Reconceptualizing Political Obedience in Islamic Thought An Analytical Study of Ḥadīth Literature
Main Article Content
Keywords
obedience, Jāmiʿ al-Uṣūl, ruler, community, Ḥadīth, authority
Abstract
This study examines the concept of obedience to the ruler in Islam focusing on prominent ḥadīth collections, primarily Ibn al-Athīr’s Jāmiʿ al-Uṣūl fī Aḥādīth al-Rasūl. It conducts a comprehensive textual and contextual analysis, extending its exploration to classical and contemporary works of Islamic political thought. The primary objective is to unveil insightful clues that contribute to a profound understanding of the concept of obedience, synthesizing original Islamic sources, historical experiences of the ummah, and the current realities of the Islamic world. The study argues that the concept of obedience emerges as conditional and contextual, balancing the rights of the ruler and the people. Also, the term ulū al-amr, symbolizing the joint effort of legislation, law enforcement, and adjudication, rejects autocratic power and political tyranny. Rulers are expected to consult with scholars, emphasizing a reciprocal relationship for the benefit of the ummah. The study further identifies a three-tiered classification of obedience: normative obedience rooted in love and respect for just rulers, obedience of necessity applied to corrupt rulers in Muslim history prior to the collapse of the Caliphate, and a form of emergency obedience to leaders in the contemporary era. On the basis of “averting harm takes priority over bringing the benefit” dictum, Islamic law has ordered that the despotism of the ruler, viewed as a fait accompli, is something that ought to be endured, and obedience given till the time is ripe for change.
References
Endnotes
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3 See these reports in Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, Jāmi‘fi Aḥādīth al-Rasūl. (Damascus:
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4 Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 4: 61-62.
5 Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 4: 64-65; al-Haythamī, Majma‘ al-Zawā’id. (Cairo:
Maktabat al-Qudsī, 1994), 5: 220. E.g., “Listen and obey even if your back is beaten
and your wealth is taken.” Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 10: 45.
6 Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 4: 64-65; al-Haythamī, Majma‘ al-Zawā’id, 5: 220.
7 Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence, 113.
8 Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 4: 78.
9 Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 1: 253; Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī, Fatḥ al-Bārī. (Riyadh,
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11 Plato, The Republic, translated by Benjamin Jowett, (America: Anchor Books, 1980),
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12 Aristotle, Politics, translated by Benjamin Jowett, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
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13 Al-Jāḥiẓ, Rasā’il al-Jāḥiẓ. (Beirut: Maktabat al-Hilāl, 2002), 3: 99.
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15 Al-Fārābī, Ārā’ ahl al-Madīnah. (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1985), 117.
16 Ibn Sīnā, Al-Ishārāt wa-al-Tanbīhāt. (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, n.d.), 4: 60-61.
17 Ibn Khaldūn, Al-Muqaddimah. (Tunisia: Dār al-Qayrawān, 2006), 1:69-71.
18 Ibid., 1: 71. For further analysis on security and protection as the original function
of the state, see Lesile Lipson, The Great Issues of Politics: An Introduction to Political
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19 ‘Abd Allāh Nāṣīf, Al-Sulṭah al-Siyāsiyyah. (Cairo: Dār al-Nahḍah, 1983), 4.
20 Abū al-Qāsim al-Ṭabarānī, Al-Mu‘jam al-Kabīr. (Cairo: Maktabat Ibn Taymiyyah,
1983), 10:1620163; al-Haythamī, Majma‘ al-Zawā’id, 5: 222.
21 Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī, Al-Jāmi‘ li-Shu‘ab al-Īmān. (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd, 2003),
10:15.
22 Narrated by Abū Dāwūd, and Aḥmad. See al-Shawkānī, Nayl al-Awṭār. (Lebanon:
Bayt al-Afkār, 2004), 1699.
23 Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī, Al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah. (Kuwait: Dār Ibn Qutaybah,
1989), 3.
24 On the necessity of setting up a caliphate, see a detailed explanation and several
quotes of leading jurists in Muḥammad al-Rayyis, Al-Naẓariyyāt al-Siyāsiyyah
al-Islāmiyyah. (7th ed.). (Cairo: Dār al-Turāth, 1976), 128-143.
25 All the Qur’ānic quotations, unless otherwise indicated, are taken from M.A.S. Abdel
Haleem, The Qur’an. (Oxford University Press, 2004).
26 Al-Ṭabarī, Tafsīr al-Ṭabarī. (Cairo: Dār Hajar, 2003), 7: 176-182; al-Qurṭubī, Al-Jāmi‘
li-Aḥkām al-Qur’ān. (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risālah, 2006), 6: 423-433; Ibn al-Qayyim,
I‘lām al-Muwaqqi‘īn ‘an Rabb al-‘Ālamīn. (Riyadh: Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 1423 AH),
2:15-16; Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, Al-Durr al-Manthūr fī al-Tafsīr bi-al-Ma’thūr. (Cairo:
Dār Hajar, 2003), 4: 504-506; Hānī al-Mughallis, Al-Ṭā‘ah al-Siyāsiyyah fī al-Fikr
al-Islāmī. (Virginia: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2014), 112-114.
27 This is Abū Ḥayyān’s preference, who puts an emphasis on the legitimate leadership.
Tafsīr al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ. (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth, 2002), 3: 396; and Muḥammad
al-Ṭāhir ibn ‘Āshūr, Tafsīr al-Taḥrīr wa-al-Tanwīr. (Tunisia: Dār Suḥnūn, 1997), 5:
98; also Muḥammad ‘Abduh, who associates ulū al-amr with ahl al-ḥall wa-al-‘aqd
(emirs, rulers, ulama, military commanders, leaders and so on). Muḥammad Rashīd
Riḍā, Tafsīr al-Manār. (Cairo: al-Manār, 1328 AH), 5: 181. Cf. Sayf al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ
Ismā‘īl, Al-Naẓariyyah al-Siyāsiyyah min Manẓūr Ḥaḍārī Islāmī. (Amman: The
Academic Centre for Political Studies, 2002), 325.
28 Al-Shawkānī, Fatḥ al-Qadīr. (4th ed.). (Beirut: Dār al-Ma‘rifah, 2007), 308.
29 Quoted in al-Mughallis, Al-Ṭā‘ah al-Siyāsiyyah, 112.
30 Ulū al-amr always comes in the plural form. It has no singular that is derived from
the same root. Majd al-Dīn al-Fayrūzabādī, al-Qāmūs al-Muḥīṭ. (8th ed.). (Beirut:
Mu’assasat al-Risālah, 2005), 1349; al-Zabīdī, Tāj al-‘Arūs min Jawāhir al-Qāmūs.
(Kuwait: Wizārat al-Irshād, 1965-2001), 40: 379; al-Qurṭubī, Al-Jāmi‘ li-Aḥkām, 6: 432.
31 It is important to understand the circumstances that accounted for the revelation of the
verse. This contextual information broadens readers’ horizon in terms of specifying
general words, placing limitation to the absolute, and, more importantly, pinpointing
the exact meaning of the verse. The incident that brought about the revelation of
obedience verse serves a practical example of how, when differences of understanding
among leaders and their followers occur, the case should be referred to the guidance
of the Qur’ān and Sunnah. In one of the battles, the emir who has a sense of humor
was trying to test the obedience of his soldiers. So, he asked them to collect pieces
of firewood and set fire to them. Then, when done, he ordered the soldiers to throw
themselves on the fire claiming that his command must be obeyed, according to the
Prophet’s instruction. After moments of reluctance combined with a dispute, the soldiers
decided to disobey the emir and consult the Prophet instead. Later, the Prophet
answered, “If you had entered the fire, you would not have got out of it, for obedience
is only in that which is (legally) valid and reasonable.” The incident is stated in
al-Suyūṭī, Lubāb al-Nuqūl fī Asbāb al-Nuzūl. (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Kutub al-Thaqāfiyyah,
2002), 80-81; al-Wāḥidī, Asbāb al-Nuzūl. (Al-Dammām: Dār al-Iṣlāḥ, 1992), 159.
