

# Westernization, Mahmud II, and the Islamic Virtue Tradition

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## **Abstract**

The Ottoman reforms of the nineteenth century sought a reconciliation between Islam and western civilization. The ulama played a key role in this process by supporting the reformers' desire to bring Islam closer to the needs of the age and of the empire. The reformers, chiefly Sultan Mahmud II and his close friends, gained the ulama's support to such an extent that the Shaykh al-Islam wrote a treatise to persuade the masses to accept the reforms. Applying the traditional virtue literature to the Ottoman dynasty, he presented Sultan Mahmud II as an ideal caliph-sultan. This effort helped to westernize the traditional Ottoman political structure and society.

## **Introduction**

In the Muslim world, rulers have traditionally needed the ulama's cooperation for at least two reasons: the religious leaders' ability to confer legitimacy upon the political ruler and to serve as intermediaries between the rulers and the ruled in order to calm restive elements and win acceptance for unpopular measures. Throughout Islamic history, the ulama have been divided when faced with such a choice. The official ulama (*al-'ulama' al-rasmi*) have always been on the side of authority, stability, and peace. Some claim that such support has an economic aspect: since the rulers have paid

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their salaries, they have tried to legitimize the official policy in the eyes of the masses by citing the Qur'an: "... killing [in this sense stability or authority] is preferable to anarchy" (Qur'an 2:217). On the other hand, the non-official ulama (*al-'ulama' ghayr al-rasmi*), who have been economically independent of the government and have no official post, have often been outspoken critics of the rulers, based on their interpretation of another verse: "... commanding right and forbidding wrong both at the individual and the governmental level" (Qur'an 3:110).

Since the state and religion always needed each other, these two spheres formed an uneasy partnership (with the ruler holding up the upper hand) to preside over Islamic society. In essence, this unwritten contract required the ruler to grant the ulama certain privileges (e.g., semi-autonomous control over judicial and educational institutions, a voice in or a veto over policies affecting the religious establishment, and a share of the country's wealth) in return for their support.

The ulama's political and economic power declined whenever the rulers created a centralized bureaucracy and secularized the justice and education systems. Vulnerable or weak regimes invariably protected their flanks by consolidating the religious leaders in a variety of ways, such as publicly deferring to their elevated social status, conferring with them on a regular (if largely ceremonial) basis, participating in Muslim feast days (Ramadan) and activities, constructing and endowing mosques and religious schools, and especially by avoiding governmental violations of religious conventions. Even those administrations that decided upon a policy of westernization and secularization tried to work out tactics to retain the ulama's support – or at least to neutralize their potential opposition.

## **The Reforms of Mahmud II**

After its armies suffered heavy defeats at Europe's hands, the Ottoman Empire embarked upon an internal reform program inspired by European models. Acknowledging the fact that they were behind Europe in military terms, the Ottomans first sought to reform the army. Therefore, Mahmud II (reigned 1808-39) carried on the military reforms initiated by his predecessor. In 1826, with all ranks of the ulama behind him, he eliminated the Janissary corps and organized the *Asâkir-i Mansure-i Muhammadiya*.<sup>1</sup> After this, he began to widen his reforms to encompass the empire's financial, administrative, educational, and even social and cultural spheres.

To provide the necessary financial resources for his reform program, from 1813 onward he gradually put all official and non-official *waqf* (charitable foundation) revenue under the care of the Awkâf-i Humayun Nezareti. This was accomplished in 1831.<sup>2</sup> In addition, he managed to make the ulama and some Sufi leaders employees of the government. Mainly for economic purposes, the Muqata'at Hazinesi (a new military treasury) took over and administered the most important and larger *iltizams* (the farming out of tax collection). A similar treasury, the Tershane Hazinesi, was established to support the navy. Some economic burdens were imposed on shops and markets, such as the holy war taxes (*rusumat-i jihadiyye*).<sup>3</sup>

Mahmud II devoted an increasing amount of attention to education and opened training centers for the new army and the *hassa* (military) corps. Despite strong opposition, he sent the first group of 150 students to European countries (e.g., England, France, Prussia, and Austria) in 1827.<sup>4</sup> To a large extent, his educational reforms sought to create new educated elite along western lines as an alternative to the madrasa-educated elite (viz., the ulama).

As for social reforms, Mahmud II started by changing the soldiers' appearance and, later on, that of the civilians. In 1826, western tunics and trousers were formally accepted as the uniform of the Asâkir-i Mansure.<sup>5</sup> After some hesitation among the ulema and other state dignitaries, in 1828 the sultan ordered the ulema to sanction a new head-gear (the fez),<sup>6</sup> and they complied. In addition, an 1829 edict imposed regulations concerning the clothing worn by the different estates within the empire. According to this edict, all state employees but the ulama, who were allowed to keep the traditional dress, now had to wear the fez, frockcoats (*jubbe* or *harvani*), trousers, and black leather boots.<sup>7</sup>

Meanwhile, Ottoman palaces and the pashas' houses (*Pasha Konaklari*) started to be decorated and furnished with European-style furniture.<sup>8</sup> Western social manners and habits began to appear, especially in the social life of the upper-class state dignitaries who had started enjoying western-style entertainment and recreation as well. For example, inside the foreign embassies Ottoman men began dancing with the wives of foreign ambassadors.<sup>9</sup> In addition, the sultan introduced European protocol for receiving foreign diplomats<sup>10</sup> and even ordered the officials to trim their beards or shave them off completely.<sup>11</sup> European saddles became fashionable and symbols of reverence in Istanbul.<sup>12</sup> Before Mahmud II's edict, Monday and Thursday used to be holidays; now, only Thursday was recognized as a holiday by government offices.<sup>13</sup>

Mahmud II improved communications for his centralization policy and propaganda campaign. In 1831, the empire's first Turkish newspaper, *Takvim-i Vekayi*, was published to explain "the internal and external affairs of the Exalted State and changes."<sup>14</sup> Finally, we should mention that in 1832 hanging the sultan's portrait in government offices became compulsory. Although the majority of the ulama considered this a violation of the Shari'ah, a portrait of Mahmud II was sent to the Shaykh al-Islam's office.<sup>15</sup>

### Opposition to the Reforms

It is quite understandable that Mahmud II was in a difficult position. Various segments of Ottoman society did not approve of his adoption of European social and cultural practices, for these reforms threatened, to a certain extent, their social, political, and economic interests and status. Moreover, they engendered ideological arguments in society. Given an appropriate opportunity, the resentful sections were ready to express their anger and concern regarding the reforms.<sup>16</sup>

After the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29, self-criticism began in the capital. On the one hand, the sultan and his reformist group thought that more reforms were needed to strengthen the army. On the other hand, his opponents believed that the army's failure was a result of imitating infidels.<sup>17</sup> As pointed out earlier, the economic consequences of confiscating the *waqf* revenues pushed low-ranking ulama into the opposition. Lutfi reports that in 1829, many imams and *wa'izs* criticized the reforms during Ramadan; as a result, quite a number of ulama were exiled.<sup>18</sup> In 1829 and 1830, many of the dissatisfied ulama supported and joined the rebels all over the empire.<sup>19</sup> The *softas* (madrasa students) also strongly opposed the reform program.<sup>20</sup>

The Sufi orders opposed the reforms because they viewed them as having a negative impact upon their religious activities and economic interests.<sup>21</sup> Having suppressed the Janissaries, Mahmud II obtained a fatwa that accused the Bektashi order (the Janissaries' spiritual ally) of being heretics and so was able to abolish them.<sup>22</sup> Accused of sympathizing with the Bektashis, some ulama and members of the elite were also exiled.<sup>23</sup> The Mujaddidiyah and the Khalidiyah branches of the Naqshibandiyah order's emissaries, shaykhs, and a number of its adherents were also exiled on the charge of forcing people to join their order.<sup>24</sup>

The Sufis publicly protested the reforms. For instance, in 1829 during a Friday prayer attended by Shaykh al-Islam Abdulwahhab Efendi and other state dignitaries, a strange dervish cursed the *shaykh al-Islam*, accusing him

of influencing the sultan to adopt false rites.<sup>25</sup> Another dervish, Shaykh Sachli, stopped Mahmud II on the road and shouted at him: “Infidel sultan! God will demand an accounting for your blasphemy! You are destroying Islam and drawing down upon us the curse of the Prophet!”<sup>26</sup>

