

# Salafism and Traditionalism: Scholarly Authority in Modern Islam

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Emad Hamdeh's *Salafism and Traditionalism: Scholarly Authority in Modern Islam* is a meticulous study of a contemporary debate about scholarly legitimacy, between the Salafī hadith-scholar Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī and his traditional Sunnī interlocutors, focused on disputes over both hadiths and Islamic Law (*fiqh*). The book is a welcome addition to contemporary studies about Salafism, which (as the author observes) often tend to focus on political dimensions of the movement, at the expense of religious elements—this although the latter may be more significant in the sense that most Salafīs themselves view their initiative as primarily religious, and not necessarily political.

The book consists of seven chapters, plus an introduction and conclusion. The chapters are arranged in three parts, which are devoted to historical context (chapters 1-3), *fiqh* (4, 5), and hadith (6, 7), respectively. Chapter 1 serves to set the stage, by introducing the Salafī movement and the Traditional (pro-*madhhab*) camps, as well as how both these groups differ in outlook and methodology from Islamic modernists. After this general overview, Chapter 2 moves on to discuss, more specifically, the life of Shaykh al-Albānī, and to briefly introduce some of his

Traditionalist interlocutors. Chapter 3 discusses how scholarly authority is conceived of in Traditionalist circles, and also explains how modernity presented challenges to scholars within this camp. Chapter 4 explains the diversity of opinion that has always existed within Islamic law, and how Muslim scholars have approached it, including discussion of whether scripture is clear or complex, and the concept of scholarly consensus. Chapter 5 presents the *ijtihād-taqlīd* debate, and the spectrum of views on the importance of the schools of law (*madhhabs*). Chapter 6 outlines the different views on the use of *ḍaʿīf* (weak) hadiths. Chapter 7 discusses Albānī's hadith criticism, and the response of his adversaries, and then closes with an evaluation of Albānī impact on contemporary hadith studies. The conclusion is a nice wrap-up of important topics and key issues at stake. The entire book is just over 200 pages, but it is clear that extensive research has gone into it.

Chapter 1 explains how the rise of modernity, and the associated challenge to the authority of the ulema, led to three broad trends of responses among Muslims: (1) *Modernists*, such as Abduh, Riḍā, and Abū Rayya, who sought to reform Islam by addressing the Muslim disconnect from advances in human knowledge, and perceived the need for Muslims to unite against the military threat of the West. Although the modernists were typically regarded with contempt by the two remaining groups, they did have an influence on the anti-*madhhab* Salafī thought. Modernists sometimes came from outside the ulema aristocracy, but in Syria they gained legitimacy through leaders who were rooted within the tradition. Hamdeh also introduces contemporary modernists, such as Ghazālī and Qaraḍāwī, who had hostile brushes with Albānī. (2) *Traditionalists*, who are united by their affirmation of the importance of *madhhab*, *kalam*, and Sufism, and a method of inquiry rooted in a continuous tradition of scholarship that allows for gradual change, preferably during periods of stability. He clarifies that the traditionalists follow the scholarship heritage of the *madhhab*, and not merely the eponym of the *madhhab*. He comments that different opinions “remain part of the *madhhab* as long as they adhere to the methodology laid down by the founder of the school” (23). It would have been worthwhile for Hamdeh to point out that the founders often did not explicitly lay down their methodology

(leaving it to later scholars of the *madhhab* to infer these principles), and that disagreement on some of these principles did not necessarily lead to a scholar being excluded from the *madhhab*, as Kaya has discussed.<sup>1</sup> (3) *Salafīs*, who are distinct from modernists (although they are sometimes confused because of Rida's having identified as both, and because the Matkaba Salafīyya published many books by early modernists). Hamdeh explains the etymology of the term Salafī, and the fact that Salafīs are generally united by their opposition to figurative ("metaphoric or symbolic," 28) interpretation of descriptions of God, and to idolatrous practices and heresy (*bid'a*). He gives a useful taxonomy of contemporary (and often rival) threads within Salafism, including those of the Saudi establishment, the Saḥwa dissenters, and the Madkhalīs. He also employs the term 'purist Salafī' to refer to Albānī's strand of Salafism, which is characterized by iconoclastic anti-madhhabism and which has a supreme concern with the authority of texts, regardless of whether the application would be consistent with public welfare (in contrast with the modernists).

