

Research Note

The Sociology of Knowledge: Jewish and Muslim Impact on American Social Sciences

by Theodore P. Wright, Jr.

The concept "sociology of knowledge" emerged from European sociology and especially from Marxist thought which posited that the social characteristics of a category of thinkers determine their intellectual products as much or more than the intrinsic merit of their ideas themselves.¹ While Marxists, as materialists, naturally emphasized the effects of the social class of their bourgeois and feudal opponents on the latter's thinking in order to discount their arguments, the notion of social determinism can be equally well applied to other categories of thinkers such as national, ethnic, or religious in analyzing their impact on an academic discipline, provided that one is careful not to assume a simplistic, one-to-one correlation between a thinker's social background or religion and his ideas.

It is my purpose in this paper to explore the causes, degree, and possible consequences of the disproportionate role of people of Jewish origin, if not faith, in the development of the social sciences, particularly in the period since World War II in North America, compared to the as yet meager impact of Muslims in those fields. The powerful impact of Jewish scholars is not just on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, which is well-known if controversial,² but, anterior to policy-making, they have largely shaped the paradigms, the conceptual apparatus, with which most Westerners approach, perceive, and analyze society in general and the Muslim world in particular.³

A cautionary note first is in order. Scholars who are by others or by themselves designated as "Jewish" vary, like Muslims and Christians, from the most orthodox to the most secular, so one must avoid stereotyping and

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over-generalization at the same time that we attempt to delineate commonalities of Jewish conditions and modes of thought that are not entirely congruent with those to be found among their counterparts in other religiously-defined groups. Lipset and Ladd's survey of Jewish academics in the United States, for instance, revealed that they, far more than Protestant and Catholic faculty, are either indifferent to their ancestral religion or actively opposed to all religion, but this does not preclude their adhering to cultural Judaism or to Zionism politically.⁴ In fact, since the 1970s, much of the sharpest debate within the social sciences, as in the field of policy, has been among individuals of Jewish origin. For instance, both the Caucus for the New Political Science and the Ad Hoc Committee which opposed it in the American Political Science Association were Jewish-led.⁵

Next, before investigating the Jewish impact on the social sciences, one must establish that their numbers in those disciplines are really disproportionate to the Jewish percentage of the American population, which is about two and one half percent. Already, thirty years ago, Seymour Martin Lipset observed that

It is a well known fact that in this country, Sociology and some of the allied disciplines such as Anthropology and Psychology have had a disproportionate number of Jews among their leading practitioners.⁶

Twenty years later, in 1974, Lipset and Ladd documented not only this anomaly but a rising disproportion, showing law school faculty as 25% Jewish, Psychology 16.5%, Economics 15%, Sociology 12.7%, Political Science 12.6% and Anthropology 12.2%. Even these figures do not fully measure their influence as the authors found that in the elite "Ivy League" schools about a quarter of all faculty under fifty years of age were Jewish.⁷

In connection with a comparison of WASPS (White Anglo-Saxon Protestants) with Indian Muslims as "former elite minorities,"⁸ I surveyed members of the ten most prestigious Political Science Departments in the United States between 1948 and 1968 and found the WASP contingent cut in half in percentage; Jewish representation had nearly tripled. Muslim representation was minuscule. But the WASPS' absolute numbers held stable because of the great increase in size of political science departments in those decades, so it was a non-conflictual "zero-sum-game." American Political Science Association annual meeting programs had a peak of about forty percent Jewish panelists in the early 1970s.

The foregoing studies encountered methodologically great difficulty in estimating percentages of Jewish participation on any list because of the ethno-religious ambiguities of many European names in America, especially German ones, and also the familiar practice of name changing⁹ which has been most widespread among American Jews in the past in order to avoid discrimination.