### Support of the High-ranking `Ulama

Carrying out a successful westernization reform program in a traditional Islamic society required the ulama’s participation and support. Mahmud II won them over, along with some other segments of society, by following two systematic strategies. First, he personally and deliberately followed a religious policy of building up and restoring a considerable number of mosques, *wakfs*, and *tekkes* (Sufi lodges); frequently attended Friday prayer; sometimes issued *firmons* calling upon the people to observe their religious duties<sup>27</sup>; made an Islamic primary education mandatory for all children; and gave poor ulama positions as imams in his new army and doubled their salaries when they grew restive.<sup>28</sup> Second, he seems to have decided to use the ulama’s legitimate power and role as intermediaries with the general public. Fortunately, their attitudes toward the reforms were largely determined by the realities of their time rather than the ideals of Islam. Over time and in view of certain political, economic, and social developments, they generally sanctioned all of the proposed reforms, quoting such legal maxims as “necessity permits what is prohibited,” the “lesser evil,”<sup>29</sup> and “public interest requires one to act in this way.”<sup>30</sup>

The ulama also gave constructive responses to the sultan’s direct appeal to his subjects by citing the traditional virtue literature (the *Fadhail*). This genre of literature, which glorified and exalted the Ottoman dynasty’s structure and basic characteristics, had been around from the very beginning. By focussing on the caliphate in these books, an effort was made to implement some traditional religious terms in order to legitimate the dynasty. The main objects of this literature were to glorify and legitimate the Ottoman dynasty in the eyes and judgment of its subjects; in other words, to use Islam as a political tool.<sup>31</sup>

For propaganda processes, Mahmud II ordered Shaykh al-Islam Sayyid Yasincizade Abdulwahhab Efendi to write a treatise in which the theory of obedience to and the virtue of the Ottoman dynasty would be explained in terms of the virtue literature.<sup>32</sup> In response, Abdulwahhab introduced his theory by collecting twenty-five hadith and writing some comments under the title of *Khulastu’l-Bayan fi ‘Itaati’s-Sultan*.<sup>33</sup> Its date of publication, 1247/

1831, is very important, for at this time the sultan's authority was being threatened by the opposition. Upon its completion, the treatise was distributed within Istanbul as well as the empire's main cities.<sup>34</sup> It apparently made a considerable contribution to instituting the theory of obedience to the caliph-sultan in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, for its arguments reappeared in the time of Abdulhamid II (reigned 1876-1909).<sup>35</sup>

There is no doubt that, to a large extent, the theory of obedience has been exploited by autocratic regimes throughout Muslim history. In the cases of Mahmud II and Abdulhamid II, the empire and the authority of its sultans were threatened by internal and external events. Therefore, they wanted to secure their position and pull the empire together. In Mahmud II's centralization policy and Abdulhamid II's pan-Islamic policy, such a theory was desperately needed to persuade the people to obey and stand by the caliph-sultan, their legitimate ruler.

## **Making a Westernized Reformer Caliph-Sultan**

### *The Necessity of a Ruler*

Seeking to support this centralization policy, Shaykh al-Islam Abdulwahhab first established the necessity for a ruler and then moved on to prove Mahmud II's fitness for this position. Finally, he concluded that it is a religious obligation to obey such a Muslim ruler in the matter of his reforms.

Abdulwahhab opened his argument with the medieval Islamic theory that human beings are social or political beings (*hayavan-i madani*) who must cooperate in order to meet each other's requirements. Al-Ghazzali (d. 505/1111) made the same argument, stating:

... men [and women] had to live in a society and were exposed to quarrels and conflict. Therefore, they need a principle of power (*sultan*) to guide them and to arbitrate in their disputes. Such a principle required a norm (*qanun*) to enable differences to be solved and decisions based on law to be imposed.<sup>36</sup>

Abdulwahhab accepted the same argument, stating that "human beings are in need of solidarity and cooperation between each other, because every one has different abilities in issues of livelihood and continuation of life in many ways."<sup>37</sup> This statement reflects "the idea of different crafts," which was explained by al-Razi (d. 606/1209), such as agriculture for producing food, weaving for making clothing, building for creating houses, and politics for arranging human affairs in an orderly manner<sup>38</sup>:

[The] existence of this solidarity depends solely on civilization (*tamad-dun*)<sup>39</sup> and human society. But the character of the human race is different; particularly, ordinary people lean towards evil (*sharr*) and depravity (*fesad*). This, therefore, causes depravity and disorder (*fesad* and *khalal*) in the social order within a short time. This means the suspension of God's ordinances (*ahkâm*) concerning the *'umrân* of the world<sup>40</sup> and existence of mankind for a while. It is therefore necessary for some defined general principles (*usul kulliye*) for this world and the hereafter to maintain the continuity of the human race and civilization of the world. For this reason God has sent the Messengers and revealed the Books to give order to the world and to the human race, and for the welfare of mankind. He has put down ordinances (*ahkâm*): instructions (*awâmir*) and restrictions (*zawâjir*) concerning the human affairs and fixed punishments (*hudud*) for the crimes of oppressors (*zalims*) and sinners (*fasiqs*) and clarified lawful (*halal*) and unlawful (*haram*) in accordance with the rules of wisdom (*al-hikam*) on behalf of all creatures and in conformity with the necessity of time and aptitude (*isti'dad*, in Turkish text *mesalih*).<sup>41</sup>

It could be said at this stage that he was trying to establish a base for making a reformer or renewer caliph-sultan by emphasizing the *ahkam's* conformity to contemporary conditions and human welfare. As will be recalled, Islamic jurists often state that the "*ahkam* will undeniably change over the course of time."<sup>42</sup> This legal maxim appeared almost three decades later in the collection of the empire's civil codes: the *Majalla*.<sup>43</sup> Abdulwahhab continued his explanation: "Consequently, Allah has authorized a just caliph of the Ottoman dynasty (Al-i Osman) to implement the fixed punishments, the administrative issues (*siyasa*) and the obligation of jihad for the sake of Allah to raise His word until the last day."<sup>44</sup>

In medieval Islamic political thought, the necessity of a ruler was accepted. However, there was a dispute as to whether reason or revealed law dictated the necessity. The jurists claimed that the Shari'ah dictated the necessity of a ruler, whereas the philosophers justified this idea via the use of reasoning. According to the former, the Shari'ah must be implemented by one who is divinely authorized to enforce its ordinances. The Qur'an also states: "Obey God and His Messenger and those in authority among you" (4:59). Therefore, obedience is divinely imposed upon believers, and it is clear that those in authority are the imams.<sup>45</sup> Given this, the jurists insisted that the Divine had made the imamate necessary, for the imamate had been established to replace prophecy in defending the faith and administering the world.

In the light of this explanation, Abdulwahhab accepted the jurists' argument on the grounds that "God has delegated caliphs to implement the ordinances, administrative affairs, and the obligation of jihad."<sup>746</sup> On the same matter, he quoted a saying of the Prophet: "Religion and (temporal) power (*sultan*) are twins. Therefore, religion is the foundation and the sultan is guardian. Without the foundation the sultan is torn down, and without the sultan the religion will be destroyed."<sup>747</sup>

## Making Mahmud II an Ideal Ottoman Caliph-Sultan

### *His Titles*

Having established the basis for the necessity of a ruler, Abdulwahhab moved to the next step: establishing the caliph-sultan as acceptable to the Shari'ah and calling upon the masses to obey him. In his address to Mahmud II, Abdulwahhab combined the traditional Turkic-Persian titles with Islamic ones, along the same lines as the Ottoman dynastic theory, which was developed and completed by the mid-sixteenth century.<sup>48</sup> He adhered to a rather formal and traditional style of presentation, listing the sultan's titles, as follows:

*sultanu 'l-ghuzât va 'l-mujahidin* (the sultan of fighters on behalf of Islam), *khalifetu 'l-haliqa fi 'd-devrân* (the caliph for the creatures of all times), *emiru 'l-mu'minin* (the commander of the believers), *imamu 'l-muslimin* (the leader of Muslims), *munawwiru eriketi 'l-khilafa* (the illuminator of the caliphal throne), *muzayyinu seriri's-saltana* (the embellisher of the throne of power), *afkhâmu 'l-khawâqin* (the most illustrious of *khaqans*), *zill Allahi fi 'l-ard* (the shadow of God on Earth), *sahipkiran* (the lord of a fortunate conjunction), *mujaddidu 'l-erkâni 'l-dawla* (renewer of the state's pillars), *sâhibu 'l-shawkah* (the lord of might), *hâfizu 'l-bilâd* (the guardian of the lands), *nâsiru 'l-ibâd* (the helper / ally of the creatures), *'azamu salâtini 'l-ard* (the greatest sultan in the world), *ghawsu 'l-Islam wa 'l-muslimin* (the helper of Islam and Muslims), *suratu 'l-amn wa 'l-aman* (the aspect of security and protection), and *mahdi-i akhir zaman* (the savior of the End of Time).<sup>49</sup>

It is useful to focus on some of them. For example:

**GHAZI (WARRIOR).** As Abdulwahhab stated, the sultan is the sultan of the *guzah* (sing: *ghazi*), the one who wages jihad or *ghazah* (battle) for the sake of Islam. From the early years, the Ottoman sultans considered themselves leaders of a religious war (*ghazah*) against non-Muslims.<sup>50</sup> The foundation of the Ottoman Empire on the border with Byzantium gave this idea



a particular force and immediacy. As the Shari`ah makes jihad an obligation on the Islamic community, by waging war on Christian Byzantium, the Ottoman sultans fulfilled God's command as well as the duty of *ghazah*. This idea gave legitimacy to their rule and a *raison d'être* to the empire itself.<sup>51</sup> It might be that by emphasizing the *ghazah* idea, Shaykh al-Islam Abdulwahhab tried to give the empire's Muslim subjects, who had suffered from military defeats, confidence that Mahmud II was the sultan of the *ghuzah* who would always succeed in his military campaigns against the non-Muslims.

