Forum

Making Sense of Radicalization

Farid Senzai

The self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and Syria's (ISIS) burning to death of Jordanian pilot Moaz al-Kasasba and beheading of twenty-one Egyptians in Libya are just the latest incidents in a series of escalating acts of violence that epitomize the seemingly senseless carnage that so often results from the political radicalization of individual Muslims. As the international media zeroes in on such instances, one often struggles to make sense of the perpetrators' true motives. But understanding the circumstances that lead up to such viciousness is key if governments are to minimize such acts in the future.

What motivates an individual to join a terrorist organization? Is it ideology, politics, poverty, or something else? What might be done to de-radicalize an individual who has joined a terrorist group? The reality is that there is no single pathway toward radicalization. In a May 2010 report entitled "Why Youth Join al-Qaeda,"[1] U.S. Army Colonel Matt Venhaus suggested that those seeking to join jihadist networks can be divided into revenge seekers needing an outlet for their frustration, status seekers needing recognition, identity seekers in need of a group to join, and thrill seekers looking for adventure.[2] Clearly the motives for terrorism are differentiated and complex, as opposed to uniform and simple. Thus identifying an overarching pattern to understanding how individuals might become susceptible to terrorist recruiters and what intervention strategies can be employed to stop it becomes a very difficult task.

Farid Senzai, associate professor of political science at Santa Clara University, teaches courses on American foreign policy and Middle East politics. He has served as the director of research at the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, a research associate at the Brookings Institution, and a research analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations. He currently sits on the board of directors at the Central Asian Institute and the advisory board of The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, where he has contributed to several national and global surveys on Muslim attitudes. His latest book, co-authored with Kamran Bokhari, is *Political Islam in the Age of Democratization* (Palgrave Macmillan: 2013). He received his M.A. in international affairs from Columbia University and his Ph.D. in politics and international relations from Oxford University.

Over the decades, scholars have had much to say about the dynamic processes that lead to violence, the relationship between the individual and the terrorist group, the role of identity in violent conflicts, the links between religion and politics, and the ideological motivations that support extremism.[3] Martha Crenshaw's seminal article on the subject remains one of the most important in the field.[4] In it she highlights the difficulty of finding general explanations for terrorism and contends that it is possible to distinguish different types of variables as a starting point for further research on causal relations. Her work differentiates between three groups of variables, namely, strategic, structural, and psychological.[5] Other scholars writing on the subject of terrorism and political violence include Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (1986) and *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response* (2000); Walter Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism* (1987) and *A History of Terrorism* (2001); Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (1970); and Tore Bjørgo, *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality, and Ways Forward* (2005).

While all have attempted to explain the occurrence of modern terrorism, none have focused specifically on its root causes.[6] Since September 11th, the number of publications has increased sharply, and yet the higher quantity has not translated into higher quality.[7] As Andrew Silke points outs, "[a] review of recent research work found that only about 20 percent of published articles on terrorism are providing substantially new knowledge on the subject."[8] As such, this ongoing research continues to be based on the findings from years past.[9] Furthermore, a brief overview of the academic literature suggests there is little agreement on the causes of terrorism.

A logical first step in creating an effective counterradicalization program requires one to first understand the motivations that often lead to radicalization. Yet few issues have proven more divisive and controversial among experts, both within and outside of government, than trying to identify the reasons that would drive an individual to embrace radical views and then to act upon them in violent ways.[10] As a consequence, and absent reliable supporting evidence, theories about radicalization abound.[11] As Lorenzo Vidino highlights, some focus on such structural factors as political tensions and cultural cleavages, sometimes referred to as the root causes of radicalization. Others emphasize personal factors, such as the shock of a life-changing event or the influence of a mentor. Finally, several theories have been formulated to explain the radicalization specifically of western Muslims that range from a search for identity to anger over relative economic deprivation.[12]

Academic Theories

A brief review of the academic literature suggests a wide range of theories articulated by scholars in hopes of explaining the motivations leading to radicalization and terrorist activity. These can be categorized broadly as sociological motivations, psychological motivations, or rational choice.