What were the causes of this sudden rise of Jews in academia? Lipset, like Lewis Coser in the latter's recent book, *Refugee Scholars in America*¹⁰ attributes it in part to the expulsion of Jewish scholars from Germany after 1933, but that begs the question of why they had played such a prominent role there (25% as against three fourths of one percent of the population) and why many enjoyed ready acceptance and success in American academia where there had been a great deal of anti-Semitic discrimination in the previous generation.¹¹ Coser argues that American social sciences, especially Political Science, were provincial and moralistic in the 1930s but beginning to experience an "identity crisis." Just as the United States was emerging from isolation to world power, the European refugee scholars fit the need for a more cosmopolitan, realistic, and quantitative approach in both Economics and Political Science.¹² Then too, it is argued that as "marginals," other, more leftist Jewish intellectuals were in a better position to "throw a novel and searching light on American society and scholarship than was usually the case with those born and bred in the pieties of their (own) tradition." Lipset, quoting Thorsten Veblen, an earlier dissident, goes so far as to assert that "the rejection of tradition is inherent in the very concept of the intellectual as a creator of knowledge ... inherent in the obligation to create is the tendency to reject the status quo ... and thus to criticize reality from the standpoint of the ideal ... Veblen linked the inherently critical orientation of the creative intellectual to the status of the secularized Jew as an 'outsider' in Gentile societies."¹³

While this critical stance took the direction of Marxism among many Jewish intellectuals in the 1930s and 1970s, in the 1950s for many it took the opposite form of Viennese logical positivism which denied the meaningfulness of demonstrability of value statements and insisted on their strict separation from facts. Symbolic of the rapid victory of the refugee Jewish scholars over the WASP academic establishment was the eclipse of the Idealist, Quincy Wright, by the Arch-Realist, Hans Morgenthau, in International Relations at the University of Chicago following the publication of the latter's *Politics among Nations* in 1948. Henry Kissinger joined the same Cold War bandwagon with his *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* in 1957 which set him on the path ultimately to become the first American Jewish Secretary of State. The "behavioral" revolution which swept the study of domestic politics in the mid 1950s also provided an escalator, not only for refugees but for many young, second generation Jewish scholars to rise to the top of the profession, once the discriminatory admissions quotas were dismantled. A parallel line of growth was in the new field of political development led by Gabriel Almond, later to become the first Jewish President of the American Political Science Association (1966). The Princeton University Press series on Political Development had 41% Jewish authors and set the paradigm for research on

the “third world” (Irving Louis Horowitz’s term).¹⁴

Beyond the timely arrival of refugee scholars just when American social science needed a new orientation fitting its role as a superpower, how else are we to explain the sudden rise of Jews to such prominence in academia? Some authors cite “blockage”¹⁵: members of a minority, blocked from some occupations by discriminatory barriers, flock disproportionately into the ones that are relatively open. Another conventional explanation is adumbrated by the sociologist, Nathan Glazer:¹⁶

... Jews, far more than any other immigrant group, were engaged for generations in the middle class occupations, the professions, and buying and selling ... which are associated with a whole complex of habits ... of care and foresight ... trained to save his money ... to be used well to advance himself ... also to be careful about his personality, his time, his education, his way of life ... The dominant characteristic of his life is to see that the present postponement of pleasure, including sex, will lead to an increase in satisfaction later...

Glazer is applying here to Jews Max Weber’s famous thesis regarding Calvinist Christians and the rise of modern Capitalism. He finds the origin of these middle class values in a certain kind of religious outlook on the world, with a strong emphasis on learning and study. Besides, two thousand years of minority status encouraged care and moderation among “middleman” minorities, unlike other categories of subordinates like former slaves and serfs.¹⁷ Exclusion and fear of discrimination led Jews to enter the “free professions” disproportionately. Others have argued, though Lipset discounts it, that a long history of urban life because of the prohibition on Jews owning land in medieval Europe actually put them at an advantage in adapting to the largely urban life of modernity.

Unmentioned in such self analyses by Jewish scholars are two less creditable possibilities: one, that Jewish students initially felt less constrained by Christian-imposed rules of honesty and cheated more. And two, that once the minority group has a toehold in a profession, the frontrunners may, in the defensive manner of a minority, subtly, even unconsciously, favor their fellow ethnics in hiring, panel construction, and publication. Feminists later called this “networking,” a new version of the “old school tie” of the WASPs. Charles Kadushin in *The American Intellectual Elite*¹⁸ discusses the network of literary figures in New York City who dominate opinion-making and who, he remarks disingenuously, are “only fifty percent Jewish!” Gaining entry by criticism and innovation, such a minority group then redefines what is meritorious in a field, as the behavioralists did in Political Science. Then nepotism is no longer needed to favor members of one’s group, because they will win out in a free competition by the new criteria of merit. A middleman minority is accustomed to being adaptable in order to survive and is well attuned to look for opportunities, jumping aboard the bandwagon more readily than

complacent majority members who are committed to the previous paradigm. As a result, novelty in models, methods, and terminology has become practically an end in itself in American social science, regardless of the practical results.