It is also in al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmi‘ al-Ṣaḥīḥ. (Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Salafiyyah, 1400
AH), 3: 160; Muslim ibn al-Ḥajjāj, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim. (Cairo: al-Maṭba‘ah al-Miṣriyyah,
1930), 12: 223, and other ḥadīth collections, as well as most of the available books of
tafsīr, like al-Qurṭubī, Al-Jāmi‘ li-Aḥkām, 6: 430-431; al-Suyūṭī, Al-Durr al-Manthūr,
4: 502. Cf. al-Mughallis, Al-Ṭā‘ah al-Siyāsiyyah, 189-192. There is another incident
that caused the revelation of the verse. Al-Suyūṭī, Al-Durr al-Manthūr, 4: 502-503. Yet,
according to the rules of the science of ḥadīth, it is rejected for several methodological
flaws. See al-Wāḥidī, Asbāb al-Nuzūl, 159-160 (editor’s footnote). In the light of the
story, the verse directs that when a dispute arises among the ruler and the ruled,
a referral is to be passed to Allah and His messenger. As a result, obedience to ulū
al-amr “applies to that which is known of God’s law, that which is not covered by a
statement of prohibition and that which is not subject to prohibition when referred
to God’s law.” Sayyid Quṭb, In the Shade of the Qur’an. Translated into English by
‘Ādil Ṣalāḥī. (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation. 2004), 3:166.
32 The jurist Ibn al-Qayyim, quoting the obedience verse, puts the question of obedience
in a new fashion. He argues that the duty to obey the ruler is derived from
the duty to obey jurists, and the duty to obey the jurists is derived from the duty
to obey the Prophet. Therefore, the jurists are obeyed to the extent that they obey
the Prophet, and the rulers are obeyed to the extent that they obey the jurists.
Ultimately, the jurists are the ones who must be obeyed, as they are the experts
on the religious law. Ibn al-Qayyim, I‘lām al-Muwaqqi‘īn, 2:16. Cf. Abou El Fadl,
Rebellion and Violence, 130-131.
33 “God commands you [people] to return things entrusted to you to their rightful
owners, and, if you judge between people, to do so with justice: God’s instructions
to you are excellent, for He hears and sees everything” (Al-Nisā’: 58).
34 Features of ulū al-amr are clearly highlighted in Qur’ānic exegeses, such as Abū
al-Qāsim al-Zamakhsharī, Al-Kashshāf ‘an Ḥaqā’iq al-Tanzīl. (3rd ed.). (Beirut: Dār
al-Ma‘rifah, 2009), 242; al-Qurṭubī, Al-Jāmi‘ li-Aḥkām, 6: 423, 428-430; al-Shawkānī,
Fatḥ al-Qadīr, 308; Muḥammad Abū al-Su‘ūd, Irshād al-‘Aql al-Salīm. (Beirut: Dār
Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-‘Arabī, n.d.), 2: 193; and Ibn ‘Āshūr, Tafsīr al-Taḥrīr, 5: 96.
35 Al-Zamakhsharī, Al-Kashshāf, 242. Abū al-Su‘ūd, 2: 193. For other similar commentators’
statements excluding corrupt rulers from ulū al-amr, see al-Mughallis,
Al-Ṭā‘ah al-Siyāsiyyah, 112-114.
36 Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī, Al-Jāmi‘, 10: 15; Ibn Abī Shaybah, Al-Muṣannaf, 14: 305.
37 See Shāṭibī, al-I‘tiṣām. (Amman: Dār al-Athariyyah, 2008), 3: 294-311; Ibn Ḥajar
al-‘Asqalānī, Fatḥ al-Bārī, 13: 37. Al-Shāṭibī identifies the imam of al-jamā‘ah as
one who is dedicated to adhering to the Qur’ān and the Sunnah. Al-I‘tiṣām, 3: 311.
38 Ismā‘īl Ibn Kathīr, Al-Bidāyah wa-al-Nihāyah. (Cairo: Dār Hajar, 1998), 11:148.
39 Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, 12: 242.
40 See al-Faḍl Shalaq, “al-Jamā‘ah wa-al-Dawlah,” al-Ijtihād, no. 3 (1989): 55; 66-67.
41 Al-Jāḥiẓ, Rasā’il…, 3: 99. Cf. al-Māwardī, Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn. (Beirut: Dār
Iqra’, 1985), 149.
42 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978),
1, 6.
43 See these traditions in al-Haythamī, Majma‘ al-Zawā’id, 5:215-225; Abū ‘Abd Allāh
al-Ḥulaymī, Al-Minhāj fī Sshu‘ab al-Imān. (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd, 2003), 3:179.
44 Abū Ja‘far al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī. (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 1962), 3:207.
45 Edward William Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1968), 6:
2334; L. Gardet, “FITNA,” in C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, G. Lecomte
(eds.), The Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden: Brill, new ed., 1986- 2004), 2: 930-931.
46 Elsaid M. Badawi and Muhammad Abdel Haleem, Arabic-English Dictionary of
Qur’anic Usage (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 692. The fitnah in the Qur’ān has twelve meanings.
Majid al-Dīn al-Fayrūzabādī, Basā’ir Dhawī al-Tamyīz (Cairo: Al-Majlis al-A‘lā
li al-Shu’ūn al-Islamiyyah, 1992), 4: 166-169.
47 Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon, 6: 2334.
48 Al-Jurjānī, Al-Ta‘rīfāt (Cairo: Dār al-Fadīlah, 2004), 138.
49 Ibrāhīm Salqīnī, Qitāl al-Fitna bayn al-Muslimīn (Damascus: al-Nawādir, 2012),
42-46.
50 http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/fitna.
51 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/fitna.
52 Al-Nawawī, Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, 12: 222; Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 4: 61-72; Abou
El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence, 112-118.
53 Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 10, 45.
54 Ibid., 4: 69-70; al-Haythamī, Majma‘ al-Zawā’id, 5: 219.
55 Al-Ṭabarānī, Al-Mu‘jam al-Kabīr, 10: 162-163.
56 Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 10, 3-101.
57 Al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmi‘ al-Ṣaḥīḥ, 4: 312-327.
58 Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, 2207-2271.
59 Al-Haythamī, Majma‘ al-Zawā’id, 7: 220-350.
60 Al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmi‘ al-Ṣaḥīḥ, 4: 312-327.
61 Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, 2207-2271.
62 Abū Dāwūd, Sunan Abū Dāwūd (Jeddah: Dār al-Qiblah, 1998), 5: 5-28.
63 Al-Tirmidhī, Sunan al-Tirmidhī (Beirut: Dār al-Risālah al- ‘Ālamiyyah, 2002), 4:
233-318.
64 Ibn Mājah, Sunan Ibn Mājah (Cairo: al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, n.d.), 1295-1371. Note that
the Book of al-Sunan by al-Nasā’ī is excluded because it lacks a chapter on al-Fitan
and does not reference ḥadīths concerning fitnah and sedition.
65 Al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmi‘ al-Ṣaḥīḥ, 4: 312-327; Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, 2207-2271.
66 Al-‘Asqalānī, Fatiḥ al-Bārī, 13, 34; Haykal, Al-Jihad, 1: 146.
67 Ibid.
68 Haykal, Al-Jihad,1: 146-147; Salqīnī, Qitāl al-Fitna, 203.
69 Ibid.
70 Haykal, Al-Jihad, 1: 146; Kāmil Rabbā‘, Naẓariyyat al-Khurūj fī al-Fiqh al-Siyāsī
al-Islamī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2004), 194.
71 Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qur’ān (Beirut: Dār Ihyā’ al-Turāth, 1992), 5: 282;
Jamāl Abū Farḥah, Al-Khurūj ‘alā al-Ḥākim fī al-Fikr al-Siyāsī al-Islamī (Cairo:
Markaz al-Ḥadārah al-‘Arabiyyah, 2004), 62; Salqīnī, Qitāl al-Fitna, 207; Haykal,
Al-Jihad, 1: 146.