**KHALIFAH (POLITICAL SUCCESSOR TO THE PROPHET).** In the treatise, Mahmud II was proclaimed to be the *khalifetu'l-haliqa fi'd-devran* (the caliph for the creatures of all times), *emiru'l-mu'minin* (the commander of the believers), *imamu'l-muslimin* (the leader of Muslims), and *munawwiru eriketi'l-khilafa* (the illuminator of the caliphal throne). It is obvious in the *Khulasa* that Mahmud II is the caliph of all Muslims and sat on the throne of *al-khilafat al-kubra*,<sup>52</sup> a phrase that was generally used by some strict jurists only in connection with the first four political successors (caliphs) of the Prophet. This emphasis on the sultan's caliphate was the treatise's main theme. In this crucial time, Ibnu'l-Annabi also emphasized the rightness of Mahmud II's caliphate by more or less the same arguments.<sup>53</sup>

When the Ottomans reached the zenith of their glory in the sixteenth century, each sultan, as head of a Muslim empire, required spiritual and divine approval and developed the theory of the Ottoman caliphate.<sup>54</sup> In 1541, Grand Wazir Lütüfi Pasha, who was the key person in this process, composed the *Khalasu'l-Ümme fi Marifeti'l-Eimme*, a treatise that firmly defined and established the caliphate of the Ottoman sultans while denying by means of various religious arguments the classical theory that the ruler must be of Qurayshi origin.<sup>55</sup>

After the war with Russia (1768-74), the treaty of Kuchuk Kaynarja named the Ottoman sultan as caliph, thereby asserting the caliph's religious authority over the Tatars in the Crimea. From this time onward, the sultans frequently adopted this title to exert religious influence upon their Muslim subjects and to use as a political weapon against rebels within the empire. As the case of Khedive Muhammad Ali of Egypt indicates, Muslim rebels seem to have had some religious and political arguments to justify their actions against the caliph-sultan. His son Ibrahim Pasha, after invading Syria in 1831, decided to march into Anatolia. But before doing so, he received a fatwa from the mufti of Aleppo to depose the caliph. By spreading such a fatwa inside Anatolia and Istanbul, he hoped that a popular revolt

would unseat the caliph.<sup>56</sup> One of the reasons for emphasizing Mahmud II's rightful claim to the caliphate was to respond to this development.

**ZILL ALLAH (SHADOW OF GOD).** Abdulwahhab addressed Mahmud II as *zill Allah zillul-lahi fi'l-ard* (the shadow of God on Earth), a phrase that also appears in the Hadith literature.<sup>57</sup> Muslim rulers had used this title since the beginning of Islam, having borrowed it from the Sassanid political tradition to claim that God supports the ruler and sanctions all of his actions. In the Ottoman virtue literature, *zill Allah* is attributed the sultans.<sup>58</sup> It is quite understandable why Mahmud II was addressed by this title: As recounted above, he had been accused of being an "infidel sultan" (*Gavur sultan*). This title reminded his detractors that he was still within Islam and the Shadow of God, and that whatever comes from him also comes from God. All of his reforms were, therefore, in accordance with God's will.

**MAHDI (SAVIOR).** Mahmud II was called the Mahdi, thereby reflecting the popular eschatological belief that a Muslim savior will appear at the end of time.<sup>59</sup> However, he was not the first sultan to bear this title. For example, Selim I was described as the *Mahdi-i Akhir zaman* (the savior of the end of time).<sup>60</sup> Most probably, this idea was introduced into the Ottoman virtue literature by Abdurrahman el-Bistami el-Hurufi (d. 1454), author of a pamphlet entitled *Miftahu'l-Cifri'l-Cami*.<sup>61</sup> The Ottoman Empire had been suffering from a series of military defeats since the 1760s, and there was an expectation that the mahdi would save the empire. Given that this idea was already quite common among the bureaucrats and military officers,<sup>62</sup> the public was ready to accept such a savior. By attempting to modernize the empire's army in order to restore the Muslims' pride, Mahmud II was a good candidate for being presented as an expected mahdi on the horizons of the empire.

**MUJADDID (RENEWER OF THE RELIGION).** The idea of a *mujaddid* grew out of a prophetic hadith contained in Abu Dawud's collection: "At the beginning of each [Islamic] century, God Most High will send to the Muslim community someone who will renew its faith and sovereignty" (Sünen-Melahim 1). Several Ottoman sultans before Mahmud II had been given this title. Lütüfi Pasha, who used this hadith to glorify the Ottoman dynasty, assumed that the most recent "renewers of the faith" were Osman Bey who, at the beginning of the eighth Islamic century, had restored Islam after the conquests of the pagan Mongols; Mehmed I (reigned 1413-21) who, at the beginning of the ninth Islamic century, had revived the faith after the destructions of Timur; and Selim I (reigned 1512-20) who, at the beginning of the tenth Islamic century, had defeated the Safavid "infidel," Shah Isma'il, and upheld the Shari'ah.<sup>63</sup>

According to M. Es'ad, apart from those mentioned above, Sultan Mahmud II is the *mujaddid* of the laws of Islam by virtue of renewing matters relating to religion, the imperial council (*divan*), the scribe (*kalemiya*), and the army (*sayfiya*) at the beginning of the thirteenth Islamic century.<sup>64</sup> There is no doubt that Mahmud II was the renewer of the laws of Islam (*mujaddid al-qawanin al-Islam*) and of the pillar the state (*al-arkan al-dawlah*).<sup>65</sup> Here again, the title sought to respond to the public's resentment of the reforms; in other words, Mahmud II cleared the way for a new path for the Ottoman Empire by renewing the old Ottoman system.

The titles of Mahmud II represented the heroic and honorific epithets traditionally ascribed to the Ottoman dynasty, even though the empire's political and military situation made it impossible for him to fulfill their promise. However, this tendency has been continuous in the Middle East, even though it has declined very sharply for the last two centuries. Small and local successes, even military coups, made various Middle Eastern rulers "heroes" and "saviors" of the ummah and encouraged them to bear such titles. It was particularly common during the wars of independence directed against western colonialism for almost all Muslim rulers to be called by Islamic-nationalist titles, such as *qaid-i 'azam* (the exalted leader), *za'im al-ummah* (the leader of the ummah), in spite of their humiliating circumstances.

Despite some traditional Turkic titles in the treatise, one cannot claim that Abdulwahhab was appealing to the nationalist sentiments of the empire's Turkish population, for at the beginning of the nineteenth century and despite the fact that nationalist movements had started among the empire's non-Muslim communities in the Balkans, nationalism still had not gained any ground among its Muslim inhabitants. Since Islam was the only way to keep the Muslim subjects together, it would have been foolish to play on such sentiments in order to invite Muslims to obey their universal caliph-sultan.