Finally, let us get to the main topic of the paper: the impact of this historic rise to dominance in the social sciences of scholars of Jewish origin. As noted at the beginning, the most publicized result is on a specific foreign policy issue: the presentation in the media and academia of the Arab-Israeli dispute. This is usually attributed by Arabs, Muslims, and their well-wishers to the vagaries of electoral politics in the United States or, less directly, to common interests based on the "Judaean-Christian heritage" and the anti-Muslim residue of the Crusades.¹⁹ Mohammed Ahrāri has expressed this power more perceptively than most as "agenda-setting": the exclusion of alternative points of view by establishing a near monopoly of public discussion before the "attentive public," itself made up disproportionately of Jews and pro-Israeli Gentiles.²⁰

But the "sociology of knowledge" implies something more fundamental than a foreign policy issue or a skewing towards liberal, radical, or neo-conservative ideology. From the characteristics of the Jewish minority and Jewish culture, what impact might we look for in American social science?

1) The very existence of the social sciences themselves? That is, the assumption that members of a society can study not only other cultures but the one in which they live with some degree of detachment so as to create an objective science on the model of the physical sciences. Many Muslim scholars of the past decade have attacked this attempt as a Western imperialist or neo-colonialist imposition of Christian values on Muslims.²¹ On the contrary, John Murray Cuddihy in his refreshingly irreverent, *Ordeal of Civility: Freud, Marx, Levi-Strauss, and the Jewish Struggle with Modernity*²² argues that it is secular Jewish intellectuals who have sought to escape and transcend their dilemma between enclosure within "Yiddi schkeit" and conformity to the standards of "politeness" of the essentially Christian European civilization by seeking to create a universalistic science, both natural and social. Whatever the culpability of nineteenth century Christian Orientalists in perpetuating a negative image of Islam and Muslims, twentieth century social science, according to this interpretation, has been largely the creation of the secular Jewish segment of the Western intelligentsia. It is perhaps not sociologically accidental that the most effective critic of the behaviorist social science paradigm is my WASP colleague, John Gunnell.²³ Does this mean we must give up the search for an universalistic, trans-or supracultural social science paradigm because it is ineluctably contaminated with religiously-based values? If so, then how are Muslim social scientists to persuade non-Muslim counterparts to employ their Islamic paradigm short of conversion?

2) Because of the origin of many Jewish social scientists, or their immediate ancestors in Germany and their mother tongue being Yiddish, a German dialect, they may have been particularly prone to the use of neologisms and esoteric jargon which have become practically synonymous with American social science in the past generation. Whatever its intent, this process has served as an emotional barrier for native speakers of English as well as for those who learned proper English from entering and thriving in the field.²⁴

3) At the heart of the intellectual role, as we have seen, is the ability to doubt and criticize received wisdom. Whether for Jews this stems from the method of Talmudic learning through disputation, or from the situation of perennial marginality to majority society, Jews have given to the social sciences their contemporary characteristic of negativity about all established civil institutions and practices and thereby a skewing to the political Left.²⁵ Lipset admits the possibility of Right-wing intellectuals existing, equally disgruntled with the status quo, but this category has been more in evidence in Europe than in America where what passes for "neo-conservatism" is really nineteenth century classical liberal *laissez faire*. The hyper-competition in business in the 1980s, so applauded by the followers of Professor Milton Friedman of Chicago, has, incidentally, greatly facilitated the penetration ("takeover") of Big Businesses by Jewish speculators.