72 Abū Farḥah, Al-Khurūj, 62.
73 Salqīnī, Qitāl al-Fitna, 114; cf. Al-‘Asqalānī, Fatḥ al-Bārī, 13: 35.
74 Abū Dāwūd, Sunan, 5: 12; Ibn Abū Shaybah, Al-Muṣannaf, 21: 29.
75 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qur’ān, 2: 320.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 James Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2015), 4-7, 25-27.
79 Al-Kawākibī, Ṭabā’i‘ al-‘Istibdād (Cairo: Kalimāt ‘Arabiyya, 2011), 118.
80 Ibid.
81 Al-Raysūnī, Fiqh al-Thawrah (Cairo: Dār al-Kalimah, 2013), 39.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., 38. See more similar citations in al-Mughallis, Al-Ṭā‘ah al-Siyāsiyyah, 255-257.
University), 1: 547.
90 On the nature of the sultanate states and their social system, see al-Faḍl Shalaq,
“al-Kharāj wa-al-Iqṭā‘ wa-al-Dawlah,” al-Ijtihād, no. 1 (1988): 152-174. On discussion
about their legal status and the political realism of Islamic law, see al-Māwardī,
Al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah, 44; al-Faḍl Shalaq, “al-Faqīh wa-al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyyah:
Dirāsah fī Kutub al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah,” al-Ijtihād, no. 3 (1989): 15-101. See also
Riḍwān al-Sayyid, “Ru’yat al-khilāfah wa Bunyat al-Dawlah fī al-Islām,” al-Ijtihād, no.
13 (1991): 39-45; and Ibrāhīm Bayḍūn, “al-Mamālīk wa Ma’ziq al-Shar‘iyyah,” al-Ijtihād,
no. 22 (1994): 39-55; Omid Safi, The Politics of Knowledge in Premodern Islam: Negotiating
Ideology and Religious Inquiry. (The University of North Carolina Press, 2006).
91 Shalaq, “al-Jamā‘ah wa al-Dawlah,” 71-80.
92 Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, Al-Musnad. (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risālah, 1993-2001), 1:333;
al-Rayyis, Al-Naẓariyyāt al-Siyāsiyyah, 358-359. Other similar traditions are in Ibn
al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 8:416; al-Haythamī, Majma‘ al-Zawā’id, 5: 225-229.
93 See, for example, Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, 12: 211-230; al-Tirmidhī, Sunan al-Tirmidhī.
(Beirut: Dār al-Risālah, 2002), 3: 500-503; al-Nasā’ī, Sunan al-Nasā’ī. (Amman:
Bayt al-Afkār al-Dawliyyah, n.d.), 437-442; Ibn Mājah, Sunan Ibn Mājah. (Cairo:
Bābī al-Ḥalabī, n.d.), 954-955; al-Haythamī, Majma‘ al-Zawā’id, 5:207-231; al-Bayhaqī,
Al-Jāmi‘, 9: 459; 10: 82; Ibn Ḥibbān, Ṣaḥīḥ Ibn Ḥibbān. (Damascus: Mu’assasat
al-Risālah, 1993), 10: 411-431.
94 Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 1: 253.
95 Ibn Ḥanbal, Al-Musnad, 31: 125; Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 1: 333.
96 Muḥammad al-Ḥākim, Al-Mustadrak. (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥaramayn, 1997), 3: 234.
97 See examples in al-Rayyis, Al-Naẓariyyāt al-Siyāsiyyah, 355-358.
98 Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, 12: 238; Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 10: 45.
99 Abū Farḥah, Al-Khurūj, 31.
100 Thomas Arnold, The Caliphate. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924), 47.
101 Ibid., 48-50.
102 William Muir, The Caliphate. (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 600.
103 Duncan B. MacDonald, Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence, and
Constitutional Theory. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1903), 58.
104 Quoted in Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence, 12.
105 Abū Ḥanīfah, the renowned jurist, sanctions rebellion against corrupt rulers, asserting
the obligation to engage in “commanding the right and forbidding the evil”
through verbal counsel and warnings. If these measures prove ineffective, the use
of force becomes justified. It is reported that Abū Ḥanīfah encouraged the rebellions
against the Umayyads by Zayd ibn ‘Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn, in the year 122 AH and, later,
against the Abbasids by Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyyah, in the year 143 AH. For
legal and historical details on Abū Ḥanīfah’s opinion, see Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām
al-Qur’ān, 1:86-89; al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh Baghdād. (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb
al-‘Arabī), 13:384-386; Muḥammad Abū Zahrah, Tārīkh al-Madhāhib al-Islāmiyyah.
(Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-‘Arabī, n.d.), 348-349.
106 See Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence, 68-99; Haykal, Al-Jihād, 1: 122; al-Rayyis,
Al-Naẓariyyāt al-Siyāsiyyah, 352-353; Ḥākim al-Muṭayrī, Al-Ḥurriyyah aw al-Ṭūfān.
(2nd ed.). (Beirut: al-Mu’assasah al-‘Arabiyyah li-al-Dirāsāt wa-al-Nashr, 2008), 141-161;
Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Religion and Politics under the Early ‘Abbāsids: The Emergence
of the Proto-Sunnī Elite. (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 70-81; ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Badrī, al-Islām bayna
al-‘Ulamā’ wa-al-Ḥukkām. (Saudi Arabia: al-Maktabah al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1965).
107 See al-Rayyis, Al-Naẓariyyāt al-Siyāsiyyah, 216-219, 338-342. He quotes leading
jurists and theologians who agree that the ruler never has privileges elevating him
above the law or enjoys immunity from being brought to justice. Cf. Muḥammad
Salīm al-‘Awwā, Fī al-Niẓām al-Siyāsī li-al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyyah. (Cairo: Dār
al-Shurūq, 2006), 226-227; al-Muṭayrī, al-Ḥūriyyah aw al-Tūfān, 21-26; Muḥammad
Ra’fat ‘Uthmān, Riyāsat al-Dawlah fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī. (Dubai: Dār al-Qalam, 1986),
435-438; Fatḥī al-Duraynī, Khaṣā’iṣ al-Tashrī‘ al-Islāmī fī al-Siyāsah wa al-Ḥukm.
(Damascus: Mu’assasat al-Risālah, 1987), 183, 344; Ḥasan al-Turābī, al-Siyāysah
wa-al-ḥukm. (Beirut: Arab Scientific Publishers, 2011), 97-120; ‘Alī Ḥasanīn, Riqābat
al-Ummah ‘alā al-Ḥākim. (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1988).
108 The Qur’ān, al-Nisā’: 58.
109 Ibn Kathīr, Al-Bidāyah al-Bidāyah wa, 9: 415.
110 It says, “The caliphate is thirty years, then followed by kingship.” Ibn Ḥanbal,
Al-Musnad, 36: 248. Cf. another tradition, 30: 356. On the difference between
the caliphate and kingship, see Muḥammad ibn Sa‘d, Kitāb al-Tabaqāt al-Kabīr.
(Cairo: al-Khānjī, 2001), 3:285; Ibn Khaldūn, Al-Muqaddimah, 1: 332-334; Abū
al-A‘lā al-Mawdūdī, al-Khilāfah wa al-Mulk, translated into Arabic by Aḥmad Idrīs.
(Kuwait: Dār al-Qalam, 1978).
111 Abū Ya‘lā al-Mawṣilī, Al-Musnad. (2nd ed.). (Damascus: Dār al-Ma’mūn, 1990), 2:
177-178.
112 Al-‘Asqalānī, Fatḥ al-Bārī, 13: 10; Haykal, Al-Jihad, 1: 122.
113 Al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmi‘ al-Ṣaḥīḥ, 4:313; Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 1: 253.
114 Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 4: 68.