### *His Personal Qualifications*

As far as the caliph's qualifications are concerned, the well-known Sunni political theory of al-Mawardi (d. 450/1058) stated that the caliph must be just (*'adil*) in his dealings with his subjects; have sufficient religious knowledge (*'ilm*) to exercise independent reasoning (*ijtihad*); be brave and courageous (*najdah wa shaja'ah*) to protect the Islamic territories and wage jihad on the non-believers; be able to hear, see, and talk perfectly and be free of

any physical disabilities; be broad-minded regarding the empire's administration; and, finally, be a member of the Quraysh tribe.<sup>66</sup>

In the Ottoman political tradition, the fundamental qualification for the sultans was the individual's worthiness to fill the position. The Ottomans believed that simple succession proved that the sultan was worthy of the crown; however, the sultan may grow old, feeble, or corrupt and thus lose his worthiness to serve. Following this orthodox Sunni line, Abdulwahhab presented Mahmud II as an almost-perfect ruler, namely, the caliph-sultan, to his subjects<sup>67</sup>:

1. In all physical and spiritual aspects, Mahmud II is perfect. He is unequalled and unique (*adimu 'l-misal*), and his creation is in the excellent form of the human race with all of its perfections (*fitrat 'u 'l-`aliya wa kamalatu 'l-insaniyya*).
2. Mahmud II has perfect intelligence. He bewilders all other minds (*muhayyiru 'l-ukul*), and the level of his intelligence in science and spiritual knowledge is unique (*mertebe-i akli ilm u irfanda sabik-i fazail-ula*). His miraculous orders and decrees are in accord with the canonical text (i.e., the Qur'an) and reason (*emir wa irade-i kerametleri muvafik-i menkul wa makul*).
3. Mahmud II has religious and spiritual knowledge (*`ilm wa `irfan*). His *`ilm* enables him to exercise independent reasoning (*ijtihad*). In contemporary literature, he is praised as a *mujtahid*.<sup>68</sup> In the Sufi tradition, *`irfan* indicates semi-divine knowledge that is superior to *`ilm*. According to this tradition, *`irfan* cannot be formally studied, but only taught by God or a spiritual teacher (*murshid*). If someone attains *`irfan*, he or she becomes an *`arif* (a Gnostic).<sup>69</sup> Mahmud II was frequently presented as a spiritual Sufi leader able to perform miracles (*karamah*).<sup>70</sup> The aim of this literature seems to have been to persuade the disciples of the various Sufi orders to accept his reforms.
4. Mahmud II has the wisdom of Plato (*hikmat Eflatun*).<sup>71</sup> The Platonic political legacy expressed in Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*, as well as in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, was introduced into the Islamic environment by such Muslim philosophers as al-Farabi (d. 958), Ibn Sina (d. 1037), and Ibn Rushd (d. 1198), who modified and then adopted it.<sup>72</sup>

As head of an empire based on Islam, Mahmud II initiated a reform movement along western lines. Therefore, it is quite understandable why "the wisdom of Plato" was added to his qualifications: It seems that he

wanted to be seen as a ruler who knew the wisdom of Plato, one of the important formative elements of western civilization that, to some extent, he wanted to adopt. Although Abdulwahhab added two more elements (i.e., *irfan* and *hikmah al-Eflatun*) to the jurists' theory, he remained within the bounds of Islamic political thought.

5. Mahmud II has a good intention: to enliven the religion and implement the prophetic tradition (*niyet-i hayriyeleri ihya-i din wa icra-yi sünnet*). His most important thoughts and concerns are for the security and order of the poor and the empire's subjects (*ehem-i efkari wa endisheleri amn u asayish-i fukara wa raiyya*).
6. Mahmud II wishes to implement justice and equity, organize the army for jihad, and improve the lands and comfort of creatures (*muradlari adl u dad wa tanzim-i cünd-i cihad ile imar-i bilad ve eriha-i ibad*). His just policies are designed to improve and ensure the ummah's prosperity (*siyaset-i adliyesi müsttezim-i salah ve falah-i umma*). The quality of *adl* became almost inseparable from Mahmud II, and he was given the title "*adli*."<sup>73</sup> Several institutions were entitled "*adli*" (referring to Mahmud II), such as the *Divan-i Ahkâm-i Adliyya* (the Council of Juridical Enactments) and the *Mekteb-i Maarif-i Adliyya* (the School of Education).

In the Islamic tradition, justice is regarded as one of the most important qualifications and aims of a Muslim ruler. This was also true of the Ottoman rulers. It is claimed that Mahmud II personally protected his people from such governmental excesses as predatory taxation and the corruption of local officials. For the Ottomans, the ruler could only guarantee this justice if he had absolute power; otherwise, he would be dependent on others and so subject to corruption himself. Absolute authority, then, was required to establish a just government and laws rather than elevating the ruler above the law, as Europeans have interpreted the sultanate. To ensure *adalet*, the Ottomans set up a number of practices and institutions in the central government surrounding the sultan. In the Ottoman Empire, it was accepted, at least theoretically, that the fundament of the state/power is justice (*Mülkün temeli adalettir*).<sup>74</sup>

Apparently, the emphasis on justice here was intended to persuade the public. As pointed out, Mahmud II confiscated *wakfs*, *timars*, and the lands of the *âyans* (notables) and *derebeys* (tribal chiefs). Moreover, he changed the class structure within Ottoman society. This policy might have engendered the feeling that such people were treated unjustly and that Mahmud II

was, therefore, an unjust ruler. However, Abdulwahhab presented Mahmud II as the most suitable ruler for his own time.

### *His Duties*

Within the realm of administration, the theologians enumerated the caliph's main duties. For example, al-Balqillani (d. 404/1013) stated that the imam was obligated to defend the ummah against its enemies, enforce the fixed punishments (*hudud*) mentioned in the Shari`ah, restrain oppression and redress grievances, divide the revenues (*fay'* [booty] and zakat) among the Muslims, and make the pilgrimage safe.<sup>75</sup> Al-Mawardi developed this statement by adding the following responsibilities: to undertake jihad, fix stipends (*ataya*), seek out trusted persons, appoint advisers, oversee affairs both personally and carefully, and protect the ummah from disorder and sinfulness.<sup>76</sup>

In the Ottoman political literature, almost all of these main duties were applied to the caliph-sultan.<sup>77</sup> Abdulwahhab follows the same line, giving a long list of duties that the caliph must fulfill, which he generally referred to as the sultan's goals: To enforce the fixed punishments (*iqamat al-hudud*), revive the religion and perform the sunnah (*ihya' al-din wa ijra' al-sunnah*), provide comfort for the poor and the empire's subjects (*rahat al-fuqara' wa al-`ibad*), serve the religion and the state (*khidmat al-din wa al-dawlah*), provide security for the general public (*amn al-ra'yah*), reorganize the army of jihad (*tanzim jund al-jihad*), provide goodness for the *millah* (religious community) and salvation for the ummah, undertake the state's administration (*tadbir al-mulkiyah*), and enforce punishments (*iqamat al-siyasah*).<sup>78</sup>

Here, three concepts need explanation: *dawlah*, *tadbir*, and *siyasah*. *Dawlah* basically means to turn, to alternate. Over the centuries, this concept acquired the additional meanings of dominion, state, and realm: a ruler's kingdom, such as Dawlat-i Osmaniyya, which referred to the house of Osman.<sup>79</sup> Throughout the nineteenth century, it seems that all of these meanings were used. However, at the end of that century, the meaning of *dawlah* was fixed as "state." In this process, the Sened-i Ittifaq of 1808, signed between Mahmud II and the *âyans*, has been regarded as one of the important steps in separating the state from the ruler by such contemporary historians as N. Berkes.<sup>80</sup> It was thought that the Sened did not mention the sultan in terms of being a party, but only as a *dawlah*.<sup>81</sup>

It seems that in the treatise, the state's dependence on the sultan was indicated by the phrase "the axis of your personality means religion and

state” (*kutb-u zat-i shawkatlari medar-i din u dawlah*).<sup>82</sup> And yet the separation of the state and the sultan was described in such a way as “the body of state founds a new soul with the new military and administrative *kanuns*” (*jism al-dawlah wajada ruhan jadidan bi tajdid al-gawanin al’askariyya ve bi ihya al-usul al-mulkiyya*).<sup>83</sup> The term *tadbir* means organization, management, regulation, and administration in Islamic political thought. In this sense, al-Baqillani stated that *tadbir al-jaysh* (the organization of the army) is among the imam’s duties.<sup>84</sup> Al-Mawardi also declared that the caliph must know the *tadbir*,<sup>85</sup> that is to say, the issue of administration.

As for the concept *siyasah*, the political literature uses it to refer to managing human affairs. In Islamic law *ta`zir* (discretionary chastisement) has been described as *al-siyasat al-shar`iyah*.<sup>86</sup> In the Ottoman context, according to U. Heyd, *siyasa* “... in its widest sense, it seems to denote ‘punishment’ in general, which may include strokes and punishment. As a technical term, however, it generally means either execution or severe corporal punishment or both.” He also states that “it refers to a punishment inflicted in accordance with the shari`a as well as one decreed by the ‘*kanun*.’ Also, penalties not in conformity with the shari`a and inflicted by secular authorities are often said to be carried out *siyaseten*, i.e. ‘as an administrative punishment.’”<sup>87</sup> In this sense, Abdulwahhab used the phrase “by committing the crime of disobedience, some people deserve the wrath of God and the punishment of the Padishah” (*siyasat-i padishahiyya*)<sup>88</sup> for those groups that oppose the reforms.

