?

Egypt represents the first grand clash between Christian power and Muslim power, for it was the first territory that the Arab Muslim armies were able to detach from the Byzantine Empire. Some would argue that this first blow set in motion a process that culminated in the fall of Constantinople to the Muslim armies several centuries later. The conquest of Constantinople (now Istanbul) in 1453 by the Turks inaugurated the Ottoman Empire. The Arab conquest of Egypt also fertilized the flowering of an Islamic civilization on Egyptian soil, one of whose institutions is al Azhar University, a center of learning that has lasted for a thousand years. Can we describe al Azhar as the first global university, for has it not always attracted students from throughout the Muslim world?

We earlier referred to technology as another engine of globalization across time. Were the ancient Egyptians the first to use technology for grand constructions of eternal durability? Long before the construction of the Aswan Dam by Soviet engineers in the 1950s, there was the construction of the great pyramids linking the living with the dead. Ancient Egypt was arguably among the first grand civilizations. Technology and empire were linked in anticipation of new worlds to conquer. Much closer to our own day is a different kind of construction in Egypt: the building of the Suez Canal under the direction of the French engineer Ferdinand de Lesseps. Hundreds of Egyptian workers died while building this canal, thereby making it not just a product of Western expertise and capital, but also one of Egyptian sweat and blood. The canal was a major contribution to globalization, since it helped to connect Europe, Africa, and Asia in new ways. But the canal also is a monument to technology and economy as engines of globalization.

By the second half of the twentieth century, Egypt's President Gamal Abdul Nasser (1953-70) saw Egypt as a center of three circles: Arab, Islamic, and African (a triad of cultures). Egypt had become a bridge across three continents: Africa, Asia, and Europe (a triad of continents). In one way or another, Egypt had nursed four different monotheistic traditions (Akhenaton, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam). However, has Egypt been a victim of globalization in the later chapters of its history, however great an initiator of the processes of globalization it once was? And, when all is said and done, how is Islam faring between the forces of homogenization and those of hegemonization?

Globalization and Dār al Ḥarb

Following the end of World War II, a strange thing happened. Quite unconsciously, the West adopted an Islamic view of the world: the tripartite division of the world by ancient Islamic jurists into *dār al Islām* (the Abode of Islam), *dār al ḥarb* (the Abode of War), and *dār al ṣulḥ* (the Abode of Peaceful Co-Existence or Contractual Peace). This last was Islam's informal empire.[1]

Within *dār al Islām*, amity and cooperation on Islamic principles were supposed to prevail and *Pax Islamica* was supposed to be triumphant. *Dār al Islām* included Muslims as well as non-Muslims of the protected communities (*ahl al kitāb* [People of the Book] and *dhimmīs* [non-Muslims under Islamic protection]), who enjoyed state protection against internal insecurity and external aggression.[2]

Dār al ḥarb was not necessarily an arena of direct military confrontation. Many times, this category of lands included those of non-Muslims who were often hostile to Islam, constituting the sort of situation that Thomas Hobbes would describe much later as a condition without a shared sovereign.[3] Muslim jurists developed the concept of *dār al ḥarb*, a state of war, in order to recognize authorities in countries that did not agree on the sovereignty of God. As Khadduri points out:

> Islam's cognizance of non-Islamic sovereignties merely meant that some form of authority was by nature necessary for the survival of mankind, even when men lived in territories in the state of nature, outside the pale of the Islamic public order.[4]

The countries of *dār al ṣulḥ* (also known as *dār al 'ahd*) were those non-Muslim countries that had an neoimperial arrangement with Muslim rulers: they enjoyed greater autonomy and peace in exchange for tribute or a collective tax paid to the Muslim treasury. The *dār al ṣulḥ* was not recognized as a separate category by all Muslim jurists, for some felt that "if the inhabitants of the territory concluded a peace treaty and paid tribute, it became part of the dar al-Islam and its people to the protection of Islam."[5]

After World War II, the West appropriated Islam's traditional tripartite view of the world and simply substituted itself for Islam. For much of the Cold War, the world comprised the following categories:

1. *Dār al gharb* or *dār al maghrib* (the Abode of the West) instead of *dār al Islām*;
2. *Dār al ḥarb* (the Abode of War, essentially the communist world);

3. *Dār al ṣulḥ* or *dār al 'ahd* (the Abode of Peaceful Coexistence, the Third World). The Third World paid tribute to the West in the form of the debt burden and other forms of economic exploitation in a modern version of the tribute paid by the *dār al ṣulḥ* to medieval Muslim rulers.