115 Ibid., 4: 66.
116 Al-Ghannūshī, Al-Ḥurriyyāt al-‘Ammah fī al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyyah. (Beirut: Markaz
Dirāsāt al-Waḥdah al-‘Arabiyyah, 1993), 183.
117 Al-Nafīsī, ‘Indamā Yaḥkum al-Islām. (Kuwait: Āfāq, 2013), 162.
118 Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, 12: 238; Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 10: 45.
119 Ibid.
120 The primary objective of this distinction is to underscore the pivotal shift in the role
of Islam in state governance and legal frameworks, rather than to imply a static or
unchanging nature within the Islamic historical context. This periodization aims
to draw attention to the transition from an era where Islam was the unifying and
guiding force in governance to an era where secular ideologies took precedence,
fundamentally changing the socio-political dynamics of Muslim societies.
121 Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 1: 278.
122 The Prophet described this phase as a period of kingship that follows the thirty-year
Caliphate. Ibn Ḥanbal, Al-Musnad, 36: 248. This era of kingship was associated with
oppression and despotism. See Abū Ya‘lā al-Mawṣilī, Al-Musnad, 2: 177-178.
123 John Esposito, Islam and Politics. (4th ed.). (New York: Syracuse University Press,
1998), 28.
124 The dissolution of the Ottoman Caliphate precipitated a profound and extensive
transformation in the perception and dynamics of the Arab and Islamic realms.
The subsequent developments and occurrences in these regions during the initial
decades of the twentieth century were significantly shaped by this event. The geopolitical
landscape of the Islamic world underwent fragmentation and dispersal,
with European powers assuming predominant roles in shaping political alignments
and affairs. On the collapse crisis and different responses of thinkers of the Arab
and Muslim world, see Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought. (Kuala
Lumpur, Islamic Book Trust, 2001), 78-103; Muḥammad. M. Ḥusayn, al-Ittijāhāt
al-waṭaniyyah fī al-‘adad al-mu‘āṣir. (3rd ed.). (Cairo: Maktabat al-‘Ādāb, 1980), 2:
5-93; Zakī al-Mīlād, “Ṣadmat zawāl al-khilāfah al-‘Uthmāniyyah fī al-fikr al-Islāmī
fī al-‘ishrīnāt,” al-Ijtihād, no. 45-46 (2000): 275-294.
125 Haykal, Al-Jihād, 1: 138-139.
126 Sonia Alianak’s book Middle Eastern Leaders and Islam: A Precarious Equilibrium.
(New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2007) provides examples of Arab leaders using
Islam for expediency, including King Hussein of Jordan, the Saudi Royal family,
Saddam Hussein, Hafez al-Assad, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni
Mubarak. John Esposito’s The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999) discusses Muammar Qaddafi and Jaafar Nimeiri’s manipulation
of religion. For Tunisian leaders, see Kenneth Perkins’ essay in The Making
of the Tunisian Revolution (2013). On how Saudi Arabia and Iran use Islam in
foreign policy, see Peter Mandaville and Shadi Hamid, “Islam as Statecraft: How
Governments Use Religion in Foreign Policy” Foreign Policy at Brookings, November
2018.
127 Like Qaddafi, who argued that the word “qul” (say) at the beginning of the chapter of
al-Ikhlās and other verses was unnecessary and advocated for its removal. Similarly,
Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia’s first President from 1957 to 1987, actively sought to
undermine Islamic pillars and ridicule Islamic norms and principles. See Muḥammad
al-Zamzamī, Al-Islām al-Jarīḥ fī Tūnis; al-Ghannūshī, Al-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyyah wa
Mas’alat al-Taghyīr. (London: al-Markaz al-Maghāribī, 2000I), 40-41.
128 According to a number of recent media releases, notably from Israeli leaders, and
commentators, the Syrian regime seemed to have been involved in a robust relation
with Israel, and the destiny of the latter heavily depends on the necessary survival
of the former. See evidence at “Al-Ittijāh al-Mu‘ākis.” (January 1, 2016). Al Jazeera.
Retrieved February 8, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XXcp3sNFPks. https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=S2McfT4Gbvw.
129 From a realistic point of view, the majority of jurists recognized the legitimacy
of the usurper who came to power by force rather than through a proper contract.
See Haykal, Al-Jihād, 1: 165-202; al-Mawsū‘ah al-Fiqhiyyah al-Kuwaytiyyah,
“al-Imāmah al-kubrā.” 6: 224-225; Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence, 13, 158;
al-Rayyis, Al-Naẓariyyāt al-Siyāsiyyah, 353-355.
130 Al-Ghannūshī, Al-Ḥurriyyāt al-‘Ammah fī al-Dawlah, 183.
131 Al-Nafīsī, ‘Indamā Yaḥkum al-Islām, 161-163.
132 Ibrāhīm Zayn, the Dean of Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human
Sciences, IIUM, interview by the author, Gombak, Selangor, Malaysia. June 17, 2016.
133 Muḥammad al-Ṭāhir al-Mīsāwī, Associate Professor, Department of Fiqh and Usul
al-Fiqh, IIUM, interview by the author, Gombak, Selangor, Malaysia. January 27,
2017.
134 Ḥākim al-Muṭayrī, Al-Ḥurriyyah aw al-Tūfān, 315-316.
135 Al-Ghannūshī, Al-Ḥurriyyāt al-‘Ammah fī al-Dawlah, 183.
136 Ibid.
137 See these reports in al-Nawawī, Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, 12: 222; Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘
al-Uṣūl, 4: 61-72; al-Bayhaqī, Al-Jāmi‘, 10: 5-30; al-Haythamī, Majma‘ al-Zawā’id,
5:216-225.
138 Ibn Taymiyyah, Minhāj al-Sunnah, 1: 556.
139 A tradition describes the relationship between evil-doing rulers and their subjects
as that which is based on mutual hatred and curse. When the Prophet was asked
whether this tense atmosphere allows rising against those rulers, he answered, “No,
as long as the prayer is maintained.” Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 4:66.
140 Al-Zamakhsharī, Al-Kashshāf, 242.
141 Imam ‘Abd al-Fattah Imam, Thomas Hobbes, (Beirut: Dār al-Tanwīr, 1985), 330.
142 Ibn ‘Asākir, Tārīkh Dimashq. (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1997), 36: 184. See a similar statement
by ‘Abd Allāh ibn Mas‘ūd in al-Ṭabarānī, Al-Mu‘jam al-Kabīr, 10: 162-163. It
is also reported that “A period of sixty years of a tyrant ruler is better than one
night without a sultan.” These reports hint to the fact that peoples’ various affairs
are best run under the state authority headed by the ruler and that order and stability
are normally ensured by the existence of the ruler or leader, whether just or
not. See al-Rayyis, Al-Naẓariyyāt al-Siyāsiyyah, 135-137; al-Māwardī, Al-Aḥkām
al-Sulṭāniyyah, 3.
143 The Prophet is quoted as saying, “The corrupt emirate is better than harj.” When
asked about the meaning of harj, the Prophet replied, “Killing and lying.” Al-Ṭabarānī,
Al-Mu‘jam al-Kabīr, 10:162-163.
144 Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmū‘ Fatāwā ibn Taymiyyah. (al-Manṣūrah, Dār al-Wafā’, 2005),
20: 54.
145 Ibid.
146 Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī, Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn. (Beirut: al-Maktabah al-‘Aṣriyyah,
1990), 1: 150-176.
147 Ibn Khaldūn, Al-Muqaddimah, 1: 277-282. Similarly, Ibn Taymiyyah criticized early
rebellions that, despite noble intentions, proved misguided and led to detrimental
outcomes. See his book Minhāj al-Sunnah, 4: 527-530.
148 Al-Ghannūshī, Al-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyyah, 80.
149 Ibid., 80-81.
150 Ibid., 108.
151 Al-Ḥulaymī, Al-Minhāj, 9: 184.
152 Al-‘Asqalānī, Fatḥ al-Bārī, 13: 8.
1 Thomas Pierret “The Role of the Mosque in the Syrian Revolution,” Near East
Quarterly 7, (2012): 1-5. On the role of the mosque in politics, see Akbar S. Ahmad,
“The Mosque in Politics” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World,
edited by John Esposito. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 3: 140-143.