Sociological Theories

According to Victoroff, the sociological factors might include relative deprivation (i.e., poverty), oppression, and/or national culture factors. The first of these sociological theories is what scholars refer to as *deprivation* theory, which suggests that economic disparities and poverty causes terrorism. This claim underlies Gurr's (1970) theory of relative deprivation, that rebellions come into existence when people cannot bear the misery of their lot.[13] As Schmid (1983) observed, this theory derives more from psychoanalysis than from empirical sociology. Irrespective of the psychiatric roots, multiple writers have claimed a sociological link between poverty and terrorism (e.g., Schmid 1983; Harmon 2000; Hasisi and Pedahzur 2000; Krueger and Maleckova 2002).[14]

More recently, increasing differences between the material welfare of the haves and have-nots have been postulated to provoke a new era of political violence that will accelerate as globalization not only creates new foci of poverty, but facilitates communication among those who perceive themselves to be globalization's victims (e.g., Maya, Lander, and Ungar 2002).[15] One possibility is that either absolute deprivation or relative economic disparity ignites terrorist sentiments, especially among members of an oppressed underclass (e.g., Zamoyski 1999). On the other hand, many radical jihadists who have joined terrorist groups come from middle-class or well-to do-families. So although poverty may play a role in some political violence, relative deprivation is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain revolutionary terrorism. Similary, Krueger and Maleckova's (2002) work with Palestinians does not support a simple poverty-causes-terrorism conclusion.[16]

A second theory proposed and also within the sociological camp focuses on the issue of *oppression*, which in their view provokes political violence (e.g., Fanon 1965; Whitaker 1972; Schmid 1983). Particularly in the case of nationalist separatist or ethnic-sectarian terrorism (e.g., ETA, PIRA, Hamas), actors often cite the injustice of their treatment by governments that rob them of identity, dignity, security, and freedom as the motive for joining a terrorist group (Crenshaw 1986; Taylor and Quayle 1994; Post,

Sprinzak, and Denny 2003).[17] Since it is difficult to measure oppression itself, a sociopolitical relationship is subject to one's point of view. And since the impact of oppression may be felt subjectively to greater or lesser degrees by individuals within a community at risk, perceived oppression may be the proper cognitive emotional variable to examine as a potential risk factor for terrorism.

Others have argued that even if perceived oppression could be shown to breed terrorism, it would never be a sufficient explanation.[18] As Silke (2003, 33) states: "Very few individuals of aggrieved minorities go on to become active terrorists. The question has always been, why did these particular individuals engage in terrorism when most of their compatriots did not?" Sociological theories, like rational choice approaches do not answer this question.[19]

A final theory within the sociological camp includes what scholars have referred to as the *national* and *cultural* motivations of terrorism. While many differences have been observed among cultures, Weinberg and Eubank (1994), who proposed that terrorism expresses itself differently in "collectivist" versus "individualist" cultures,[20] claimed that a specific variable was key According to this theory, in collectivist cultures a person's identity is primarily derived from the social system by dividing the world strictly according to in-groups and out-groups and linking their personal wellbeing to the wellbeing of their group. However, in individualist cultures identity is derived from personal goals. Weinberg and Eubank propose that collectivists would be more likely than individualists to carry out terrorist attacks on out-groups, including foreigners, whereas individualists would be less inhibited as regards attacking one of their own.[21]

Psychological Theories

In contrast to sociological theories that emphasize factors influencing the behavior of an entire group, psychological theories of terrorist behavior primarily emphasize individual factors. A fierce controversy has roiled the psychiatric community since the early twentieth century, one that has divided the psychoanalytic approaches to the study of individual psychology, primarily derivative of Freudian theory, from non-psychoanalytic approaches (Wallerstein 1995). For the purposes of this essay, these approaches are considered separately.[22]

The first of these psychological theories focuses on *identity*. It has been proposed that candidates for terrorism are young people lacking self-esteem

who have a strong or even desperate need to consolidate their identities (Olsson 1988). On the basis of unstructured (and largely undocumented) interviews with Irish and European terrorists, Taylor and Quayle (1994) reported that many became politically violent while seeking a sense of purpose and self-worth, "a place in the sun." The theory of psychologist Erik Erikson (1959), that adolescents reach a stage of identity formation at which ideologies assist in self-definition, was the basis for Bollinger's (1981; also see Crenshaw 1986) psychoanalytic interpretation of his interviews with eight members of German terrorist groups. He claimed that over-controlling parents prevented these respondents from developing autonomy, which led to the identity crises that made violent struggle irresistible. At the extreme, those with identity confusion are perhaps tormented by a sense of isolation, conceivably engaging in terrorist violence as an adaptive response to the pain of anomie (Ferracuti 1982).[23]