4) As themselves a perennial minority, Jews in social science have tended to identify with other minorities as against the majorities in society in the process of what Schermerhorn calls "victimology."²⁶ Similarly they favor "underdogs" over elites, rights over duties, judicial usurpation over majority rule through legislatures,²⁷ and cosmopolitan internationalism over nationalism (except for Israel).

5) Because they were long excluded from the land, Jews like other middleman minorities early became primarily urban dwellers. This was, as suggested, an advantage in modernization, but rendered Jewish social scientists uninterested in and unsympathetic with rural life and agricultures (again, with the exception of Israel) or in peasants except as mobilizable cannon fodder of revolution against traditional elites. It is symptomatic of this that the only "political development" textbook written from a rural point of view was written by Robert Gamer who, uniquely among social scientists, grew upon a farm in Kansas.²⁸

6) One of the most pervasive if often subtle influences of Jews on social science is through the impact of psychoanalytic concepts and assumptions on other social sciences. Cuddihy treats psychoanalysis as an almost entirely Jewish "science."²⁹ Like the sociology of knowledge in its Marxist version, it leads to the assumption that nobody acts from his explicitly asserted motives.

7) In American partisan politics, Jews have heavily favored the Democratic Party over the Republican ever since the New Deal gave many opportunities

to Jewish social scientists in Washington and favored the regulatory and social welfare functions of government. This in turn has contributed to the heavy partisan unbalancing of the discipline of Political Science from a roughly 50:50 distribution between the parties in the generation active before 1930 to a more than 80% Democratic allegiance by the 1960.³⁰ One can see a consequence of this in the American academic bias against Pakistan and in favor of India, mirroring the general positions of the pro-Pakistan Republican and pro-India Democratic parties.

8) As a once persecuted religious minority, Jews on the average take a stronger position in the United States in favor of separation of church and state than Christians, especially majority Protestants, do. This has led in the last generation to the removal of even minimal, nondenominational prayers from public schools by court action.

9) Writing thirty years ago, Lawrence Fuchs³¹ found the distinctive values of America's Jewish subculture to be learning, charity, and non-asceticism. Regarding the third, he asserted "Jews have been disproportionately influential in the de-Puritanizing of America because of special place of Jews in Hollywood, the legitimate theater, advertising, publishing, and the ladies garment trades. It does not require much extrapolation from this observation of their prominent role in the next stage of the sexual revolution in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s and that the social sciences in legitimizing and defending through the courts pornography, obscenity, and homosexuality.

10) As to Fuchs's category of charity, he quotes a Rabbi Isserman that *zedakeh* means righteousness, the rights of man, not charity in the Christian sense of compassion. This emphasis has given a changed tone to American public and foreign policy debate since the 1960s as exemplified by vociferous Jewish opposition to President Reagan's healing speech at the German cemetery at Bitburg and by the vindictive and self-defeating attempt of the World Jewish Congress to prevent the election of former United Nations Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, to the Presidency of Austria four decades after his service in the German Army.

11) Although orthodox Judaism was as discriminatory against women as Orthodox Christianity or Islam, Jewish women (e.g. Bella Abzug, Friedan, Gloria Steinem) took a leading part in the feminist movement, the academic expression of which has been the proliferation of Women's Studies Programs and the biased reinterpretation of each of the social sciences from a feminist point of view.

Which of the posited Jewish academic characteristics are shared with Muslims and which are not?

1) Muslim scholars once had, but then lost through the closing of the gates of *ijtihad*, the abstracting, generalizing capacity central to Western social science, but one finds it still among some Middle Eastern "middleman"

minorities³² when they become intellectuals and enter academia, e.g. among the Lebanese, though admittedly mostly Christian. The older generation of Arab-speaking experts on the Middle East are Lebanese or Armenian Christians.

2) Insofar as Muslims are relative latecomers to modern social science, one cannot expect them to have contributed much to the jargon of the disciplines except in the study of their own cultures and countries of origin where Arabic terms have become a sign of expertise. The coining of neologisms applicable to more than just one's own people is a major path to prominence in the social sciences in America. Horowitz's "three worlds of development" shows no sign of being displaced by the "Dār al-Islam vs. Dār al-Ḥarb" distinction of Muslims.