2 Thomas Pierret, Religion and State in Syria. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2013), 216-234; Jawad Qureshi, “The Discourses of the Damascene Sunni Ulama
During the 2011 Revolution,” St. Andrews Papers on Contemporary Syria 4, no. 1
(2012): 59-91.
3 See these reports in Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, Jāmi‘fi Aḥādīth al-Rasūl. (Damascus:
Maktabat al-Ḥalwānī, 1969), 4: 61-72; al-Nawawī, Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim. (Cairo:
al-Maṭba‘ah al-Miṣriyyah, 1930), 12: 222; Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence
in Islamic Law. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 112-118.
4 Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 4: 61-62.
5 Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 4: 64-65; al-Haythamī, Majma‘ al-Zawā’id. (Cairo:
Maktabat al-Qudsī, 1994), 5: 220. E.g., “Listen and obey even if your back is beaten
and your wealth is taken.” Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 10: 45.
6 Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 4: 64-65; al-Haythamī, Majma‘ al-Zawā’id, 5: 220.
7 Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence, 113.
8 Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 4: 78.
9 Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 1: 253; Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī, Fatḥ al-Bārī. (Riyadh,
1421 AH), 13: 8-10; Muhammad Khayr Haykal, Al-Jihād wa al-Qitāl fī al-Siyāsah
al-Shar‘iyyah. (Beirut: Dār al-Bayāriq, 1996), 1: 122.
10 Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 4: 69-70; al-Haythamī, Majma‘ al-Zawā’id, 5: 219.
11 Plato, The Republic, translated by Benjamin Jowett, (America: Anchor Books, 1980),
63.
12 Aristotle, Politics, translated by Benjamin Jowett, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1920), 1253 a, p. 28.
13 Al-Jāḥiẓ, Rasā’il al-Jāḥiẓ. (Beirut: Maktabat al-Hilāl, 2002), 3: 99.
14 Ibn Abī al-Rabī‘, Sulūk al-Mālik fī Tadbīr al-Mamālik. (Beirut: Dār al-Andalus, 1983),
175.
15 Al-Fārābī, Ārā’ ahl al-Madīnah. (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1985), 117.
16 Ibn Sīnā, Al-Ishārāt wa-al-Tanbīhāt. (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, n.d.), 4: 60-61.
17 Ibn Khaldūn, Al-Muqaddimah. (Tunisia: Dār al-Qayrawān, 2006), 1:69-71.
18 Ibid., 1: 71. For further analysis on security and protection as the original function
of the state, see Lesile Lipson, The Great Issues of Politics: An Introduction to Political
Science. (8th ed.). (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1989), 47-50.
19 ‘Abd Allāh Nāṣīf, Al-Sulṭah al-Siyāsiyyah. (Cairo: Dār al-Nahḍah, 1983), 4.
20 Abū al-Qāsim al-Ṭabarānī, Al-Mu‘jam al-Kabīr. (Cairo: Maktabat Ibn Taymiyyah,
1983), 10:1620163; al-Haythamī, Majma‘ al-Zawā’id, 5: 222.
21 Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī, Al-Jāmi‘ li-Shu‘ab al-Īmān. (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd, 2003),
10:15.
22 Narrated by Abū Dāwūd, and Aḥmad. See al-Shawkānī, Nayl al-Awṭār. (Lebanon:
Bayt al-Afkār, 2004), 1699.
23 Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī, Al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah. (Kuwait: Dār Ibn Qutaybah,
1989), 3.
24 On the necessity of setting up a caliphate, see a detailed explanation and several
quotes of leading jurists in Muḥammad al-Rayyis, Al-Naẓariyyāt al-Siyāsiyyah
al-Islāmiyyah. (7th ed.). (Cairo: Dār al-Turāth, 1976), 128-143.
25 All the Qur’ānic quotations, unless otherwise indicated, are taken from M.A.S. Abdel
Haleem, The Qur’an. (Oxford University Press, 2004).
26 Al-Ṭabarī, Tafsīr al-Ṭabarī. (Cairo: Dār Hajar, 2003), 7: 176-182; al-Qurṭubī, Al-Jāmi‘
li-Aḥkām al-Qur’ān. (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risālah, 2006), 6: 423-433; Ibn al-Qayyim,
I‘lām al-Muwaqqi‘īn ‘an Rabb al-‘Ālamīn. (Riyadh: Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 1423 AH),
2:15-16; Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, Al-Durr al-Manthūr fī al-Tafsīr bi-al-Ma’thūr. (Cairo:
Dār Hajar, 2003), 4: 504-506; Hānī al-Mughallis, Al-Ṭā‘ah al-Siyāsiyyah fī al-Fikr
al-Islāmī. (Virginia: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2014), 112-114.
27 This is Abū Ḥayyān’s preference, who puts an emphasis on the legitimate leadership.
Tafsīr al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ. (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth, 2002), 3: 396; and Muḥammad
al-Ṭāhir ibn ‘Āshūr, Tafsīr al-Taḥrīr wa-al-Tanwīr. (Tunisia: Dār Suḥnūn, 1997), 5:
98; also Muḥammad ‘Abduh, who associates ulū al-amr with ahl al-ḥall wa-al-‘aqd
(emirs, rulers, ulama, military commanders, leaders and so on). Muḥammad Rashīd
Riḍā, Tafsīr al-Manār. (Cairo: al-Manār, 1328 AH), 5: 181. Cf. Sayf al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ
Ismā‘īl, Al-Naẓariyyah al-Siyāsiyyah min Manẓūr Ḥaḍārī Islāmī. (Amman: The
Academic Centre for Political Studies, 2002), 325.
28 Al-Shawkānī, Fatḥ al-Qadīr. (4th ed.). (Beirut: Dār al-Ma‘rifah, 2007), 308.
29 Quoted in al-Mughallis, Al-Ṭā‘ah al-Siyāsiyyah, 112.
30 Ulū al-amr always comes in the plural form. It has no singular that is derived from
the same root. Majd al-Dīn al-Fayrūzabādī, al-Qāmūs al-Muḥīṭ. (8th ed.). (Beirut:
Mu’assasat al-Risālah, 2005), 1349; al-Zabīdī, Tāj al-‘Arūs min Jawāhir al-Qāmūs.
(Kuwait: Wizārat al-Irshād, 1965-2001), 40: 379; al-Qurṭubī, Al-Jāmi‘ li-Aḥkām, 6: 432.
31 It is important to understand the circumstances that accounted for the revelation of the
verse. This contextual information broadens readers’ horizon in terms of specifying
general words, placing limitation to the absolute, and, more importantly, pinpointing
the exact meaning of the verse. The incident that brought about the revelation of
obedience verse serves a practical example of how, when differences of understanding
among leaders and their followers occur, the case should be referred to the guidance
of the Qur’ān and Sunnah. In one of the battles, the emir who has a sense of humor
was trying to test the obedience of his soldiers. So, he asked them to collect pieces
of firewood and set fire to them. Then, when done, he ordered the soldiers to throw
themselves on the fire claiming that his command must be obeyed, according to the
Prophet’s instruction. After moments of reluctance combined with a dispute, the soldiers
decided to disobey the emir and consult the Prophet instead. Later, the Prophet
answered, “If you had entered the fire, you would not have got out of it, for obedience
is only in that which is (legally) valid and reasonable.” The incident is stated in
al-Suyūṭī, Lubāb al-Nuqūl fī Asbāb al-Nuzūl. (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Kutub al-Thaqāfiyyah,
2002), 80-81; al-Wāḥidī, Asbāb al-Nuzūl. (Al-Dammām: Dār al-Iṣlāḥ, 1992), 159.