Given the broad scope of this chapter, it is understandable that the author had to be selective, and so the following critiques should not be seen as overshadowing the worth of Hamdeh's discussion here. Missing from Hamdeh's taxonomy (although this might be a conscious omission) are those who pursue an Albānī-like methodology in *fiqh* but not necessarily in theology, such as Aḥmad al-Ghumārī (d. 1970) who went even further than Albānī by deeming it *shirk* (polytheism) to follow a *madhhab* in preference to hadith.<sup>2</sup> Also missing are Salafī groups from outside the Middle East, such as the South Asian Ahl-e Hadith (who are mentioned in passing later on page 161) and Indonesian Muḥammadiyya. Hamdeh correctly observes that although Salafīs draw on the legacy of Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, and others, there is no single progenitor of Salafism. I would proffer to add that the Salafīs also have things in common with the tradition of the third-century hadith-folk, as described by Shah Wali-Allah in his *Inṣāf*. Hamdeh comments that purist Salafīs regard as heresy even things that "most Salafīs would consider innocuous." An example would have been helpful here. Similarly, Hamdeh's observation that the purist Salafīs are not strictly literalists (37) could have benefitted from further elaboration. Hamdeh comments

that although the Saudi Salafīs “acknowledged that a stronger proof-text would trump the school’s teachings, this concession was largely rhetorical” (31). This is not accurate. Ibn ‘Uthaymīn’s *al-Sharḥ al-Mumtī*’, a commentary on the Ḥanbalī summary-text *Zād al-Mustaḥṣin*’, is replete with scores (even hundreds) of cases where Ibn ‘Uthaymīn diverges from the *madhhab* on the strength of his evaluation of the evidence, at times even taking a view from outside all four Sunnī *madhhabs*.

Chapter 3 gives an outline of Albānī’s biography as context for his hadith criticism, and presents numerous examples of the strength of his conviction that led him to be viewed as charismatic by his followers and pretentious by his detractors. We are told about Albānī’s falling out with his father over adherence to the Hanafī *madhhab*, his work as a repairer of watches, and the rise of his popularity within Syria. We learn about his three-year stay in Saudi Arabia, after Shaykh Ibn Bāz invited him to teach at the University of Madinah, and his subsequent clashes with the Saudi Salafī scholars over issues such as the number of *rak‘a* of *tarāwīḥ*, whether women are required to cover their faces, and whether women are allowed to wear gold in the form of a full circle. Albānī’s interactions and disagreements (mainly concerning political participation) with the Muslim Brotherhood are also explained. The confrontational picture that Hamdeh paints of Albānī is ameliorated by some humanizing anecdotes which show another side to this polarizing figure: Albānī’s refusal to excommunicate Sayyid Qutb, despite being pressed to do so by one of his followers, and Albānī’s telling students to refrain from haranguing Ḥabīb al-Raḥmān al-A‘zamī because of his age and illness. Indeed, as Hamdeh points out in more than one place in the book, Albānī seems to have mellowed somewhat in his later years. Hamdeh concludes the chapter by introducing some prominent Traditionalist detractors of Albānī, including the Syrian émigré to Saudi Arabia Abū Ghudda, the South Asian Ḥabīb al-Raḥmān al-A‘zamī and Muḥammad [‘Abd al-Rashīd] al-Nu‘mānī, the Syrian Būṭī, the Moroccan Ghumārīs, and their students Maḥmūd Sa‘īd Mamdūh and Ḥasan Saqqāf. Hamdeh’s observation that, “What all of Albānī’s detractors have in common is an allegiance to the *madhhabs* and a rejection of his approach to the Islamic legal tradition” (58) is generally true, although the Ghumārīs are a prominent exception.

Chapter 3 is a slightly modified version of an article originally published in this journal (*AJIS* 37:1-2 (2020)). It explains the mechanism of religious authority within the Traditionalist camp, and how Salafī autodidacts in the age of media threatened this authority. Hamdeh explains the importance for Traditionalists of the student-teacher link (modeled on the Prophet-Companion relationship) that culminates in award of an *ijāza*, and how that the fact that Albānī did not have formal teachers in hadith was often used against him by Traditionalists. The author explains that there was the danger of haphazardness if this Traditionalist system was bypassed, and the system was designed to prevent non-experts from speaking about religion. Hamdeh poses the question of how the formal recognition conferred through an *ijāza* differs from contemporary scholars acknowledging someone’s learning and scholarship (as we find for Albānī) without granting a formal *ijāza*. ‘Awwama provides part of the answer: that the student-teacher link allows the student to imbibe the good character traits of the teacher; he gives the example of Ibn Hazm, whose harshness against those he disagrees with has been attributed to his lack of *talaqqī*. Hamdeh has mentioned “respect for scholarly authorities” (63) but did not explicitly state this conclusion. Indeed, as Hamdeh observes, what enraged Traditionalists about Albānī is *how* he disagreed. One might also mention here that Aḥmad al-Ghumārī, a Sufi Traditionalist detractor of Albānī, acknowledged that Albānī was “very, very excellent” in his knowledge of hadith (*aqbala ‘alā ‘ilm al-hadīth fa-atqanahū jiddan jiddan*), but that his stubbornness stood in the way of his being truly eminent.<sup>3</sup>