A second psychological approach places its attention on what Harvard psychiatrist Robert J. Lifton (2000) referred to as *absolutist* or *apocalyptic* theory. In it, he suggests that cults and apocalyptic groups envision mass destruction as a path toward replacing the corrupt world with a pure new social order. Apocalyptic groups typically exhibit absolutist moral polarization, idealization of a messianic figure, and impaired reality testing, imagining vast conspiracies of evil such as a "world shadow government" of Jews. Absolutist thinking helps motivate terrorism via its seductive appeal to young adults with weak identities, and terrorists use of it to defend themselves from normal emotional responses to violence through denial, psychic numbing, or isolation of affect – both of these fit with psychoanalytic theory. Although neither absolute is a normolation of affect by themselves that offers an *animus belli* or explains the specific impulse to harm innocents, it seems plausible to predict that irrational violence against the "other" would be precipitated when pathological defenses lead to black-and-white thinking about the outgroup, combined with paranoia about in-group annihilation. This is consistent with the proposal of Devine and Rafalko (1982) to the effect that, paradoxically, terrorists are often uncompromising moralists who see the world in starkly polar terms.[24]

The third psychological theory deals with *humiliation* – and the consequent internal pressure for revenge – has been hypothesized to drive terrorist violence (Juergensmeyer 2000). Revenge for humiliation by an oppressor is, in fact, an ancient cultural tradition with direct links to the current violence in the Middle East. The oppression of the early Christians, embodied in the image of Christ on the cross, was part of the inspiration for the apocalyptic movement

in Christianity that culminated in the First Crusade (Armstrong 2001). A cycle of oppression and humiliation, followed by violent action in the name of liberation, characterizes the subsequent history of the Middle East. Palestinian psychiatrist Eyadel Sarraj (2002) has specifically observed that humiliation is an important factor that motivates young suicide bombers. Abdul Aziz Rantisi, the late political leader of Hamas, confirmed this notion in a statement published three years before his death via targeted killing by the Israeli Defense Forces: "To die in this way is better than to die daily in frustration and humiliation" (Juergensmeyer 2000, 187).[25]

A fourth theory on terrorism focuses on group psychology within idiosyncratic subcultures that coalesce in reaction to circumstances they perceive as intolerable (Taylor and Ryan 1988; Friedland 1992; Hoffman 1998; Merari 1998; Levine 1999; Post 2004; Sageman 2004). Sageman, a strong proponent of the group hypothesis, goes so far as to say that "it's a group phenomenon. To search for individual characteristics ... will lead you to a dead end" (Rotella 2004, A3).[26]

For these scholars, membership in a terrorist organization offers disciples a heady liquor of a well-defined personal role, a righteous purpose, the opportunity for revenge for perceived humiliations, and the lifting of constraints on the expression of otherwise prohibited behaviors, all of which free the member from personal responsibility for attacks on out-groups (Hacker 1983;Taylor and Ryan 1988; Weinberg and Eubank 1994; Stern 1999). Group forces, including ideological indoctrination, repetitive training, and peer pressure, has been hypothesized to influence the group's violence whether or not individual members were predisposed to such behavior before joining (Crenshaw 1992; Clayton, Barlow, and Ballif-Spanvill 1998). This may occur because collective identity subsumes individual identity. As Post, Sprinzak, and Denny (2003, 176) put it: "An overarching sense of the collective consumes the individual. This fusion with the group seems to provide the necessary justification for their actions with an attendant loss of felt responsibility."[27]

Rational Choice Theory

Some scholars, especially those within the field of political science, have argued that terrorism, like many other types of political behavior, can best be understood through the prism of *rational choice* theory. Jeffrey Ian Ross points out that while structural and psychological causes are important, "rational choice" is most relevant to understanding the causes of terrorism.[28] According to him, the terrorist strives to act optimally in order to achieve his/her goal in

a clear demonstration of a conscious, calculated rational decision, one that is often reluctantly embraced only after a considerable reflection and debate involving the weighing of costs and benefits, before undertaking the murderous journey (e.g., Sandles, Tschirhart, and Cauley 1983; Sandler and Lapan 1988; Crenshaw 1992; Wilson 2000).[29]

Jeff Victoroff, who provides a detailed review of the theories mentioned above, highlights the many weaknesses in each of them. For instance, the leading psychological theories of terrorism include a broad spectrum of sociological, psychological, and psychiatric approaches. Furthermore, none of them has been tested in a systematic way; in fact, they have been found to be overwhelmingly subjective, speculative, and, in many cases, derived from 1920s psychoanalytic hypotheses that are not amenable to testing.[30] The reality is that scholars are unlikely to find simple answers because the terrorism phenomena and the processes leading to radicalization are highly complex.