It is also in al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmi‘ al-Ṣaḥīḥ. (Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Salafiyyah, 1400
AH), 3: 160; Muslim ibn al-Ḥajjāj, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim. (Cairo: al-Maṭba‘ah al-Miṣriyyah,
1930), 12: 223, and other ḥadīth collections, as well as most of the available books of
tafsīr, like al-Qurṭubī, Al-Jāmi‘ li-Aḥkām, 6: 430-431; al-Suyūṭī, Al-Durr al-Manthūr,
4: 502. Cf. al-Mughallis, Al-Ṭā‘ah al-Siyāsiyyah, 189-192. There is another incident
that caused the revelation of the verse. Al-Suyūṭī, Al-Durr al-Manthūr, 4: 502-503. Yet,
according to the rules of the science of ḥadīth, it is rejected for several methodological
flaws. See al-Wāḥidī, Asbāb al-Nuzūl, 159-160 (editor’s footnote). In the light of the
story, the verse directs that when a dispute arises among the ruler and the ruled,
a referral is to be passed to Allah and His messenger. As a result, obedience to ulū
al-amr “applies to that which is known of God’s law, that which is not covered by a
statement of prohibition and that which is not subject to prohibition when referred
to God’s law.” Sayyid Quṭb, In the Shade of the Qur’an. Translated into English by
‘Ādil Ṣalāḥī. (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation. 2004), 3:166.
32 The jurist Ibn al-Qayyim, quoting the obedience verse, puts the question of obedience
in a new fashion. He argues that the duty to obey the ruler is derived from
the duty to obey jurists, and the duty to obey the jurists is derived from the duty
to obey the Prophet. Therefore, the jurists are obeyed to the extent that they obey
the Prophet, and the rulers are obeyed to the extent that they obey the jurists.
Ultimately, the jurists are the ones who must be obeyed, as they are the experts
on the religious law. Ibn al-Qayyim, I‘lām al-Muwaqqi‘īn, 2:16. Cf. Abou El Fadl,
Rebellion and Violence, 130-131.
33 “God commands you [people] to return things entrusted to you to their rightful
owners, and, if you judge between people, to do so with justice: God’s instructions
to you are excellent, for He hears and sees everything” (Al-Nisā’: 58).
34 Features of ulū al-amr are clearly highlighted in Qur’ānic exegeses, such as Abū
al-Qāsim al-Zamakhsharī, Al-Kashshāf ‘an Ḥaqā’iq al-Tanzīl. (3rd ed.). (Beirut: Dār
al-Ma‘rifah, 2009), 242; al-Qurṭubī, Al-Jāmi‘ li-Aḥkām, 6: 423, 428-430; al-Shawkānī,
Fatḥ al-Qadīr, 308; Muḥammad Abū al-Su‘ūd, Irshād al-‘Aql al-Salīm. (Beirut: Dār
Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-‘Arabī, n.d.), 2: 193; and Ibn ‘Āshūr, Tafsīr al-Taḥrīr, 5: 96.
35 Al-Zamakhsharī, Al-Kashshāf, 242. Abū al-Su‘ūd, 2: 193. For other similar commentators’
statements excluding corrupt rulers from ulū al-amr, see al-Mughallis,
Al-Ṭā‘ah al-Siyāsiyyah, 112-114.
36 Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī, Al-Jāmi‘, 10: 15; Ibn Abī Shaybah, Al-Muṣannaf, 14: 305.
37 See Shāṭibī, al-I‘tiṣām. (Amman: Dār al-Athariyyah, 2008), 3: 294-311; Ibn Ḥajar
al-‘Asqalānī, Fatḥ al-Bārī, 13: 37. Al-Shāṭibī identifies the imam of al-jamā‘ah as
one who is dedicated to adhering to the Qur’ān and the Sunnah. Al-I‘tiṣām, 3: 311.
38 Ismā‘īl Ibn Kathīr, Al-Bidāyah wa-al-Nihāyah. (Cairo: Dār Hajar, 1998), 11:148.
39 Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, 12: 242.
40 See al-Faḍl Shalaq, “al-Jamā‘ah wa-al-Dawlah,” al-Ijtihād, no. 3 (1989): 55; 66-67.
41 Al-Jāḥiẓ, Rasā’il…, 3: 99. Cf. al-Māwardī, Adab al-Dunyā wa-al-Dīn. (Beirut: Dār
Iqra’, 1985), 149.
42 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978),
1, 6.
43 See these traditions in al-Haythamī, Majma‘ al-Zawā’id, 5:215-225; Abū ‘Abd Allāh
al-Ḥulaymī, Al-Minhāj fī Sshu‘ab al-Imān. (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd, 2003), 3:179.
44 Abū Ja‘far al-Ṭabarī, Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī. (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 1962), 3:207.
45 Edward William Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1968), 6:
2334; L. Gardet, “FITNA,” in C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, G. Lecomte
(eds.), The Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden: Brill, new ed., 1986- 2004), 2: 930-931.
46 Elsaid M. Badawi and Muhammad Abdel Haleem, Arabic-English Dictionary of
Qur’anic Usage (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 692. The fitnah in the Qur’ān has twelve meanings.
Majid al-Dīn al-Fayrūzabādī, Basā’ir Dhawī al-Tamyīz (Cairo: Al-Majlis al-A‘lā
li al-Shu’ūn al-Islamiyyah, 1992), 4: 166-169.
47 Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon, 6: 2334.
48 Al-Jurjānī, Al-Ta‘rīfāt (Cairo: Dār al-Fadīlah, 2004), 138.
49 Ibrāhīm Salqīnī, Qitāl al-Fitna bayn al-Muslimīn (Damascus: al-Nawādir, 2012),
42-46.
50 http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/fitna.
51 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/fitna.
52 Al-Nawawī, Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, 12: 222; Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 4: 61-72; Abou
El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence, 112-118.
53 Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 10, 45.
54 Ibid., 4: 69-70; al-Haythamī, Majma‘ al-Zawā’id, 5: 219.
55 Al-Ṭabarānī, Al-Mu‘jam al-Kabīr, 10: 162-163.
56 Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 10, 3-101.
57 Al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmi‘ al-Ṣaḥīḥ, 4: 312-327.
58 Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, 2207-2271.
59 Al-Haythamī, Majma‘ al-Zawā’id, 7: 220-350.
60 Al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmi‘ al-Ṣaḥīḥ, 4: 312-327.
61 Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, 2207-2271.
62 Abū Dāwūd, Sunan Abū Dāwūd (Jeddah: Dār al-Qiblah, 1998), 5: 5-28.
63 Al-Tirmidhī, Sunan al-Tirmidhī (Beirut: Dār al-Risālah al- ‘Ālamiyyah, 2002), 4:
233-318.
64 Ibn Mājah, Sunan Ibn Mājah (Cairo: al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, n.d.), 1295-1371. Note that
the Book of al-Sunan by al-Nasā’ī is excluded because it lacks a chapter on al-Fitan
and does not reference ḥadīths concerning fitnah and sedition.
65 Al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmi‘ al-Ṣaḥīḥ, 4: 312-327; Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, 2207-2271.
66 Al-‘Asqalānī, Fatiḥ al-Bārī, 13, 34; Haykal, Al-Jihad, 1: 146.
67 Ibid.
68 Haykal, Al-Jihad,1: 146-147; Salqīnī, Qitāl al-Fitna, 203.
69 Ibid.
70 Haykal, Al-Jihad, 1: 146; Kāmil Rabbā‘, Naẓariyyat al-Khurūj fī al-Fiqh al-Siyāsī
al-Islamī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2004), 194.
71 Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qur’ān (Beirut: Dār Ihyā’ al-Turāth, 1992), 5: 282;
Jamāl Abū Farḥah, Al-Khurūj ‘alā al-Ḥākim fī al-Fikr al-Siyāsī al-Islamī (Cairo:
Markaz al-Ḥadārah al-‘Arabiyyah, 2004), 62; Salqīnī, Qitāl al-Fitna, 207; Haykal,
Al-Jihad, 1: 146.