Hamdeh also points out the importance of stability and conformance for Traditionalists, but observes that some of them did occasionally arrive at controversial conclusions. It would have been useful to point out the role of consensus in this, and the etiquettes of how one disagrees, and also that many Traditionalists have a few anomalous views, but that these have generally been tolerated unless these issues become many, or split the unity of the community, or are related to fundamental issues, as Shāṭibī has discussed.<sup>4</sup> Hamdeh’s observation about the importance of aural transmission for hadith transmission in particular is generally true, but it is worth noting that in later times (certainly by the time Traditionalism had

reached its “mature, institutionalized form,” 22), with the near-ubiquity of the contents of hadith compilations, the requirement for aurality was significantly relaxed. The *ijāza ‘amma*, which potentially even authorized a student to transmit hadith without any study with the teacher, was widely deemed acceptable, and the perpetuation of the *isnāds* for hadith became largely symbolic, “for blessings.”

Hamdeh goes to explain other factors that contributed to the decline of Traditionalist authority: the loss of economic stability due to discontinuation of state patronage of ulema, the emergence of the printing press and the resulting democratization of knowledge, and the rise of the modern university model of education and accompanying attitude of dismissiveness towards classical texts. He mentions that Traditionalists were “skeptical of Western influence ... rejecting the West and its advancements” (74). In my opinion, this is an over-simplification, and there were other factors contributing to the inimical attitude of many Traditionalists to the West. Hamdeh presents the Egyptian accountant-turned-popular preacher Amr Khaled as an example of a non-specialist threatening the authority of the ulema. I would comment that the content of Khaled’s preaching is largely traditional, bringing traditional knowledge down to the level of the common people, and might be considered analogous to one family member sharing with the rest what he/she learned from an *‘alim* at the mosque, or non-ulema Sufi shaykhs of the past providing religious guidance to the masses, or even the work of the *quṣṣāṣ* (who admittedly were seen as a danger by the ulema). Eickelmann has similarly observed how even among traditional students, a portion of their learning is from their peers during review sessions amongst themselves.<sup>5</sup> Of course, Khaled’s preaching is on a much larger scale, and this can be seen as encroaching on the role of the ulema. Hamdeh closes the chapter with a section about why Traditionalists had reservations about self-learning, and how they were forced to make use of modern media, “to remain relevant and compete” (94).

Chapter 4 discusses how pluralism has always been a feature of Islamic law, because most scholars recognized that the transmission and import of many sacred texts convey less than full certainty. This is relevant to the subject, because Albānī claimed that certainty can be obtained

in *fiqh*; and although he did allow for some difference of opinion, he tried to limit the scope of disagreement by re-evaluating evidence from the Qur'an and sunna and rejecting some scholarly opinions that he saw as contradicting the evidence. Thus (as pointed out in Chapter 5) he viewed his project not as merely another *madhhab*. Hamdeh does well to identify commonalities between Albānī and the Traditionalists, including the fact that they both agree that not *all* interpretations are valid, and that it is not allowed to cherry-pick from scholarly opinions based on whim or self-interest. Hamdeh mentions the Mu'tazilites as having "rejected probability in Islamic law" (103), but it is worth noting that this dissent was largely hypothetical, for most of the Mu'tazilites followed the Sunni *madhhabs* (especially the Ḥanafī) in practice. Hamdeh astutely points out that while Traditionalists view scripture as "complex and multivalent" sources of law, namely, requiring interpretation by trained scholars, the purist Salafis in contrast see the Qur'an and sunna not as sources, but as clear statements of the law itself. Consequently, Albānī saw a good deal of scholarly disagreement to be a result of straying from the proof-texts under the influence of fanaticism or party-spirit (*ta'aṣṣub*). Hamdeh illustrates this with reference to Albānī's book *Ṣifat al-Ṣalāt*, which is viewed by purist Salafis as the "ultimate criterion" on how to pray correctly, and the more specific case of whether in *ṣalāt* the hands should be folded over the chest or left hanging by the sides. Hamdeh points out a weakness in Albānī's view regarding the self-evidentiality of scripture, namely than Ibn Ḥazm (for instance) made a similar claim to Albānī's, yet we find Ibn Ḥazm and Albānī disagreeing on some issues. Hamdeh points out that Albānī's response (i.e. that Ibn Ḥazm lacked expertise in hadith) could be used against Albānī himself.