But one major proviso needs to be emphasized. Although the Western doctrine of the Abode of War was in theory the communist world, in practice the actual wars of the second half of the twentieth century have been fought almost entirely in the Third World, including the lands of Islam.[6] Since 1980, at least five hundred thousand Muslim Libyans, Iranians, Lebanese, Palestinians, and Iraqis have been killed by the armaments of a trigger-happy Western world.

In the Gulf war of 1991, the West used the United Nations (UN) flag to give its militarism a universalistic appeal and legitimacy.[7] The human toll in Iraq still rises, due to the continuing deprivation caused by the British-American economic sanctions that were given universalistic legitimacy by the UN Security Council.[8] The Iraqi infant mortality rate has tripled since the end of the war, and deaths from preventable diseases among ordinary Iraqis has escalated.[9] Yet despite his nation's geographic and military emasculation, Saddam Hussein's hold on the country appears to be unshakable.[10]

The ostensible reason for the sanctions is to ensure that Iraq does not rebuild its weapons of mass destruction. And yet each permanent member of the Security Council has its own weapons of mass destruction. Unlike France, Iraq has not yet found the necessary arrogance to test nuclear weapons thousands of miles away from its own core population, thereby endangering the population of other lands. Protests against such tests by the militarily weak Pacific nations include street demonstrations, diplomatic downgrading of relations, and boycotts of such French goods as wine.[11] Iraq also does not have a partner who is a permanent member of the Security Council, to whom it can say, "Scratch my nuclear back and I'll scratch yours."

The UN and the Cultural Counterrevolution

The UN, as a supposedly global institution, represents states and regions, but does not try to represent civilizations. Six out of the past seven UN secretaries-general have come from Christian traditions,[12] yet the Christian world contains only about one-fifth of the world's population. There has been no Hindu, Muslim, or Confucian secretary-general, despite the fact that these populations, when combined, outnumber Christians by more than two to one. There has been one Buddhist secretary-general, U

Thant. One Buddhist, and five Christians, although there are probably as many Buddhists as Christians in the world.[13] The ratio raises a question: Should the UN system be more attentive to proportional representation of cultures?[14]

The UN was formed primarily by the victors of World War II, all of whom belonged to one and one-half civilizations. Britain, the United States, France, and the European part of the Soviet Union all belonged to Western civilization, while the Asian part of the Soviet Union provided the other half. After they established themselves as permanent members of the UN's powerful Security Council, they made one concession to another civilization: they allowed pre-Communist China to be a permanent member. Of the five original languages of the UN, four were European: English, French, Spanish, and Russian. Again, a concession was made to China by recognizing its language. Arabic has more recently gained recognition for some purposes.

A kind of bicameral legislature began to emerge: an upper house, which was the more powerful but less representative body known as the Security Council; and a lower house, which was the less powerful but more representative body known as the General Assembly. This bicameral concept developed by practice rather than design, and was very Western in origin. The upper house was the global "House of Lords"—warlords! The conception was basically Western in origin.

One major function of the UN was to help keep the peace according to the principles of international law. The Law of Nations was itself a child of European diplomatic history and statecraft. It once used to be the law of Christian nations, which gradually became the law of civilized nations, and then became the law of developed nations.[15] That old international law was used to legitimate Western colonization of other countries. The intellectual forebears of Western political thought were marked by an arrogant Eurocentrism. John Mill distinguished between "barbarians and societies worthy of the Law of Nations."[16] What was even more appalling was the approbation of colonialism by early socialists: Karl Marx applauded Britain's colonization of India,[17] and Engels applauded France's colonization of Algeria.[18] All of these were "civilizational criteria" accepted by almost the entire white world.