Furthermore, as Victoroff correctly points out, scholars should realize that terrorist behavior is more likely determined by a combination of innate factors, biological factors, early developmental factors, cognitive factors empowerment, environmental influences, and group dynamics. The degree to which each of these factors contributes to a given event probably varies among individual terrorists, among individual groups, and among types of groups. Theories that claim the predominance of one influence over the others are premature, since such studies have not systematically examined more than one or two of these factors, let alone empirically examined one while controlling for the others.[31]

Radical Jihadists

What do we know and what could be said about radical jihadists? A striking similarity among many radicalized jihadists is how little they actually know about Islam and the Qur'an. Those who join these violent extremist groups rarely have formal training or disciplined teaching in the religion; in fact, in most cases they have no more than a rudimentary understanding often shaped by online sources or talking to extremists online. Akil Awan, a lecturer in political violence and terrorism at the University of London's Royal Holloway, suggests that those drawn to jihadism are usually raised in largely secular households or possess only a rudimentary grasp of Islam that rarely extends to religious practice. Research shows that in many cases these would-be jihadists were hardly strict adherents to Islam's major tenants before turning to violence. Take, for instance, the case of Mohammed Ahmed and Yusuf Sarwar, two

British men jailed for travelling to Syria in 2013 to join an al-Qaida-linked terrorist group. Before their departure, they purchased *Islam for Dummies* and *The Qur'an for Dummies*, an act that hardly suggests a deep understanding of Islam's historic and religious tradition.

We can see a similar situation in the case of Chérif and Saïd Kouachi, the two brothers accused of carrying out the massacre at the Paris headquarters of the satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo*. Awan points out that these orphans of Algerian background were not raised as pious Muslims. In fact, Chérif led a decidedly non-devout and hedonistic life: smoking marijuana, drinking alcohol, listening to gangster rap, and having numerous girlfriends. Cherif, who also went by the name "Abu Issen," had been part of the "Buttes-Chaumont network" that helped send would-be jihadis to fight alongside al-Qaeda in Iraq after the US-UK invasion in 2003. During his 2008 trial, Chérif's lawyer said that his client described himself as an "occasional Muslim." Others have described him as a "confused chameleon," aptly summing up the troubled identity crises commonly experienced by many jihadists.

Awan points out that this crisis of identity often leads minority individuals to a dislocated sense of self, one characterized by alienation from the mainstream and parental cultures. Those susceptible youth who succumb to emotional and psychological schizophrenia soon begin to feel a sense of increased isolation, of not belonging to either camp. Their precarious predicament makes the ideas pitched by radical recruiters and preachers of violent extremism – being part of an *ummah* that does not worry about one's race, ethnicity, or place of birth – persuasive and attractive. The prospect of membership, expressed as an opportunity to join the side of like-minded believers besieged by evil forces, and of being part of a cosmic struggle against the military onslaught of "Western Crusaders" attempting to impose their will on Muslim societies, appeals to many vulnerable youth. And why not, for its worldview and sense of purpose are clear and easy-to-understand.

Such perceptions also allow them to respond to the political and economic grievances held by Muslims worldwide. This does not exonerate religion; but as Awan correctly suggests, religion is also a product of social, economic, and political factors that become translated into solutions for these individuals. In most cases, terrorist actions are motivated by political concerns that are, perhaps, couched in religious garb to validate their heinous crimes. Religion might provide the motif or stamp of approval for their action, but not for the original motive.

This perversion of Islam into an ideology that allows the wanton killing of innocent people in pursuit of a utopian society needs to be confronted di-

rectly. But contrary to what many believe, what is needed is *more* Islam, not less. However, it must be the normative, traditional Islam – the Islam that exemplifies centuries of scholarly and theological consensus that neutralizes such perversions. Any other "version" of Islam is not likely to have credibility among extremists. The consensus is clear: The murder of innocent people under any circumstances is prohibited. This message must be forcefully conveyed and instilled into the minds of vulnerable youth who have fallen for misappropriations of Islamic scripture. Muslims are engaging and leading an ideological and theological battle that only reputable and legitimate Muslim scholars can win. And yet this approach cannot unfold if the broader society continues to "stigmatize," "modernize," and/or "secularize" these individuals, for such reactions often do more harm than good and usually play right into the jihadi narrative that "outsiders" are attempting to malign and misguide Muslims from "true" Islam.