72 Abū Farḥah, Al-Khurūj, 62.
73 Salqīnī, Qitāl al-Fitna, 114; cf. Al-‘Asqalānī, Fatḥ al-Bārī, 13: 35.
74 Abū Dāwūd, Sunan, 5: 12; Ibn Abū Shaybah, Al-Muṣannaf, 21: 29.
75 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qur’ān, 2: 320.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 James Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2015), 4-7, 25-27.
79 Al-Kawākibī, Ṭabā’i‘ al-‘Istibdād (Cairo: Kalimāt ‘Arabiyya, 2011), 118.
80 Ibid.
81 Al-Raysūnī, Fiqh al-Thawrah (Cairo: Dār al-Kalimah, 2013), 39.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., 38. See more similar citations in al-Mughallis, Al-Ṭā‘ah al-Siyāsiyyah, 255-257.
University), 1: 547.
90 On the nature of the sultanate states and their social system, see al-Faḍl Shalaq,
“al-Kharāj wa-al-Iqṭā‘ wa-al-Dawlah,” al-Ijtihād, no. 1 (1988): 152-174. On discussion
about their legal status and the political realism of Islamic law, see al-Māwardī,
Al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah, 44; al-Faḍl Shalaq, “al-Faqīh wa-al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyyah:
Dirāsah fī Kutub al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah,” al-Ijtihād, no. 3 (1989): 15-101. See also
Riḍwān al-Sayyid, “Ru’yat al-khilāfah wa Bunyat al-Dawlah fī al-Islām,” al-Ijtihād, no.
13 (1991): 39-45; and Ibrāhīm Bayḍūn, “al-Mamālīk wa Ma’ziq al-Shar‘iyyah,” al-Ijtihād,
no. 22 (1994): 39-55; Omid Safi, The Politics of Knowledge in Premodern Islam: Negotiating
Ideology and Religious Inquiry. (The University of North Carolina Press, 2006).
91 Shalaq, “al-Jamā‘ah wa al-Dawlah,” 71-80.
92 Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, Al-Musnad. (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risālah, 1993-2001), 1:333;
al-Rayyis, Al-Naẓariyyāt al-Siyāsiyyah, 358-359. Other similar traditions are in Ibn
al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 8:416; al-Haythamī, Majma‘ al-Zawā’id, 5: 225-229.
93 See, for example, Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, 12: 211-230; al-Tirmidhī, Sunan al-Tirmidhī.
(Beirut: Dār al-Risālah, 2002), 3: 500-503; al-Nasā’ī, Sunan al-Nasā’ī. (Amman:
Bayt al-Afkār al-Dawliyyah, n.d.), 437-442; Ibn Mājah, Sunan Ibn Mājah. (Cairo:
Bābī al-Ḥalabī, n.d.), 954-955; al-Haythamī, Majma‘ al-Zawā’id, 5:207-231; al-Bayhaqī,
Al-Jāmi‘, 9: 459; 10: 82; Ibn Ḥibbān, Ṣaḥīḥ Ibn Ḥibbān. (Damascus: Mu’assasat
al-Risālah, 1993), 10: 411-431.
94 Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 1: 253.
95 Ibn Ḥanbal, Al-Musnad, 31: 125; Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 1: 333.
96 Muḥammad al-Ḥākim, Al-Mustadrak. (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥaramayn, 1997), 3: 234.
97 See examples in al-Rayyis, Al-Naẓariyyāt al-Siyāsiyyah, 355-358.
98 Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, 12: 238; Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 10: 45.
99 Abū Farḥah, Al-Khurūj, 31.
100 Thomas Arnold, The Caliphate. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924), 47.
101 Ibid., 48-50.
102 William Muir, The Caliphate. (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1915), 600.
103 Duncan B. MacDonald, Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence, and
Constitutional Theory. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1903), 58.
104 Quoted in Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence, 12.
105 Abū Ḥanīfah, the renowned jurist, sanctions rebellion against corrupt rulers, asserting
the obligation to engage in “commanding the right and forbidding the evil”
through verbal counsel and warnings. If these measures prove ineffective, the use
of force becomes justified. It is reported that Abū Ḥanīfah encouraged the rebellions
against the Umayyads by Zayd ibn ‘Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn, in the year 122 AH and, later,
against the Abbasids by Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyyah, in the year 143 AH. For
legal and historical details on Abū Ḥanīfah’s opinion, see Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām
al-Qur’ān, 1:86-89; al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh Baghdād. (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb
al-‘Arabī), 13:384-386; Muḥammad Abū Zahrah, Tārīkh al-Madhāhib al-Islāmiyyah.
(Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-‘Arabī, n.d.), 348-349.
106 See Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence, 68-99; Haykal, Al-Jihād, 1: 122; al-Rayyis,
Al-Naẓariyyāt al-Siyāsiyyah, 352-353; Ḥākim al-Muṭayrī, Al-Ḥurriyyah aw al-Ṭūfān.
(2nd ed.). (Beirut: al-Mu’assasah al-‘Arabiyyah li-al-Dirāsāt wa-al-Nashr, 2008), 141-161;
Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Religion and Politics under the Early ‘Abbāsids: The Emergence
of the Proto-Sunnī Elite. (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 70-81; ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Badrī, al-Islām bayna
al-‘Ulamā’ wa-al-Ḥukkām. (Saudi Arabia: al-Maktabah al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1965).
107 See al-Rayyis, Al-Naẓariyyāt al-Siyāsiyyah, 216-219, 338-342. He quotes leading
jurists and theologians who agree that the ruler never has privileges elevating him
above the law or enjoys immunity from being brought to justice. Cf. Muḥammad
Salīm al-‘Awwā, Fī al-Niẓām al-Siyāsī li-al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyyah. (Cairo: Dār
al-Shurūq, 2006), 226-227; al-Muṭayrī, al-Ḥūriyyah aw al-Tūfān, 21-26; Muḥammad
Ra’fat ‘Uthmān, Riyāsat al-Dawlah fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī. (Dubai: Dār al-Qalam, 1986),
435-438; Fatḥī al-Duraynī, Khaṣā’iṣ al-Tashrī‘ al-Islāmī fī al-Siyāsah wa al-Ḥukm.
(Damascus: Mu’assasat al-Risālah, 1987), 183, 344; Ḥasan al-Turābī, al-Siyāysah
wa-al-ḥukm. (Beirut: Arab Scientific Publishers, 2011), 97-120; ‘Alī Ḥasanīn, Riqābat
al-Ummah ‘alā al-Ḥākim. (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1988).
108 The Qur’ān, al-Nisā’: 58.
109 Ibn Kathīr, Al-Bidāyah al-Bidāyah wa, 9: 415.
110 It says, “The caliphate is thirty years, then followed by kingship.” Ibn Ḥanbal,
Al-Musnad, 36: 248. Cf. another tradition, 30: 356. On the difference between
the caliphate and kingship, see Muḥammad ibn Sa‘d, Kitāb al-Tabaqāt al-Kabīr.
(Cairo: al-Khānjī, 2001), 3:285; Ibn Khaldūn, Al-Muqaddimah, 1: 332-334; Abū
al-A‘lā al-Mawdūdī, al-Khilāfah wa al-Mulk, translated into Arabic by Aḥmad Idrīs.
(Kuwait: Dār al-Qalam, 1978).
111 Abū Ya‘lā al-Mawṣilī, Al-Musnad. (2nd ed.). (Damascus: Dār al-Ma’mūn, 1990), 2:
177-178.
112 Al-‘Asqalānī, Fatḥ al-Bārī, 13: 10; Haykal, Al-Jihad, 1: 122.
113 Al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmi‘ al-Ṣaḥīḥ, 4:313; Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 1: 253.
114 Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 4: 68.
115 Ibid., 4: 66.
116 Al-Ghannūshī, Al-Ḥurriyyāt al-‘Ammah fī al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyyah. (Beirut: Markaz
Dirāsāt al-Waḥdah al-‘Arabiyyah, 1993), 183.