The chapter then turns to address the concept of scholarly consensus (*ijmā'*), which has been accepted as authoritative by Traditionalists, who often criticized Albānī for violating it. Incidentally, Hamdeh's comment that "Consensus means that all of the jurists of any generation after the Prophet are certain that what they have understood is actually what God intended" (120) could have been more precisely worded. If each individual jurist was certain, then it would be because the text was decisive, and in that case an appeal to consensus would be redundant. Consensus is

relevant to issues where each individual jurist arrives at a probabilistic conclusion; but after they realize that they all agree, then they conclude that the conclusion is not merely probabilistic but certain (if they accept the authority of consensus).

Hamdeh explains that Albānī accepts *ijmāʿ* in principle, but observes that it is difficult to realize in practice. Additionally, Albānī would give priority to an *aḥad* hadith over *ijmāʿ*, whereas most Traditionalists would do the reverse on the basis that the hadith is probabilistic (*ẓannī*) whereas *ijmāʿ* is certain (*qaṭʿī*). Albānī’s prohibition of full-circle gold rings is used to illustrate this concept. Albānī rejects the validity of the consensus on this issue, whereas Traditionalists appeal to the fact that no other scholar agreed with Albānī, and also to historical reality of Muslim women having worn gold throughout history without scholars criticizing this. In Albānī’s partial defense, I may point out that the *ijmāʿ* on this issue could be deemed probabilistic, and therefore if it conflicts with a probabilistic hadith then either of the two conclusions could be equivalent on the epistemological level. Additionally, the Companion Abū Hurayra is reported to have similarly prohibited full-circle gold, although many scholars have interpreted this view as personal precaution. Hamdeh goes on to observe that the purist Salafīs are on shaky ground for accepting the transmission of Qur’an and hadith through traditionalist scholars, but not accepting their *fiqh*. To be fair, this is debatable, for ‘Traditionalism’ (in the sense understood here) was a later development, and many transmitters of the first two to three centuries of Islam were not followers of *madhhabs*. Furthermore, a purist Salafi might respond that skepticism is justified for *fiqh*, because it is a human invention (at least, according to the purist Salafīs), whereas hadith transmission does not involve human input. Admittedly, if the Salafīs do regard the Traditionalist scholars as morally corrupt, then it would be a problem to accept hadith from them.

Chapter 5 continues to address the disputes in the domain of *fiqh* by covering the attitudes of the two rival camps towards the *madhhabs*: are they a “valuable, collective scholarly understanding” (129) of Sharia, or a blameworthy accretion to Islam and a fallible human effort to be regarded with suspicion? Hamdeh explains that purist Salafīs try



to follow the *salaf*, whom he explains as those who lived before 300H. It should be noted that although this is one interpretation of the word *qarn* (which occurs in the famous hadith used to prove the excellence of the *salaf*), there are other views. Ibn Taymiyya understood it to refer to generations, not centuries, and that therefore that the *salaf* are those who lived until around 130H.<sup>6</sup> Hamdeh points out that the purist Salafī notion that the role of the scholar is merely to present the relevant proof-text to the layman is incoherent, as it assumes that the layman can understand the proof-text, even while the purist Salafīs agree that a layman is not a scholar. This segues into presentation of two contradictory views from Albānī: an earlier view strongly against *taqlīd*, and a later view that acknowledges a role for it on the basis that it is not always feasible for the scholar to explain his scholarly reasoning. It seems Albānī was at pains to distinguish his allowed *taqlīd* from that of the Traditionalists, by saying that the Salafī does not restrict himself to following only scholars of one *madhhab* and also that the layman is obligated to leave a fatwa if it becomes clear to him that it is wrong. Hamdeh speculates that Albānī initially needed to attack *taqlīd* in order to establish and validate himself, following which his position mellowed. Even so, Hamdeh does not present his grounds for saying that Albānī was actually seeking fame and validation, as opposed to his views having merely matured with time. The chapter also makes a few other important points: that the purist Salafīs were the first sizeable group to be not only anti-*taqlīd*, but also anti-*madhhab*; that the Traditionalists generally set a high (even unattainable) bar for qualifications to become a *mujtahid*; and that purist Salafīs (along with some Traditionalists) felt that power and unity would come through a return to implementation of rituals based on Qur'an and sunna. Hamdeh also discusses the anti-*madhhab* book by another purist Salafī scholar, Khujandī (from Khujanda, in Tajikistan), and the Traditionalist Būṭī's response to him.