## The Theory of Obedience to the Caliph-Sultan

It is clear that throughout Islamic history, only a few caliphs ever fulfilled the conditions demanded by the political theorists. What would be the way out for them under these circumstances? Al-Ghazzali’s response clarifies the ulama’s attitude:

There are those who hold that the imamate is dead, lacking as it does the required qualifications. But no substitute can be found for it. What then? Are we to give up obeying the law? Shall we dismiss the *kadis*, declare all authority to be valueless, cease marrying and pronounce the acts of those in high places to be invalid at all points, leaving the populace to live in sinfulness? Or shall we continue as we are, recognizing that the imamate really exists and that all acts of the administration are valid, given the circumstances of the case and the necessities of the actual moment?<sup>89</sup>

In general, the majority of the jurists preferred any kind of stable authority to civil strife (*fitnah*) in order to preserve the ummah's unity. They demanded that all subjects obey the ruler, whether or not he fulfilled the required conditions. To legitimize their arguments, they generally quoted the following Qur'anic verses: 'Rebellion (*fitnah*) is greater (more dangerous) than murder (*qatl*)' (2:217) and "Allah forbids all shameful deeds, injustice, and rebellion (*baghiy*)" (16:90).<sup>90</sup>

A considerable number of hadiths enshrining the duty of obedience to a Muslim ruler were also put into circulation. Abdulwahhab, as mentioned above, collected and interpreted twenty-five of these traditions that had been used by earlier jurists for the same purpose. For example, some of them appeared in *Kitab al-Kharaj*, which is attributed to Abu Yusuf (d. 179/798). The most well-circulated among them is "Fear God and obey Him. Even if a flat-nosed, shrunken-headed Abyssinian slave is invested with power over you, hearken to him and obey him"<sup>91</sup> Another very common one is: "One who obeys God obeys me [the Prophet], and one who obeys the imam obeys me; one who rebels against me rebels against God, and one who rebels against the imam rebels against me."<sup>92</sup> Another typical example is "If the imam is just, then reward is due to him and gratitude from you; if he is tyrannical, then the burden of sin is his and it is yours to be patient."<sup>93</sup>

From the translations of some of these hadiths into Turkish, which Abdulwahhab then interpreted in his treatise, it seems that there was some appeal to the people's Islamic sentiments rather than to their Turkish-Persian sentiments. For instance, he translated *sultan* as *padishah-i Islam* or *imamu'l-muslimin*, and *zill Allah* as the *Shadow of God*.<sup>94</sup> It seems that this inclination in both the translation and the interpretation was designed to respond to the religious criticism and concern about the institution of the caliphate and its decrees.

Having introduced these hadiths, Shaykh al-Islam Abdulwahhab went a step further: He sought sanctions from the Qur'an to legitimize obedience to the present caliph-sultan. He quoted the well-known verse: "Obey God, obey the Messenger, and obey those in authority among you" (4:59), adding that "according to the ulama of religion, *ulu al-amr* means the caliph of Islam."<sup>95</sup> For the same purpose, he provided some Sufi traditions saying that Ibn al-Arabi (d. 638/1240) had stated that if the sultan is *kamil* (perfect in personality and character), he is the pole of the world (*qutb*); if he is *ghayr al-salih* (imperfect), he is the saint (sing. *badal*, pl. *abdal*). Abdulwahhab declared without any hesitation: "Thank God that our sultan is the greatest sultan (*al-Sultan al-'Azam*); he is the pole of the time (*qutb al-zaman*)."<sup>96</sup>



He continued to glorify the Ottoman dynasty by quoting the sayings of the Prophet and the Sufis. He included the following hadith, which appears in the collections of al-Bukhari and Abu Dawud: “There will be a group of people among my ummah who are in the right path.” He commented that, according to the researchers, “a group of people” means “the House of Osman.”<sup>97</sup> Another hadith, which appears in Ibn Hanbal’s *Musnad*, is that “Verily, Constantinople will be conquered. The commander of this conquest is the best commander, and the army is the best army.” There is no doubt that Constantinople was conquered by the House of Osman. These two hadiths show, asserted Abdulwahhab, the empire’s virtue and continuity.<sup>98</sup>

He included some Sufi comments on the following verse: “And verily we have written in the Scripture (the Psalms of David), after the Reminder. My righteous servants will inherit the earth” (21:105). Here, Abdulgani al-Nablusi commented “that it is a sign from the Qur’an about the sultans of the Ottoman dynasty; the words *‘ibad al-salihin* refer to the House of Osman.”<sup>99</sup> Shaykh Salah al-Din Safadi and Imam Yahya ibn ‘Aqb, most probably another two Sufis, commented that “the Ottoman sultans are the most righteous sultans and the most virtuous after the Companions of the Prophet.”<sup>100</sup>

After interpreting the verses, the hadiths, and the comments of Sufis concerning the people’s obedience to the sultan and the sultan’s glory, Abdulwahhab concluded that “all these hadiths demonstrate the obedience imposed upon every believer to the imam of the Muslims, even if the sultan is tyrannical (*jabir*) or sinful (*ja’ir*)”<sup>101</sup> “It has been proved from hadiths, the Qur’an, and the Sufi writings,” he continued, “that the Shari’ah arranged divine ordinances for affairs of religion and of the world. To obey its performer, therefore, is an obligation upon Muslims. According to reason and the canonical texts, it is also obligatory to keep on praying for the life of the sultan and his *dawlah*”<sup>102</sup> Moreover, having reminded his people that the sultan’s ancestors conquered the lands and countries and enlightened them with the light of monotheism and the faith of Islam, Abdulwahhab stated that “this also gives the sultan a right to demand obedience from his subjects.”<sup>103</sup>

Clearly, Mahmud II was presented as a traditional Muslim caliph-sultan in terms of his titles, duties, and qualifications. The reasons for this could be that the ulama still saw him as a traditional Muslim leader, that Mahmud II wanted to be presented in this way, or that public opinion was not ready to see or accept any leader except the caliph-sultan. It seems that the last statement had some grounds in Istanbul for, as mentioned above, some groups had shown their disapproval of any change in the social, military, and political

spheres as well as in the sultan's appearance. Furthermore, logically, only a Muslim caliph-sultan could demand obedience from his Muslim subjects.

Abdulwahhab also directed some accusations against the opposition groups by calling them the common people (*awam-i nas*), because of their supposed ignorance, forgetfulness, and probably weak faith. First, they did not know about the affairs of the world (*umur-i dūnya*) and the rights of the caliph (*hukuk-i halife*), namely, his legislative power and the demand of obedience from his subjects. Second, they were not unaware of the country's public interest (*mesalih-i dawla*). Therefore, they were causing civil strife, disorder, and rebellion (*fitnah, fasad, and baghah*).<sup>104</sup>

## Conclusion

The Ottomans inherited a rich mixture of political traditions from vastly disparate ethnic groups: Turks, Persians, Mongols, and Mesopotamians, and, of course, from Islam. The Ottoman Empire, like those earlier ones founded by the Turks, the Mongols, and the various Mesopotamian peoples, rested on the principle of the monarch having absolute authority.

It could be said that Islam and the state supported each other in the Ottoman Empire. Shaykh al-Islam Abdulwahhab made a reformer caliph-sultan along western lines with an addition of Islamic and other traditional values, since Mahmud II was in great need of such support. Beyond any doubt, the reformers of that time faced the problem of how to transform a traditional medieval Muslim society and empire into a modern one. In this respect, the ulama were the vital element in executing such a policy. The best strategy for the sultan and his reform-minded officials to follow was, first of all, to somehow persuade the ulama and thus acquire their approval for any reform. The ulama would then convince the empire's Muslim subjects that the proposed reforms did not violate Islamic norms.

Let's ask the following question: Was there any alternative ideology or system to the ulamas' interpretation of the sacred texts, say, in the sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire? It seems very unlikely. It was also highly unlikely that any elite group in Istanbul would be willing to follow Europe. Even though the reform process had started earlier, at the end of the eighteenth century the picture clearly changed. Based on actual experience, the Ottomans were well aware that Europe was superior to their empire in every aspect. Furthermore, there was an elite group within the empire with whom the sultan wanted to secure the empire by strengthening it both militarily and in other areas by adopting European practices. They believed that the only

way to prevent the empire from declining further was to follow the European example.