3) Muslims, like Jews, are People of the Book, and the mode of argumentation among *fuqahā'*, aided by the lack of Sunni priestly hierarchy, is similar to what I called Talmudic disputation, but the longtime prohibition on innovation (*bid'ah*) and the adherence to *Taqīd* in Islam discouraged the hypercritical frame of mind of modern intellectuals and social scientists. One finds it in a very few intellectuals with Muslim names but they tend to be Marxists or dependency theorists like 'Alī Mazrui or Asgherali Engineer of India.

4) Most Muslims, unlike Jews, come from countries where their co-religionists are in a majority and so are unlikely to exhibit the strong concern for minorities other than their own which I have attributed to Jews. They do, however, show unusual but sometimes counterproductive concern about Muslim minorities, e.g. in the *Journal* of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs in Saudi Arabia. One might expect that Muslim scholars in America might eventually benefit from the same position of "marginals" or "outsiders" which was so fruitful for Jews, though for them it may be decreasingly so as Jews join and benefit from the Establishment.

5) Likewise, Muslims, except perhaps for Ismailis, do not share the heavily urban experience of Jews, although Islam is often said to be ideally practiced in towns and cities. Huge populations of Muslims in Egypt, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia, however, are peasants and might attract the sympathetic interest of Muslim scholars. Muslims having arrived in the West so recently are not apt to share the rural experience.

6) Muslims have played little or no role in the development of psychoanalysis so they should be in a good position to expose some of the quackery in this field pointed out by Dr. Mālik Badrī in "Muslim Psychologists in the Lizard's Hole."³³

7) As to ideology and party preference, Muslims have come to the United States in any numbers only in the last twenty years (or through conversion) and number only 1.2 million.³⁴ Even in combination with a much larger number of Afro-American Muslims, they have had very little impact com-

pared to Jewish citizens. Furthermore, they are more divided among various nationalities, races, and languages. Because of peculiarities of the new immigration law of 1965, Ghayur found that educational levels among first-generation immigrants are very high and most already live in the middle or upper middle class. This should enable them to participate in politics at the same high level as Jewish-Americans, but more likely as Republicans.

8) Muslims share with Jews the status of religious minority and therefore an interest in preserving and even extending the pluralism of the American polity, though perhaps not by advocating secularism. Demands by Muslims in Great Britain for *ḥalāl* meat, separate education, and Muslim holidays probably foreshadow similar agitation in the United States later.

9) Muslims would seem to be closer to Christians than Jews on the score of Puritanism and to bolster some of the positions of the Moral Majority.

10) Regarding feminism, Islam is the most conservative of the three major religions. But on none of these last issues have Muslims had any impact on American social science.

All-in-all, up to now Muslims have not made much of a mark in the American social sciences despite sharing some of the listed attributes of Jews that have helped the latter become so prominent in these disciplines. With the oil affluence of the 1970s, an increase in self confidence just when Western intellectuals have suffered a "failure of nerve," and a potential decline of Jewish participation in academia as other, more lucrative careers in law, business, and politics open up to them, it is possible that social scientists of Muslim cultural background, if not always of Muslim faith, are about to begin making major contributions to the social sciences. So far, however, their efforts have been too defensive or "apologetic" to command the attention and respect of the American Social Science Establishment.³⁵ This cannot be done, I would predict, simply by reasserting the utility of classical Islamic concepts and practices like *shūrā*, *khilāfah*, *zakāt* and *mudārabah*, unless their relevance to analysis of the very different circumstances of the modern world and non-Muslim societies can be demonstrated.³⁶ As Muhammad Ma'rūf has warned: "to be content with repeating the words of the *Qur'ān* can only be seen as a ruse to prevent an adequate understanding, and as an excuse for the inexcusable lack of Islamic scholarly attention to the scientific study of these issues...[which is as] inexcusable [as] simply to copy and uncritically adopt the principles, procedures, and theories behind modern scientific studies... For a Muslim, what humans ought to do is dictated by the *Qur'ān*, but our understanding of the implications of what the *Qur'ān* says has to be strengthened by the scientific understanding of the individual and collective nature of human beings."³⁷