Various types of deradicalization programs are in place across the globe, including Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Jordan, Malaysia, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Indonesia.[32] One of the largest of these initiatives was the coalition-run program in Iraq, which began in 2007 to handle more than 24,000 detainees. Singapore has one of the most successful rehabilitation programs. The technique starts by examining the texts used by prisoners to justify violence before asking them to look beyond their *tafsīr*. Verses are often taken out of context, says Ustaz Mohamed bin Ali, a graduate of al-Azhar University, the foremost seat of learning for Sunnis. He says a fanatic may have memorized entire sections of the Qur'an but can still struggle to interpret their meaning. "Jihad itself has several meanings. One of them is to fight, but to fight on a legitimate battlefield. So what these guys are doing is not jihad," he says. "Jihad is to strive for anything good in yourself to fight your own desires."[33]

Singapore's program, though, is regarded as the most successful and the model upon which the others are loosely based. The initiative began in the face of a rising internal security threat from Jemaah Islamiyah (an al-Qaeda arm in Southeast Asia) in 2002, after volunteering imams set out to stifle recruitment drives. Detainees are encouraged to better themselves with access to a library and academic courses.[34]

Similarly, Saudi Arabia has several long-running and ambitious programs in which Islamic scholars try to lead radicals to moderation. Saudi rehabilitation efforts have been underway since 2004, when the Ministry of Interior committed itself to softer, non-kinetic counterterrorism tactics as part of a revised domestic security strategy. Managed by committees of clerics, psychol-

ogists, and security officers, the initiative is a religious counseling program that also seeks to rehabilitate prisoners through education and training. After completing the program, they are released, reintegrated released into Saudi society, and monitored.[35] The authorities say that of the roughly 3,000 inmates who have participated voluntarily, only nine have been arrested for returning to jihad and another thirty-five for security-related offences.

Some experts acknowledge the Saudi program is more holistic in its approach compared to programs where the only thing addressed is ideology.[36] Family members are included in the rehabilitation process; for example, the graduate and the head of the family both have to sign a pledge renouncing extremism. What is also unique is the thousands of dollars given to some graduates to encourage the prospect of a new life; it helps pay for weddings, furniture, a new Toyota.[37] One of the program's poster boys is Ahmed al-Shayea, a failed suicide attacker who killed nine people and maimed over sixty others – including himself – in Baghdad using a truck bomb five years ago. Al-Shayea says he began to change his thinking when a cleric told him that the jihad he had gone to Iraq to join was not religiously sanctioned. "There is no jihad. We are just instruments of death," he told the Associated Press in 2007.[38]

Governments that are serious about improving public safety by mitigating radicalization and terrorism must encourage this kind of work. But this cannot be done if the state continues to alienate Islam, in sociopolitical terms, as a belief system that naturally urges its adherents toward violence and, therefore, must somehow be curbed. Such an antagonistic approach will only backfire.

Appropriately trained Muslim scholars who represent the authentic Islamic tradition must be empowered to lead this effort and equipped with ways to allow their voices maximal reach. For example, unstable Yemen's deradicalization program, based on the "Committee for Dialogue," features well-established, authentic Muslim scholars who engage with suspected al-Qaeda members and sympathizers to discuss basic Islamic concepts. Participating religious figures pay special attention to the concept of jihad in order to address the misconceptions held by radicalized individuals. This particular program and others like it, which have shown success elsewhere, emphasize three points: (1) Islam views acts of violence as unacceptable and the Qur'an condemns the killing of civilians in all cases, (2) the individual's interpretation of Islam is erroneous, and (3) only legitimate Muslim scholars have the necessary knowledge and qualifications to interpret the Qur'an.