Under these circumstances, Shaykh al-Islam Abdulwahhab, as head of the ulama, was in a difficult position. It seems that he had to make a historic decision concerning the empire's survival: whether to survive in the modern era by participating in the process of westernization or turn back to the past and defend its legacy. He chose the first option and tried to catch up and thereby control the political, social, and intellectual developments that had become inevitable. Along with the top official ulama, he did this as far as possible within the scope of Islam by participating in policymaking and justifying decisions via Islamic maxims.

If we consider that the reform policy's goal was to adopt western economic, military, and administrative practices into an Islamic society, it becomes easy to understand the ulama's attitude toward the reform movement. One could say that in this process of adoption, the ulama's main concern was, as the representatives of Islamic civilization, to soften the impact of this new civilization and present it as complying with the needs of modern times. From the Tanzimat period (1839-76) onward, this became their task. In this respect, the Ottoman ulama of the nineteenth century were on the defensive.

Furthermore, they might have realized that the internal weakening of their corps made it impossible for them to resist such a policy. Additionally, it could be speculated that the high-ranking ulama who were short-sighted did not realize that this process of western-inspired reform eventually would destroy the Islamic nature of the Ottoman Empire and society. It could also be speculated that Islam is still strong enough and can play a constructive role in modern Turkey's efforts to join the European Union, for it can once again serve as a means of legitimating the desired reform programs in the eyes of the Turkish public.

## Endnotes

1. For a well-documented study of the ulama's attitude toward Mahmud II's military reforms, see U. Heyd, "The Ottoman Ulama and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II," *Studies in Islamic History and Civilization, Scripta Hierosolymitana*, no. 9 (Hebrew University, Jerusalem) (1964): 63-96; A. Levy, "The Ottoman Ulama and the Military Reform of Sultan Mahmud II," in *Asian and African Studies*, vol. 7: *The Ulama in Modern History*, ed. Gabriel Bear (Jerusalem: Israel Oriental Society, 1971), 13-39.

2. J. R. Barnes, *An Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1987), 72-73, 76; Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), 92.
3. S. J. Shaw and E. K. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 2: *Reform Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975* (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 28.
4. The Naval Engineering School (Muhendishane-i Bahr-i Humayun) and the Army Engineering School (Muhendishane-i Berr-i Humayun), opened by Selim III, were enlarged to include military technical education in 1827. In the same year, an Army Medical School (Tebhane-i Amire) was opened. O. M. Ergin, *Türkiye Maarif Tarihi* (Istanbul: Eren Pub., 1940), 2:127-28, 256-80; Lewis, *Modern Turkey*, 83; E. Z. Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Pub., 1961), 5:162.
5. For the *firman* concerning the regulations of the new uniforms for the Mansure on different classes, see Lutfi, *Tarih* (Istanbul: 1290 AH), 191-93. The new uniforms were introduced to lighten the soldiers' clothes during war and peace (*Asâkir-i Mansure elbisesinin takhîfi ... sefer ve hadarde*). Ibid, 255; Lewis, *Modern Turkey*, 99.
6. Lutfi, *Tarih*, 255, Lewis, *Modern Turkey*, 100.
7. For the text of the decree, see Lutfi, *Tarikh*, 2:269, Lewis, *Modern Turkey*, 101.
8. Lewis, *Modern Turkey*, 101.
9. A. Cunningham, "Startford Canning and the Tanzimat," in *Beginning of Modernization in the Middle East in the 19th Century*, eds. W. R. Polk and R. L. Chambers (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 253.
10. Lewis, *Modern Turkey*, 106.
11. I. Engelhart, *Türkiye ve Tanzimat: Devlet-i Osmanîyenin Tarih-i Islahatı* trans. from French by A. Resadi (Istanbul: 1328 AH) 19; N. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montréal: McGill University Press, 1964), 122.
12. Engelhart indicates that even the grand vizier, who avoided using the European saddle, fell out of favor with Mahmud II. Engelhart, *Türkiye ve Tanzimat*, 19.
13. Lutfi, *Tarih*, 3:100; However, in 2:55, Lutfi reports that "once there was no holiday in the Porte (Bab-i Ali), the government offices had to be open every day. But the civil servants of the Imperial Treasury had their holiday, Thursday. Therefore Thursday was decided as a holiday for all government departments." See also Lewis (*Modern Turkey*, 101), who states that it was adopted from France.
14. *Masalih-i dakhiliya ve kharijiya-i Devlet-i `Aliyye ve tebdilat*. Lutfi (*Tarikh*, 3:109) cited the first editorial of the *Takvim-i Vekayi*.
15. Lutfi (*Tarih*, 5:50-51) provides an account of hanging the first portrait of the sultan in the Selimiye Keshlasé. With a big state ceremony, the portrait was hung on the wall after the ulema and shaykhs had prayed.
16. For example, as the historian and statesman M. Nuri Pasha states: "Because of the lack of a regular army, the Russians won the war (referring to 1829) and

- came to Edirne. In Istanbul, the remaining Janissaries and their disgraced accomplices ascribed this defeat to the destruction of the Janissaries and the failure of the new army. Therefore, they made anti-propaganda and even dared, to some extent, to demonstrate against the authorities in the streets of Istanbul.” M. Nuri Pahsa, *Netayic’ul Vukuat*, pub. N. Çagatay (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Pub., 1987), 3-4:297.
17. Heyd, *Ottoman Ulama and Westernization*, 70-71.
  18. Lutfi, *Tarikh*, 2:144.
  19. For instance, in his Ramadan sermons in the Eyub mosque, the Bosnian *mudarris* publicly accused the sultan and his reformists of being unbelievers (*kuffar*) and was exiled. The mufti of Tosya and some ulama supported the local rebels. See Lutfi, *Tarih*, 2:169, 3;146; Heyd, *Ottoman Ulama and Westernization*, 71.
  20. Quoted from Heyd, *Ottoman Ulama and Westernization*, 73.
  21. When the Evkaf Nezareti was established, it controlled tightly the revenue of the Sufi orders’ *waqfs*. In times of need, the Nezaret used its control to suppress the orders. Furthermore, it started to give salaries to the orders’ heads, thereby making them state employees and civil servants. This practice reduced the shaykhs’ dignity and influence among the masses. I Gunduz, *Osmanlıarda Devlet-Tekke Münasebetleri* (Ankara: Seha Publication, 1983), 15. The author provides some information about the Sufi shaykhs’ complaints of the sultan’s policy toward them.
  22. For the ulama’s arguments against this order, see M. Es’ad, *Uss-i Zafer* (Istanbul: 1243/1827), 207-21; S. Farughi, “The Tekke of Haci Bektas: Social Position and Economic Activities,” *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, no. 7 (1976): 201-02.
  23. S. Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), 230.
  24. For this order’s activities, see B. Abu Manneh, “The Naqshibandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in the Ottoman Lands in the Early 19th century,” *Die Welt des Islam*, no. 22 (1982): 21-25.
  25. *Pekmezci delisi nam meyzub Cuma günü Süleymaniye camiinde Shaykhul-islam Efendi’ye ‘Seni sakalından sürümeli, padishahçayine-i batda aləhtərdən’ diye bagərdə* Lutfi, *Tarikh*, 2:94; Heyd, *Ottoman Ulama and Westernization*, 73.
  26. Quoted from R. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: 1963), 31. The same dervish in Lutfi’s *Tarih* appears as a *wa’iz* in Istanbul. He was exiled because of his criticism of the new regulations (*nizamat-i jadiyda*), 2:144.
  27. For instance, a *firman* calls people “*Shariat-i Islamiyyenin esasi ve din-i mubin-i Ahmediyyenin imad, bina, me’ash ve me’adi olan bes vakit namazin cevami’i sharifte cemaatle eda ve daire eshab-i iman tarikiye kanak-larda cemaatle namaza mudavemet eylemeleri.*” See Lutfi, *Tarih*, 2:66. For Mahmud II’s internal religious policy, see Heyd, *Ottoman Ulama and Westernization*, 90-94; Abu Manneh, “Naqshibandiyya-Mujaddidiyya,” 29-33