And then the UN began to admit not only more countries but more cultures, such as Pakistan in 1947, Myanmar [Burma] and Sri Lanka [Ceylon] in 1948, and later Malaysia and Singapore. There followed some newly independent Arab countries, such as Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, Algeria (Egypt was already a member), and newly independent Black African countries, beginning with Ghana in 1957. New values were trying to express themselves through a Eurocentric infrastructure. Later,

the UN became the channel through which other countries and cultures began to insist on changes in international law. When India occupied Goa, thus liberating it from Portuguese rule, Krishna Menon enunciated the principle that "colonialism was permanent aggression," thereby delegitimizing colonialism.[19] African struggles against apartheid led to the shrinkage of the principle of domestic jurisdiction as applied to South Africa's official policy of apartheid. Eventually, apartheid was regarded as a matter of relevance to international security, and the UN began to take a more active role in combating it.[20]

In the post-Cold War era, is the UN likely to be used by the dominant civilization (the West) against other civilizations? Is that what happened during the Gulf war? Was the UN hijacked by the West to legitimize massacres in defense of its oil interests? In Bosnia, is the UN being used by the West to make sure there is no viable Muslim state in the middle of Europe?

More than ever since the end of the Cold War, recent Western theories of international relations still grapple with the following distinctions:

1. A bipolar world (such as existed during the Cold War);
2. A unipolar world (what exists now, with the United States being the only superpower); and
3 A multipolar world (encompassing such new centers as China and eventually India, which will outnumber China in population in another thirty years).

Unfortunately none of those superpowers or poles are basically Muslim, although they do include Muslim populations. Is a world with only one superpower—a unipolar world—in reality *dār al ḥarb* in its entirety? Was the old bipolar world of the Cold War *dār al ḥarb*? Is a global village under non-Muslim control *dār al ḥarb*? In other words, if globalization is creating one world, and if that world is not under Muslim control, is the whole world temporarily *dār al ḥarb*?

Islam: Victim or Victor?

At the moment, the Muslim world is a net loser from both homogenization and hegemonization. However, will Islam one day gain from homogenization? Only if Muslim values penetrate the global pool. Can people share Muslim values without sharing the Muslim religion? For example, many American Muslims find themselves sharing social values with Republicans, such as prayer in school, family values, and stable marriages, while opposing easy abortion and too much homosexual permissiveness. One can agree with Islamic values without being a Muslim.

Indeed, after World War I the United States briefly agreed with the Muslim value of banning alcohol and passed a constitutional amendment against it. But not enough Americans were convinced, and after a decade (and Al Capone's adventures), another constitutional amendment was passed allowing it once again. Will Muslim values in the twenty-first century once again gain favor?

There was a time when the Muslim presence in the Western world was one of intellectual and scientific influence, and when such Arabic words as *algebra* and *cipher* entered Western scientific lexicons.

One of the remarkable things about the twentieth century is that it has combined the cultural Westernization of the Muslim world with the more recent demographic Islamization of the Western world. The foundations for the cultural Westernization of the Muslim world were laid mainly in the first half of the twentieth century, whereas the foundations of the demographic Islamization of the Western world are being laid in the second half of the twentieth century.

By the first half of the twentieth century, the West already had colonized more than two-thirds of the Muslim world: from Kano to Karachi, Cairo to Kuala Lumpur, and Dakar to Jakarta. The first half of the twentieth century also witnessed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the more complete de-Islamization of the European state system. The aftermath included abolishing the caliphate as the symbolic center of Islamic authority. The Muslim world became more fragmented than ever and even more receptive to Western cultural penetration. Other forces facilitating the cultural Westernization of the Muslim world included the replacement of Islamic and Qur'anic schools with Western-style schools; the increasing use of European languages in major Muslim countries; and the growing impact of Western media upon the distribution of news, information, and entertainment, ranging from magazines, cinema, television, and video to the new universe of computers. Homogenization was responding to the forces of hegemonization.