As we have seen, the motivations leading to radicalization is complex and often highly individualized process, usually shaped by a poorly understood interaction of structural and personal factors. And just as there is no

grand theory of radicalization and no common terrorist profile, there is no single explanation for why people deradicalize or disengage from a militant group. The factors that trigger this process are as many and varied as those that lead individuals to radicalize.[39] Aware of these complexities, most authorities have understood the need to adopt highly flexible approaches to counterradicalization. There is broad consensus that no single approach will work in all cases, and in some cases none will work. Methods used in radicalization prevention might not be appropriate in deradicalization. Efforts should be adapted to the specific circumstances, supported by a deep knowledge of the characteristics of the individual or group they are directed to, and continuously assessed.[40]

Conclusion

Countering radicalization requires a nuanced understanding of socioeconomic and personal factors as well as specific ideological and theological aspects. European governments have often supported individuals and organizations that have challenged jihadist ideology from a theological perspective[41] by creating university courses to train imams, organizing lectures for Muslim clerics, and, more generally, providing platforms that enable various "moderate" voices to reach a wider audience. Such exposure to moderate or mainstream interpretations are, in turn, expected to make them more resistant to radical interpretations.[42]

Given that the road to radicalization is highly complex, Muslim leaders, scholars, theologians, and activists need to formulate a sound counter-narrative, one that includes research on foreign and domestic Muslims, in order to create a diversified counter-radicalization narrative that reflects the teachings of mainstream Islam and the nuanced views of Muslims globally. Public and private foundations should fund research on ideologies that influence radicalization, the processes of radicalization, factors that cause individuals to join and/or leave terrorist organizations, and successful deradicalization strategies.

A policy of long-term community-government cooperation and partnership at all levels, as well as with law enforcement agencies, should utilize these relationships to establish sincere two-way dialogues, constructive debates, and brainstorming sessions.[43] Furthermore, members of mosques, cultural associations, community centers, and student groups should work hard to empower moderate Muslim voices within their respective communities; however, at this point in time they still need a great deal of help in terms of their institutional capacity building and messaging capabilities.[44] Government outreach initiatives

need to develop partnerships with the Muslim community that will enable the latter's leaders to be the first line of defense via community-led interventions. Many Muslim scholars and community leaders can provide professional counseling, counter-radicalization programming, and religious retraining within an authentic religious paradigm.

Community-led interventions should address social alienation, public and private foundations should fund community centers that foster a sense of belonging through sports and creative arts programs, and mentors who can talk realistically about shared values and non-violent approaches to conflict and disagreements instead of just repeating platitudes need to be located and made available.[45]

The Internet remains a problem due to the number of radical websites. A way has to be found to debunk their arguments by engaging local Muslim leaders, imams, and scholars who can produce moderate, counter-radical websites firmly grounded in mainstream Islam. Local community centers and mosques should inform parents of what they can do to prevent their children from falling for the online indoctrination produced by ISIS and other terrorist groups.[46] Washington could also work with its allies and partners abroad to find ways to shut down those sites that attract susceptible recruits living in the West.

More broadly, the general public needs to be educated about Muslims and Islam. Given the media's increased attention to homegrown terrorism and the misunderstandings between Muslims and non-Muslims in America, a public, national dialogue needs to be initiated to counter the misperceptions that many have about Muslims.[47] Government officials need to be far more assertive in their effort to organize public forums that address the threat of domestic radicalization along with the differences between radical and mainstream religious tenets of Islam. One major problem associated with such attempts, however, is how to convince the general public that such undertakings are not Muslim propaganda.

Similarly, public and private foundations should provide resources for intra-Muslim discussions and the subsequent implementation of organic, bottom-up, counter-radicalization efforts. Also needed are public awareness campaigns against radicalization, such as issuing statements against radical ideologies that breed violence and hatred, and publishing pamphlets and booklets that highlight the Islamic values of religious tolerance, pluralism, gender equality, and social cohesion.[48]

Other seemingly intractable issues are the role that western countries play in promoting misguided foreign policies that often rely heavily on a military adventurism. The continued military hubris advocated by major

western powers often fuels the animosity felt in Muslim majority countries and makes it that much easier for radical jihadist groups to recruit impressionable youth. Similarly the European xenophobia and racism that prevents the full integration of Muslims into mainstream society leaves the youth vulnerable to jihadi influence despite the well-intentioned efforts of those trying to direct them toward mainstream Islam.

In short, the fight against radicalization must address both the supply and demand side of the equation. Both the West and the Muslim world need to adopt a more comprehensive approach that takes account of all these issues in order to address the problem we face. Only then, will we be able to provide an adequate and more realistic response to the battle against radicalization.

Endnotes

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