28. This practice not only provided jobs for imams and *wa`izs*, but also pleased the *softas*, who numbered several thousand in Istanbul. Most of them were poor and had to wait a long time to get a job. M. C. Zilfi, "The Ilmiye Registers and the Ottoman Medrese System prior to the Tanzimat," in *Contributions a l'Histoire Economique et Sociale de l'Empire Ottoman* (Collection Turcica III) (Paris: 1983), 323. Zilfi estimates the number of the *softas* at more than 5,000-6,000; Heyd's estimation is about 5,000. Reed gives their number as over 50,000. H. A. Reed, "Ottoman Reform and the Janissaries: The Eskinci Layihasi of 1826," in *Social and Economic History of Turkey, 1071-1920*, eds. O. Okyar and H. Inalcik (Ankara: 1980), 197.
29. *Al-darurat tubih al-mahzurat* and *ahwan-i sharrayn*, respectively. These legal maxims are from A. Cawdat's *Tarih*, as quoted by Heyd, *Ottoman Ulama and Westernization*, 89.
30. *İcab-ë maslahat böyle iktiza eder*: I. Sangu "Mahmud II 'nin İzzet Molla ve Asakir-i Mansure Hakkında bir Hattë," *Tarih Vesikalarë* no. 1 (1941): 168.
31. Some important virtue literature books on the Ottoman dynasty are as follows: Aşıkpaşazade, *Tevarih-i Al-i Osman* (n.p.: n.d.); Neşri, *Cihannuma* (n.p.: n.d.); Lütfi Paşa, *Khalasu'l-Ümme fi Marifeti'l-Eimme* (Süleymaniya Library, Yeni Cami, 1182 AH); Andulğani Nablusi (d. 1143/1731), *Talaatu'l-Behiyya fi Muluki'd-Dawlati'l-Osmaniyya* (n.p.: n.d.) (one of the most referred-to works); and Abdurrahman al-Bistami, *Miftahu'l-Cifri'l-Cami* (Tr. into Turkish by Shaykh Burhaneddin, manuscript, Sulaymaniya Library, Hafid Efendi 179, n.d.). Abdulwahhab also refers to the following ones: Muhyiddin Ibnu'l Arabi, (d. 638/1240), *Al-Shajaratu'l-Nu'âmaniyya*, (n.p.: n.d.); Shaykh Salahuddin es-Safedi, *Sharhu Shajaratu'n-Numaniyya*, (n.p.: n.d.); İmam Yahya b. 'Aqab, *Sharhu'l-Daira*, (n.p.: n.d.); and Shaykh Mustafâ as-Sadqë *Al-Muazzinu bi't Tarab fi'l-farqë bayna'l-Ajam wa'l-Arab*, (n.p.: n.d.). Mer'i ibn Yusuf (d. 1033/ 1624) *Qaladidu'l-Ikyan fi Fadhaili Al-i Osman*, trans into Turkish by Shaban b. Shifai (n.p.: n.d.). Mer'i ibn Yusuf was a prominent Hanbali jurist of seventeenth-century Egypt who tried to legitimate the Ottoman dynasty in the eyes of the empire's Arab subjects. See Eyüp Öztürk, "Osmanli Tarihçiliginde Fezâil Edebiyati: Mer'i ibn Yusuf'un Kalâidü'l-Ikyan fi Fezâili Al-i Osman Örneği," MA thesis (Ankara: 2004)
32. In this process, Mahmud II's close ally Mehmed Es'ad Efendi wrote *Uss-i Zafer* (Istanbul, 1248/1828) for general reading in *lisan-i asr* (simple Turkish). Also İbnu'l-Annabi (Muhammad ibn Hüseyin el-Hanefi of Algaria) wrote a treatise to legitimize Mahmud II's military reforms: *Es-Sa'yu'l-Mahmud fi Nizami'l-Cunud* (Süleymaniya Library Esad Efendi: 1885). It was translated by M. Es'ad Efendi under the title *Al-Kawakibu'l-Mas'ud fi Kawkabati'l-Cunud*, (Süleymaniye Library, Es'ad Efendi, 2363).
33. Shaykh al-Islam Sayyid Yasincizade Abdulwahhab Efendi, *Khulastu'l-Bayan fi Itaati's-Sultan* (Istanbul: 1247/1831). This treatise was written in Arabic (parts 1-15) and Turkish (parts 16-31). Both parts are almost the same.

34. In this respect, the treatise was expounded upon by a prominent scholar, the mufti of Baghdad Alusi (Ebu's-Sena Mahmud Shihabuddin ibn Abdullah) (d. 1270/1853) to address Arab public opinion, under the title *Al-Bayanu al-Sharhi'l-Burhan fi 'Itaati's-Sultan*. He wrote this book at the request of Ali Rıza Pasha and presented it to him. Munir Hasan, "Alusi'nin Shia'ya Karş Reddiyesi," MA thesis (Ankara: 2002), 40.
35. Some of them are as follows: (1) Ahmed Midhad Efendi, *Tavzih-i Kelam ve Tasrih-i Meram* (Istanbul: 1296/1880); (2) Es-Seyyid Muhammad Ebu'l-Huda Efendi of Hama-Syria, *Da'i'r-Reshad li Sebili'l-Ittihad ve'l-'Inkëyad*, tr. into Turkish by Kudsi Efendizade Abdulkadir of Aleppo (Istanbul: after 1880). The same author also wrote another pamphlet, *En-Nafahatu'n-Nabawiyya fi Hâl-mati'l-Khëafeti'l-Hamidiyyati'l-Osmaniyya* (manuscript, n.p.: n.d.); (3) Mehmed Fevzi Efendi, the Mufti of Edirne, *En-Nasayihu'l-Fawziyya fi'l-Ed'îya ve'l-Madayihu'l-Seniyya* (Istanbul: after 1885). Mahmud b. Hamza Efendi of Damascus, *Al-Burhan 'ala Bakai Mulki Beni Osman ila 'Akhiri'z-Zaman* (Istanbul 1304/1886), tr. into Turkish and popularized by Bereketzade Ismail Hakkë Efendi, *Baka-yë Saltanat-ë Osmaniyya* (Istanbul: 1332/1913); (4) Ahmad Hafzi Efendi (ex-mufti of Yemen), *Hilafet ve Cihada Dair Kirk Hadis* (Istanbul: 1307/1890); (5) Yusuf ibn Ismail en-Nabhani, (head of the Beirut Law Court), *El-Ahadisu'l-Arbain fi Vucubi Ta'ati Emiri'l-Mü'minin* (Beirut: 1312/1893); (6) Nazif Sururi, *Khilafat-i Mu'azzama-i Islamiyya* (Istanbul: 1315/1899). He compiled almost the same hadiths used by Abdulwahhab and reinterpreted them to suit the political conditions of the time. He says that "the meanings of these hadiths were written by one of the very great 'ulama, the late Abdulwahhab Efendi, and published by him for the interest of Islam"; (7) Zaki, *'Alam-i Islamiyyat* (Istanbul: 1316/1900); (8) Es-Sayyid Muhammad Arif (a famous 'alim of Damascus), *El-Hakku'l-Mubin fi Ahadisi 'Arbain fi Man Kharaja 'an Taati Amiri'l-Mu'minin wa Shakka 'Asa'l-Muslimin* (Damascus: 1318/1900). For more information, see Ismail Kara, ed. *Hilafet Risaleleri* (Treatises on the Caliphate), vols. 1-3 (Istanbul: 2002-03).
36. Quoted from A. K. S. Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam* (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press: 1985), 108. Also see al-Ghazzali, *Al-Iqtisad fi al-I'tiqad* (Egypt: n.d.), 197-99. For Fakhr al-Din al-Razi's argument, see *ibid*, pp. 132-33; for Ibn Khaldun's, see *ibid*, 156; for al-Farabi's, see E. I. J. Rosenthal, *Political Thought*, 126.
37. Abdulwahhab, *Khulasa*, 3.
38. Lambton, *State and Government*, 132.
39. This word appears in Tursun Bey's *Tarih-i Ebu'l Feth "temeddun örfümüzce ana shehir; köy oba denir;"* ed. M. Tulum (Istanbul: Fetih Pub., 1977), 12
40. In Ibn Khaldun's theory, 'umran means human civilization and social organization. Lambton, *State and Government*, 156.
41. Abdulwahhab, *Khulasa*, 17.