Notes

1. Jacques Maquet, *The Sociology of Knowledge* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1973), reprint of 1951 publication, pp. 4-6.
2. For a comparison of interest in this matter to Muslims, see my "Ethnic Group Pressures in Foreign Policy: Indian Muslims and American Jews," *Economic and Political Weekly*, XVII, 40 (Oct. 9, 1982), pp. 1655-1660. For the contrary interpretation, see Steven L. Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).
3. The concept of paradigm was Thomas Kuhn's in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
4. Seymour M. Lipset and Everett C. Ladd, Jr., "Jewish Academics in the United States", in Marshall Sklare, ed., *The Jew in American Society* (New York: Behrman, 1974), pp. 255-288. Charles E. Silberman, *A Certain People* (New York: Summit Books, 1985), reports in Chapter 6, The more recent renewal of American Judaism even among Jewish intellectuals and academics.
5. On the ethnic composition of the Caucus for the New Political Science, see the letter to the editor of *P.S.*, Vol. II, No. 2 (Spring, 1969) by Milton Colvin.
6. Seymour M. Lipset, "Jewish Sociologists and Sociologists of the Jews", *Jewish Social Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 3, July 1955, p. 177.
7. Lipset and Ladd, *op.cit.*, pp. 262, 266-267.
8. "Identity Problems of Declining Former Elite Minorities: South Asian Muslims and North American 'Wasps'", Occasional Paper Series of the Muslim Studies Subcommittee of the Committee on Southern Asian Studies, University of Chicago, 1972. Republished in *Secular Democracy* (Delhi), V, 8 (August, 1972), pp. 43-51 and in *Journal of Asian Affairs*, I, 2 (Fall 1976), pp. 58-63.
9. Ernest Maass, "Integration and Name Changing among Jewish Refugees from Central Europe in the United States", *Names*, VI (Sept. 1956), pp. 129-171.
10. Lewis Coser, *Refugee Scholars in America; Their Impact and Their Experiences* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).
11. Dan A. Oren in his *Joining the Club: A History of Jews and Yale* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), explains the decline of anti-Semitic discrimination in terms of a change in the climate of general public opinion after World War II in which the main foe, Nazi Germany, was identified with anti-Semitism.
12. Coser notes that refugees from the Austrian school of quantitative economists flourished much more in the United States than those from the German historical school of economists. The welfare state needed econometrics for manipulation of the national economy for the sake of full employment.
13. Thorstein Veblen, "The Intellectual Preeminence of Jews in Modern Europe," in his *Essays in Our Changing Order* (New York: Viking, 1934), quoted by Lipset, *op.cit.*, p. 279. The concepts of "insider" and "outsider" come from Robert Merton. See Peter Berger, *Pyramids of Sacrifice*, for a more critical view of intellectuals.
14. Irving L. Horowitz, *The Three Worlds of Development* (New York: Oxford, 1966). The series on "Studies in Political Development" was sponsored by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council whose Jewish members included Almond, Binder, Hyman, Neumann, Verba, Weiner and Zolberg. Kemal Karpat, a Turk, was the only Muslim participant.