117 Al-Nafīsī, ‘Indamā Yaḥkum al-Islām. (Kuwait: Āfāq, 2013), 162.
118 Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, 12: 238; Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 10: 45.
119 Ibid.
120 The primary objective of this distinction is to underscore the pivotal shift in the role
of Islam in state governance and legal frameworks, rather than to imply a static or
unchanging nature within the Islamic historical context. This periodization aims
to draw attention to the transition from an era where Islam was the unifying and
guiding force in governance to an era where secular ideologies took precedence,
fundamentally changing the socio-political dynamics of Muslim societies.
121 Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 1: 278.
122 The Prophet described this phase as a period of kingship that follows the thirty-year
Caliphate. Ibn Ḥanbal, Al-Musnad, 36: 248. This era of kingship was associated with
oppression and despotism. See Abū Ya‘lā al-Mawṣilī, Al-Musnad, 2: 177-178.
123 John Esposito, Islam and Politics. (4th ed.). (New York: Syracuse University Press,
1998), 28.
124 The dissolution of the Ottoman Caliphate precipitated a profound and extensive
transformation in the perception and dynamics of the Arab and Islamic realms.
The subsequent developments and occurrences in these regions during the initial
decades of the twentieth century were significantly shaped by this event. The geopolitical
landscape of the Islamic world underwent fragmentation and dispersal,
with European powers assuming predominant roles in shaping political alignments
and affairs. On the collapse crisis and different responses of thinkers of the Arab
and Muslim world, see Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought. (Kuala
Lumpur, Islamic Book Trust, 2001), 78-103; Muḥammad. M. Ḥusayn, al-Ittijāhāt
al-waṭaniyyah fī al-‘adad al-mu‘āṣir. (3rd ed.). (Cairo: Maktabat al-‘Ādāb, 1980), 2:
5-93; Zakī al-Mīlād, “Ṣadmat zawāl al-khilāfah al-‘Uthmāniyyah fī al-fikr al-Islāmī
fī al-‘ishrīnāt,” al-Ijtihād, no. 45-46 (2000): 275-294.
125 Haykal, Al-Jihād, 1: 138-139.
126 Sonia Alianak’s book Middle Eastern Leaders and Islam: A Precarious Equilibrium.
(New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2007) provides examples of Arab leaders using
Islam for expediency, including King Hussein of Jordan, the Saudi Royal family,
Saddam Hussein, Hafez al-Assad, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni
Mubarak. John Esposito’s The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999) discusses Muammar Qaddafi and Jaafar Nimeiri’s manipulation
of religion. For Tunisian leaders, see Kenneth Perkins’ essay in The Making
of the Tunisian Revolution (2013). On how Saudi Arabia and Iran use Islam in
foreign policy, see Peter Mandaville and Shadi Hamid, “Islam as Statecraft: How
Governments Use Religion in Foreign Policy” Foreign Policy at Brookings, November
2018.
127 Like Qaddafi, who argued that the word “qul” (say) at the beginning of the chapter of
al-Ikhlās and other verses was unnecessary and advocated for its removal. Similarly,
Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia’s first President from 1957 to 1987, actively sought to
undermine Islamic pillars and ridicule Islamic norms and principles. See Muḥammad
al-Zamzamī, Al-Islām al-Jarīḥ fī Tūnis; al-Ghannūshī, Al-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyyah wa
Mas’alat al-Taghyīr. (London: al-Markaz al-Maghāribī, 2000I), 40-41.
128 According to a number of recent media releases, notably from Israeli leaders, and
commentators, the Syrian regime seemed to have been involved in a robust relation
with Israel, and the destiny of the latter heavily depends on the necessary survival
of the former. See evidence at “Al-Ittijāh al-Mu‘ākis.” (January 1, 2016). Al Jazeera.
Retrieved February 8, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XXcp3sNFPks. https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=S2McfT4Gbvw.
129 From a realistic point of view, the majority of jurists recognized the legitimacy
of the usurper who came to power by force rather than through a proper contract.
See Haykal, Al-Jihād, 1: 165-202; al-Mawsū‘ah al-Fiqhiyyah al-Kuwaytiyyah,
“al-Imāmah al-kubrā.” 6: 224-225; Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence, 13, 158;
al-Rayyis, Al-Naẓariyyāt al-Siyāsiyyah, 353-355.
130 Al-Ghannūshī, Al-Ḥurriyyāt al-‘Ammah fī al-Dawlah, 183.
131 Al-Nafīsī, ‘Indamā Yaḥkum al-Islām, 161-163.
132 Ibrāhīm Zayn, the Dean of Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human
Sciences, IIUM, interview by the author, Gombak, Selangor, Malaysia. June 17, 2016.
133 Muḥammad al-Ṭāhir al-Mīsāwī, Associate Professor, Department of Fiqh and Usul
al-Fiqh, IIUM, interview by the author, Gombak, Selangor, Malaysia. January 27,
2017.
134 Ḥākim al-Muṭayrī, Al-Ḥurriyyah aw al-Tūfān, 315-316.
135 Al-Ghannūshī, Al-Ḥurriyyāt al-‘Ammah fī al-Dawlah, 183.
136 Ibid.
137 See these reports in al-Nawawī, Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, 12: 222; Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘
al-Uṣūl, 4: 61-72; al-Bayhaqī, Al-Jāmi‘, 10: 5-30; al-Haythamī, Majma‘ al-Zawā’id,
5:216-225.
138 Ibn Taymiyyah, Minhāj al-Sunnah, 1: 556.
139 A tradition describes the relationship between evil-doing rulers and their subjects
as that which is based on mutual hatred and curse. When the Prophet was asked
whether this tense atmosphere allows rising against those rulers, he answered, “No,
as long as the prayer is maintained.” Ibn al-Athīr, Jāmi‘ al-Uṣūl, 4:66.
140 Al-Zamakhsharī, Al-Kashshāf, 242.
141 Imam ‘Abd al-Fattah Imam, Thomas Hobbes, (Beirut: Dār al-Tanwīr, 1985), 330.
142 Ibn ‘Asākir, Tārīkh Dimashq. (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1997), 36: 184. See a similar statement
by ‘Abd Allāh ibn Mas‘ūd in al-Ṭabarānī, Al-Mu‘jam al-Kabīr, 10: 162-163. It
is also reported that “A period of sixty years of a tyrant ruler is better than one
night without a sultan.” These reports hint to the fact that peoples’ various affairs
are best run under the state authority headed by the ruler and that order and stability
are normally ensured by the existence of the ruler or leader, whether just or
not. See al-Rayyis, Al-Naẓariyyāt al-Siyāsiyyah, 135-137; al-Māwardī, Al-Aḥkām
al-Sulṭāniyyah, 3.
143 The Prophet is quoted as saying, “The corrupt emirate is better than harj.” When
asked about the meaning of harj, the Prophet replied, “Killing and lying.” Al-Ṭabarānī,
Al-Mu‘jam al-Kabīr, 10:162-163.
144 Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmū‘ Fatāwā ibn Taymiyyah. (al-Manṣūrah, Dār al-Wafā’, 2005),
20: 54.
145 Ibid.
146 Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī, Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn. (Beirut: al-Maktabah al-‘Aṣriyyah,
1990), 1: 150-176.
147 Ibn Khaldūn, Al-Muqaddimah, 1: 277-282. Similarly, Ibn Taymiyyah criticized early
rebellions that, despite noble intentions, proved misguided and led to detrimental
outcomes. See his book Minhāj al-Sunnah, 4: 527-530.
148 Al-Ghannūshī, Al-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyyah, 80.
149 Ibid., 80-81.
150 Ibid., 108.
151 Al-Ḥulaymī, Al-Minhāj, 9: 184.
152 Al-‘Asqalānī, Fatḥ al-Bārī, 13: 8.
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Bakour, B. (2025). Reconceptualizing Political Obedience in Islamic Thought: An Analytical Study of Ḥadīth Literature. American Journal of Islam and Society, 42(1-2), 6–41. https://doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v42i1-2.3428
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