Finally, there has been the omnipresent technology of the West, a force that carries with it not only new skills but also new values. The net result has been a form of globalization of aspects of culture. However, this has been a Eurocentric and Americocentric brand of globalization, meaning that one aspect of Western culture eventually is embraced by other cultures and masquerades as universal. An informal cultural empire is born; hegemony is triumphant.

The globalization of two pieces of Eurocentric world culture may tell the story of things to come: the Western Christian calendar, especially the Gregorian calendar, and the worldwide dress code for men, which we mentioned earlier. Many African and Asian countries have adopted the

Western Christian calendar as their own. They celebrate their independence day according to the Christian calendar and write their history according to Gregorian years, using such distinctions as BC (before Christ) or AD (*anno domini* [in the year of our Lord]). Some Muslim countries recognize Sunday as the day of rest instead of Friday, and others have reperiodicized all of Islamic historiography according to the Christian calendar.

In the second half of the twentieth century, both Muslim migration to the West and conversions to Islam within the West are consolidating a new Islamic presence. In Europe, there are now twenty million Muslims, eight million of whom are in western Europe. This figure excludes the Muslims of Turkey, who number some sixty-three million. As a result, there are new mosques from Munich to Marseilles.

Paradoxically, the cultural Westernization of the Muslim world is one of the causes behind the demographic Islamization of the West. The cultural Westernization of Muslims contributed to the "brain drain" that lured Muslim professionals and experts from their native lands to jobs and educational institutions in North America and the European Union. The old formal empires of the West have unleashed a demographic counter-penetration. Some of the most qualified Muslims in the world have been attracted to professional positions in Europe or North America. It is in this sense that the cultural Westernization of the Muslim world in the first half of the twentieth century was part of the preparation for the demographic Islam-ization of the West in the second half of the twentieth century.

But not all Muslim migrants to the West were highly qualified. The legacy of Western colonialism also facilitated the migration of less-qualified Muslims from such places as Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Algeria into Britain and France, which is another example of postcolonial demographic counter-penetration. There also have been occasions when, in need of cheap labor, the West deliberately encouraged the immigration of less-qualified Muslims (e.g., Germany's importation of Turkish workers during the 1960s and 1970s).

As another manifestation of the demographic Islamization of the Western world, there are now over one thousand mosques and Qur'anic centers in the United States alone, as well as professional associations for Muslim engineers, social scientists, and educators. There are some six million American Muslims, and the number is rising impressively. Muslims will outnumber Jews in the United States by the end of the twentieth century, and Islam is currently the fastest growing religion in North America.[21] In France, Islam has the second highest number of adherents; Catholicism has the most followers. In Britain, some Muslims are experimenting with their own Islamic Parliament, while others are demanding

state subsidies for Muslim schools. Germany is realizing that its earlier importation of Turkish workers was an invitation to the muezzin and the minaret to establish themselves in German cities. Australia has discovered that it is a neighbor of Indonesia, the country with the largest Muslim population in the world. Australia also has discovered an Islamic presence within its own body politic.

Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are the three Abrahamic creeds of world history. Today, the West is often described as a Judeo-Christian civilization, thus linking the West to two of those Abrahamic faiths. But if Muslims one day outnumber Jews in countries like the United States, perhaps one day Islam will replace Judaism as the second most important Abrahamic religion after Christianity. Numerically, Islam eventually may overshadow Judaism in much of the West, regardless of future immigration policies.

Thus the question has arisen of how Islam is to be treated in Western classrooms, textbooks, and media as it becomes a more integral part of Western society. In the Muslim world, education has been substantially Westernized. Is it now the turn of education in the West to become partially Islamized? The Euro-Islamic story of interpenetration continues to unfold. Is this a new threshold for globalization, or is it just another manifestation of the postcolonial condition in world history? In reality, it may be both.

The counter-penetration of Islam and Muslims into Western civilization will not end Western hegemonization on its own. However, a significant Islamic presence in the Western world may begin to reverse the wheels of cultural homogenization. Values will begin to mix, tastes compete, and perspectives intermingle as a new moral calculus evolves on the world scene.