15. The blockage thesis comes from Robert Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, (New York: the Free Press, 1957), via Everett Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change*, (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1962). I employed it in "Muslim Mobility in India through Peripheral Occupations: Music, Sports, Cinema, Smuggling," in *Asie du Sud*, Marc Gaborieau et Alice Thorner, eds., (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1979), pp. 271-281.
16. Nathan Glazer, "Social Characteristics of American Jews," in *The Jews*, Louis Finkelstein, ed. (New York: Harper Row, 1949, 1960), pp. 1722-1724. One might speculate here that the rapid ethnic succession of Jews to WASPS in academia was facilitated by strong similarities in certain aspects of Jewish culture and that of the New England, Calvinist subset of WASPS: parsimony, high value attached to education, contentiousness, lack of an authoritarian priesthood, Yankee ingenuity, Yankee sharp dealing and aggressiveness, even to the Puritan belief that they were God's Chosen People sent into New England the way God sent the Israelites into Canaan, and the widespread use of Old Testament names in colonial New England. See Cleveland Amory, *The Proper Bostonian* (New York: Dutton, 1947) and Nathaniel Weyl, *The Jew in American Politics* New Rochelle: Random House, 1968), pp. 32-33.
17. For the middleman minority, see Walter Zenner, "Middleman Minority Theories – A Critical Review" in *Sourcebook on the New Immigration*, R. S. Bryce Laprote et. al. eds (New Brunswick: Transaction Books for Smithsonian Institution), pp. 413-426.
18. Charles Kadushin, *The American Intellectual Elite* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), p. 23. For a more naive version, see Nathaniel Weyl, *The Creative Elite in America* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1966).
19. Fred R. Van der Mehden, "American Perceptions of Islam," in *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, John L. Epsposito, ed. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982), pp. 18-31.
20. Modammed E. Ahrari, "Domestic Context of U.S. Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East," paper for the 1985 Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, citing Roger Cobb and Charles Elder, *Participation in America: the Dynamics of Agenda-Building* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974).
21. E.g., Ismā'il R. al Fārūqī, *Islamization of Knowledge (Washington: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1402/1982)*, pp. 1-8.
22. John Murray Cuddihy, *The Ordeal of Civility: Freud, Marx, Levi-Strauss and the Jewish Struggle with Modernity* (New York: Basic Books, 1974).
23. John G. Gunnell, "Social Science and Political Reality: the Problem of Explanation," *Social Research*, XXXV (1968), pp. 159-201. Of course, Leo Strauss and his followers also attacked behavioralism.
24. This is not to say that WASPS like Talcott Parsons and Harold Lasswell who studied in Germany did not become masters of jargon-mongering.
25. Lipset and Ladd, *op.cit.* pp. 278-285; Peter Berger, *Pyramids of Sacrifice* (New York: Anchor, 1976).
26. R. A. Schermerhorn (another WASP in the broader sense), coined the term in his *Comparative Ethnic Relations* (New York: Random House, 1970), p.8.
27. Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1969), foreshadowed this. The perception of it as judicial usurpation is shown in Raoul Berger, *Government by Judiciary* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).
28. Robert Gamer, *The Developing Nations* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1976), stood conventional development theory on its head by praising self-sufficient peasant communities and assigning to merchants the role of wreckers. Eric Wolf's *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper, 1969, is typical of the exploitative Marxist interest in peasants.

29. Cuddihy, *op.cit.*, Chapters 9 and 10.

30. Henry A. Turner, "The Party Affiliations of American Political Scientist," *Western Political Quarterly*, XVI (Sept. 1963), pp. 650-665.

31. *The Political Behavior of American Jews* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1956).

32. If this reasoning is correct, then one should expect a disproportionate number of Muslim intellectuals to emerge from the Muslim middleman minorities of India: Khojas, Bohras, Memons, but with a few exceptions like Hamza Alavi, Rāshiduddīn Khan, Asgherali Engineer and Mohammed Ayoob, this has not been the case.

33. *From Muslim to Islamic*, Volume 2, Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Convention of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists, Indianapolis, 1976, pp. 6-35.

34. M. 'Arif Ghayūr, "Muslims in the United States: Settlers and Visitors," the *Annals*, 454 (March 1981), pp. 150-163.

35. For example, AbdulHamīd AbūSulaymān, "Islamization of Knowledge with Special Reference to Political Science," *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, II:2 (December 1985), pp. 263-289.

36. Current attempts to do this by young American scholars are the doctoral dissertations of Grace Clark at the University of Maryland on Zakāt Administration in Pakistan, and of Frank Vogel of Harvard on the application of Shariat law in Saudi Arabia. For Clark, see *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan*, Anita Weiss, ed. (Syracuse University Press, 1986), pp. 79-95.

37. From the perceptive article by A. Muhammad Ma'rūf, "Towards an Islamic Critique of Anthropological Evolutionism," *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, III.1 (September 1986), pp. 89-103. In the above judgment, I am disagreeing with Sulaymān S. Nyang and Mumtāz Ahmad, who, in "The Muslim Intellectual Emigre in the United States," *Islamic Culture*, LIX:3 (July 1985), p. 290, argue that "Muslim emigre intellectuals... seem to have successfully and effectively penetrated into the mainstream of American scholarship."

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