42. On this discussion, see Ibn Abidin, *Resail* (Beirut: n.d.), 2:125; S. Mahmasani, *Falsafa al-Tashri' fi al-Islam* (Beirut: 1371/1956), 50.
43. *Ezmanñ tegayyuru ile ahkamin tegayyuru inkar olunamaz*.
44. Abdulwahhab, *Khulasa*, 4.
45. The Mu'tazilah also follow the line of the Muslim philosophers. For this argument, see R. Levy, *The Social Structure of Islam* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 284; Rosenthal, *Political Thought*, 28, 39.
46. Abdulwahhab, *Khulasa*, 4.
47. *Ibid.*, 9; cf. al-Ghazzali's exposition *Al-Iqtisad*, 197-99. For Mustafa Ali's argument, see C. H. Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Ali* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 1986), 302.
48. For a critical exposition of this theory, see C. Imber, "The Ottoman Dynastic Myth," *Turcica*, no. 19 (1987): 7-27.
49. Abdulwahhab, *Khulasa*, 5, 21.
50. Mer'i ibn Yusuf also praises the Ottoman sultans for their efforts in *ghazah* and jihad. See his *Kalâid*, folio 20b.
51. It is interesting that Mustafa Kamal Atatürk, founder of the secular Turkish Republic, also used the title *ghazi*. For the development of the idea of *ghazah* in the empire and Paul Wittek's criticism on the classical theory of this idea, see C. Imber "Paul Wittek's 'De la Defaite d'Ankara a'la Prise de Constantinople,'" *Osmanlı Arastırılmaları* (Journal of Ottoman Studies), no. 5 (1968): 65-86.
52. Abdulwahhab, *Khulasa*, 2-3.
53. See Ibnu'l-Annabi, *Es-Sa'yu'l-Mahmud fi Nizami'l-Cunud*.
54. The Ottoman sultans used the title *khalifah* even before Selim I. Inalcık, "Padişah," *İslam Ansiklopedisi* (Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı Pub.), 9:491-95.
55. Grand Wazir Lutfi Pasha, *Khalasu'l-Ümme fi Marifeti'l-Eimme* (Süleymaniya Library, Yeni Cami, 1182 AH). This treatise was translated by H. A. R. Gibb as "Lutfi Pasha on the Ottoman Caliphate," *ORIENTS*, no. 15 (1962): 287-95.
56. A. L. Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali* (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 224-26.
57. Al-Muttaqi, *Kanz al-'Ummal* (Aleppo: 1391/1971), 6:3-90; *Khulasa*, 9-10.
58. See Badri Dishad, *Muradname*, ed. Adem Ceyhan (Istanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı Pub., 1997), 1:209-10; Enveri, *Dusturname: Osmanlı Tarihi Kışmı*, ed. Necdet Öztürk (Istanbul: Akademi Pub., 2003), 46; Tursun Bey, *Tarih-i Ebu'l Feth*, 197; Oruc Bey, *Tevarih-i Al-i Osman*, ed. N. Atsız (Istanbul: 1972), 17.
59. D. B. Macdonald, "al-Mahdi," *Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1961).
60. Lutfi Pasha, *Tevarih-i Al-i Osman* (Istanbul: 1343), 13.
61. Abdurrahman el-Bistami el-Hurufi, *Miftahu'l-Cifri'l-Cami* (Süleymaniya Library, Hafid Efendi, folio 179, leaf number 164a.)
62. Sungu, *Mahmud II*, 170; Heyd, *Ottoman Ulama and Westernization*, 76.
63. Lutfi Pasha, *Tawarikh*, 11.



64. Es'ad provides a long discussion proving that Mahmud II was the Mahdi of his time. See his *Uss-i Zafer*, 174-77.
65. Abdulwahhab, *Khulasa*, 5.
66. Al-Mawardi, *Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah* (Egypt: 1973), 6.
67. Mer'i ibn Yusuf praises the Ottoman sultans almost with the same qualifications. See *Kalâid*, folio 62a.
68. Es'ad, *Uss-i Zafer*; 177.
69. M Z Pakalin, *Osmanlî Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü* (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlîğî Pub., 1953), 2:80; A Golpınarlı, *Tasavvufîan Dilimize Gecen Deyimler ve Atasözleri* (Istanbul: 1977), 25.
70. *Khulasa*, 5.
71. *Ibid.*, 6.
72. For this legacy, see Rosenthal, *Political Thought*, 113-21.
73. For a discussion on Mahmud II's title *adli*, see N Berkes, *Development of Secularism*, 94-95. In Ottoman history, Bayazid II and Mehmed III were also known as *adli*. A. D. Alderson, *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), 112.
74. In the Ottoman political tradition, the circle of justice (*dair-i adalet*) is the main pillar of sovereignty and power. See Kâmalzade Ali Efendi, *Dawlat wa Aile Ahlakı*, ed. Ahmet Kahraman (Tercüman Pub., n.d.), 283. This maxim appears in the Kutadgu Bilig of Yusuf Has Hajib (in the time of the Karahanid Turkish dynasty), Rashid R. Arat, ed. (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Pub., 1998), verses 2056-59. The Ottoman chronicles use the phrases *reyaya adalat dağâtı* (he distributed justice to the subject) or *reyaya adl ü dad itti* (he ruled the subject with justice) about the Ottoman rulers. Aşıkpaşazade, *Tevarih-i Al-i Osman*, 135; Neğri, *Cihannuma*, 1:119, 313, 314. The sultans still emphasized justice toward the end of the empire. For example, under Mahmud II's successor Abdulmajid (1839-61), there was a maxim on an Ottoman medal in French *Justice Egale Pour Tous* (Equal justice for all). Selim Deringil, *İktidarın Semboleri wa İdeoloji*, tr. G. Çağalî (Istanbul: 2002), 37.
75. Al-Baqillani, *Al-Tamhid* (Cairo: 1947) 185-86.
76. Al-Mawardi, *Ahkam*, 15-16.
77. For example, Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Pasha (d.1129/1717) writes in his *Nasa'ih al-Wuzera*: "He (the imam) should make affluent the condition of the governed (*terfih-i ahwal al-ra'aya*); carry out the injunctions of the illustrious holy law (*ijra-i ahkam-i sharifgharra*); protect the boundaries of the Muslims' territory (*sadd thughur-i inha wa ijra*); and delegate some of his functions to a wise vizier such as to protect the poor and to take care of the state affairs." W. L. Wright, tr. and ed. *Ottoman Statecraft: The Book of Counsels for Viziers and Governors, Nasa'ih ul-Wuzera wa al-Umara of Sari Mehmed Pasha the Defterdar* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971), 64.
78. Abdulwahhab, *Khulasa*, 6. Most of these virtues and aims were attributed to the Ottoman sultans by Mer'i ibn Yusuf, *Kalaid*, folio 10b.

79. Rosenthal, "Dawla," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*<sup>2</sup>. For changes in the meaning of *dawlah* in the nineteenth-century Middle East, see A. Ayolon, *Language and Change in the Arab Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press: 1987), 82.
80. For his argument, see Berkes, *Development of Secularism*, 90-94.
81. Halil Inalcik, "The Nature of Traditional Society," in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, eds, R. E. Ward and D. A. Rustow (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), 52.
82. Abdulwahhab, *Khulasa*, 20.
83. *Ibid.*, 6-7.
84. Al-Baqillani, *Tamhid*, 181-83.
85. Al-Mawardi, *Ahkam*, 6.
86. A. I. Doi, *Shari'ah: The Islamic Law* (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1982), 96-112. For the Ottoman usage of *ta'zir*, see Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986 [reprint]), 96.
87. V. L. Menage, ed. *Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law* (Oxford: 1973), 259-60. See A. Mumcu, *Siyaseten Katl* (Ankara: 1963) for the usage of the term; also see M. Z. Pakalın, *Osmanli Tarih Deyimleri*, 2:240.
88. Abdulwahhab, *Khulasa*, 22.
89. The quotations are from *Al-Iqtisad*, 107, as translated by R. Levy, *Social Structure*, 291.
90. On this discussion of the jurists, see H. Siegman, "The State and Individual in Sunni Islam," *Muslim World*, no. 54 (1964): 14-26.
91. Abu Yusuf, *Kitab al-Kharaj* (Cairo: 1352/1933), 9; al-Bukhari, *Al-Sahih*, tr. M. Muhsin Khan (Beirut: n.d.), 9:192; Abdulwahhab, *Khulasa*, 10.
92. Abu Yusuf, *Kitab al-Kharaj*, 9; Abdulwahhab, *Khulasa*, 10-11.
93. Abu Yusuf, *Kitab al-Kharaj*, 10; Abdulwahhab, *Khulasa*, 9.
94. Abdulwahhab, *Khulasa*, 22-23.
95. *Ibid.*, 12.
96. *Ibid.*, 12.
97. *Ibid.*, 13.
98. *Ibid.*, 13.
99. Abdulgani Nablusi, *Manzume min Mesâmi-i Âl-i Osman* (Istanbul: Lala Ismail libr, n.d.) 607, folio 5.
100. Abdulwahhab, *Khulasa*, 13.
101. *Ibid.*, 13.
102. *Ibid.*, 13.
103. *Ibid.*, 7-8.
104. *Ibid.*, 7, 14, 19, 30.