Chapter 6 discusses the debate, which has continued through the centuries, among ulema on the use of weak hadiths. Purist Salafīs insist that Islam does not need weak hadith, and that these are the source of many superstitions and false beliefs. Hamdeh presents a response from the Traditionalist 'Awwama, that scholars should not be held responsible

for misapplication of this concept by laymen. Hamdeh cites that in the third century there was a near-consensus regarding the permissibility of using weak hadith (a source for this statement would have been helpful), and explains the three conditions that Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī (d. 852/1449) later stipulated for such use. He explains how Albānī deconstructs these conditions, and concludes that they were designed to prevent the use of weak hadiths. He also presents other arguments for his view opposing the use of weak hadiths. Hamdeh points out that both parties agree that there is a low probability that a weak hadith is the words of the Prophet. He perceptively observes that the crux of the disagreement between the two camps is regarding what ‘safety’ implies: the purist Salafī say safety calls for *not* acting on the weak hadith, whereas many Traditionalists are of the view that one should act on the weak hadith to be safe (because there is a chance that the Prophet said it). For the purist Salafīs and those who share their view here, *isnād*-analysis should be regarded as paramount, whereas the other side looks beyond the *isnād* to things like whether the *matn* (content of the hadith) has a valid meaning, the pedagogical value of weak hadith, and communal practice. Hamdeh illustrates the last of these by a case study of Albānī’s solitary view that it is a *bid‘a* for the *tarāwīḥ* prayer to be more than eleven *rak‘a*. The chapter concludes with an analysis of Albānī’s project of dividing each of the canonical Sunni hadith books (and others) into two based on whether each hadith is weak, in an effort to make these books more useful to laymen (who could disregard the weak narrations). Hamdeh discusses the critiques of this project from the Traditionalists Saqqāf and Mamdūḥ.

Chapter 7 is devoted to the Traditionalist response to Albānī’s declaring weak some hadith in the Two *Ṣaḥīḥs*, Bukharī and Muslim, and also an evaluation of the impact of Albānī on contemporary hadith studies among Muslims. Hamdeh rightly points out that the claim of some Traditionalists, that the contents of the Two *Ṣaḥīḥs* had been accepted by *ijmā‘*, is not accurate, even though the number of disputed hadith within these two books is small. In response to Traditionalist fears that publicizing such issues might lead some laymen to doubt or to go astray, Albānī retorts that people have a right to know the truth. Hamdeh presents a synopsis of Traditionalist responses to Albānī, which vary between

defending the authenticity of the specific hadiths that Albānī impugned, to resorting to a slippery slope argument (that opening the door to critique of the Two *Ṣaḥīḥs* might lead others, especially unqualified people, to find fault with additional hadiths in these books). Hamdeh discusses in some detail Albānī’s claim that Muslim’s narrations through Abū Zubayr from Jābir have a discontinuous isnad, and Traditionalist responses to this.

Other Traditionalist critiques of Albānī’s methodology in hadith authentication are also mentioned. These include: 1) The allegation that Albānī relied on abridgement of *rijāl* works (most prominently *Taqrīb al-Tahdhīb*), rather than consulting more detailed works. Hamdeh rightly observes that while Albānī might sometimes have relied on abridgments, it is very unlikely that he always did so. 2) Salāh Iḍlibī’s charge that Albānī sometimes misunderstood the terminology of hadith scholars. 3) The critique that Albānī based his judgments on hadith on only three of the five criteria used to determine whether a hadith is *ṣaḥīḥ*. It would have been good to point out here that even some Salafīs shared this concern—and indeed the source that Hamdeh cites here is a book written by an author from the Salafī stronghold of Qaṣīm. 4) The argument made by some Traditionalists that later hadith scholars are not allowed to reach independent judgments on hadith, but must rely on the gradings from earlier scholars, who had more knowledge about the hadith narrators due to their chronological proximity to the Prophet.