Endnotes

1. Our discussion here is based on Majid Khadduri's introduction to his translation of *The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), 11-13, although he tends to emphasize the dual division between *dār al Islām* and *dār al ḥarb*.

2. Ibid, 11-12.

3. Hobbes describes this condition in his seminal *Leviathan.* For one recent edition, see Edwin Curley (ed.), *Leviathan; with Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668/ Thomas Hobbes* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994).

4. Khadduri, *The Islamic Law of Nations*, 13.

5. Ibid., 12-13. However, the distinction will prove useful in this anaylsis.

6. Although scholars of international relations concentrated on the American-Soviet relationship, some have pointed out that the West, particularly the United States, has had its most problematic international relations headaches in the Third World. See Charles W. Maynes, "America's Third World Hang-Ups," *Foreign Policy*, no. 71 (Summer 1988):

117-40, and Steven R. David, "Why the Third World Matters," *International Security*, no. 14:1 (Summer 1989): 50-85.

7. See Burns H. Weston, "Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy," *American Journal of International Law*, no. 85 (July 1991): 516-35.

8. For one recent analysis of the American stand on sanctions, see Eric Rouleau, "America's Unyielding Policy Toward Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*, no. 74 (January/February 1995): 59-72.

9. In fact, according to one study the infant mortality rate has increased fivefold since the end of the war in 1991, killing almost 576,000 Iraqi children. See *The New York Times* (1 December 1995), Section A, p. 9.

10. For critical reports on the sanctions, see the analysis by Haris Gazdar and Jean Dreze, "Hunger and Poverty in Iraq, 1991," *World Development*, no. 20 (July 1992): 921-45, and Eric Hoskins, "Killing is Killing - Not Kindness," *New Statesman & Society*, no. 5 (17 January 1992): 12-13. Despite internal unrest and prominent defections, Saddam has not been hurt by the sanctions, as pointed out, for example, by Steve Platt, "Sanctions Don't Harm Saddam," *New Statesman & Society*, no. 7 (4 November 1994): 10.

11. French Beaujolais wine, according to one report in *The New York Times*, has lost many markets as a result of the boycott of French products to protest French nuclear tests in the Pacific. Markets lost include not only those of Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, but also of The Netherlands, Scandinavia, and Germany. See *The New York Times*, (17 November 1995), Section A, p. 10.

12. These men are Trygve Lie, Dag Hammarskjold, U Thant, Kurt Waldheim, Javier Perez de Cuellar, and Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

13. See Evan Luard, *The United Nations: How it Works and What It Does* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 102-25.

14. Brian Urquhart, "Selecting the World's CEO," *Foreign Affairs*, no. 74:3 (May/June 1995): 21-26. Many Chinese Buddhists are simultaneously Confucians.

15. See Adam Watson, "European International Society and Its Expansion," in *The Expansion of International Society*, edited by Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 13-32; and Ian Brownlie, "The Expansion of International Society: The Consequences for the Law of Nations," in Ibid., 357-69.

16. See Adam Watson, "European International Society and Its Expansion," in Ibid., 13-32; and Ian Brownlie, "The Expansion of International Society: The Consequences for the Law of Nations," in Ibid., 357-69.

17. Consult Karl Marx, *On Colonialism: Articles from the New York Tribune and Other Writings by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels* (New York: International Publishers, 1972), 81-87.

18. See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1976), 6:471.

19. For a description of Menon's view of the Goa affair and Western reactions to the Indian action, see Michael Brecher, *India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World* (New York: Praeger, 1968), 121-36.

20. Guides to the UN's role in combating apartheid may be found in "The UN and Apartheid: A Chronology," *UN Chronicle*, no. 31 (September 1994): 9-14; Newell M. Stultz, "Evolution of the United Nations Anti-apartheid Regime, *Human Rights Quarterly*, no. 13 (February 1991): 1-23; and Ozdemir A. Ozgur, *Apartheid, the United Nations, & Peaceful Change in South Africa* (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1982).

21. "Amid Islam's Growth in the U.S., Muslims Face a Surge of Attacks," *New York Times* (28 August 1995).