Hamdeh goes on to note that Albānī single-handedly changed the course of modern hadith studies, by his insistence that people evaluate hadiths before quoting them. He also notes that a unique contribution of Albānī is that he revived interest in authenticating hadith, such that even Traditionalists were forced to argue on his terms, and also that Albānī graded hadiths in books that had not been previously analyzed (such as Ibn ‘Asākir’s *Tārīkh*). Hamdeh notes Albānī’s methodology in hadith was not much different from that of Traditionalists, but that “Albānī preferred textual conformity, while his critics preferred historical realism” (202). This section serves as an apt closing for the book. It would have been nice for the author to have mentioned that in spite of Albānī’s hostility to Traditionalist institutions, he did give *ijāza* to a handful of scholars,

including the Sudanese Muṣāʿid al-Bashīr. This is in line with the general trend we have seen of Albānī softening his stances as he matured. Similarly, after the dust settled, we do see some Traditionalists acknowledging the importance of Albānī. For example, the library of the Dār al-Ḥadīth (Center for Advanced Hadith Studies) in the staunchly Ḥanafi Islamic University in Binnori Town, Karachi, contains a sizeable section devoted to Albānī’s books, in acknowledgment of his efforts, although students are cautioned against his anomalous views.

The “Conclusion” summarizes the factors that led to the weakening of Traditionalists’ authority and facilitated the rise of Salafīs, particularly autodidacts. Hamdeh observes that Salafīs are characterized by a purist approach and (often) a lack of etiquette, and that they find wide appeal. He also recaps what the two camps have in common, and underscores that a major difference between them is over the question of whether authority is vested in scholars or in scripture only. Albānī discredits the *madhhabs*, and Traditionalists in turn discredit Albānī because he is self-taught. They accuse him of trying to overshadow past ulema, and feel that forsaking tradition will destroy the religion. Hamdeh points out that Albānī does not account for other pathways to deviation besides weak hadiths used by Traditionalist ulema. Each camp viewed the other as a threat to the integrity of Islam. The final paragraph contains the interesting reflection that purist Salafīs and Traditionalists “ultimately balance each other at a communal level” (207).

To conclude: this book’s 200-odd pages are packed with detailed information, along with some astute insights. The author has clearly been diligent in his research, and has made a concerted effort to present often heated debates with even-handedness. The language is generally lucid and precise, with only the occasional opaque statement or inaccuracy. The only thing I would say is missing is a discussion (even brief) of some of Albānī’s theological views. I believe this would have helped underscore Hamdeh’s point about Albānī’s independent spirit. The critiques that I have brought up earlier during this review do not detract from the value of the book as a whole, and some of them can be attributed to the limitations of space. For those who seek insight into how traditional scholarship fared in modernity, and for those who want

to know the underpinnings and prominent issues of contention in the purist Salafī–Traditionalist debate still alive today, I highly recommend this excellent book.

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## Endnotes

- 1 Eyyup Said Kaya, "Continuity and Change in Islamic Law: The Concept of Madhhab and the Dimensions of Legal Disagreement in Hanafi Scholarship of the Tenth Century," in *The Islamic School of Law: Evolution, Devolution, and Progress*, International Conference on Islamic Legal Studies, ed. Peri Bearman, Rudolph Peters, Frank Vogel, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 26-40.
- 2 Aḥmad al-Ghumārī, *al-Jawāb al-Mufīd lil-Sā'il al-Mustafīd* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1423/2002), 98.
- 3 Aḥmad al-Ghumārī, *Darr al-Ghamām al-Raqīq bi-Rasā'il al-Shaykh al-Sayyid Aḥmad ibn al-Ṣiddīq*, ed. ʿAbd-Allāh al-Talīdī (Beirut: Dār al-Bashā'ir, 2000), 191. See also his brother's similar comments: ʿAbd-Allāh al-Ghumārī, *Sabīl al-Tawfīq fi Tarjamat ʿAbd-Allāh ibn Ṣiddīq* (Cairo: Maṭba'at Dār al-Bayān, 1985), 49.
- 4 Shāṭibī, *al-Fṭiṣām* ([Saudi Arabia]: Dār Ibn ʿAffān, 1412/1992), 2:713.
- 5 Dale Eickelmann, "The Art of Memory: Islamic Education and Its Social Reproduction," in *Comparing Muslim Societies: Knowledge and the State in a World Civilization*, ed. Juan R.I. Cole (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), 110.
- 6 Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmū' al-Fatāwā*, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ibn Qāsīm (Madinah: King Fahd Printing Complex, 1995/1416), 3rd ed., 10:357.